§3. Of fimple and complex terms, 4. Of words common and proper, 5. Of concrete and abftract terms, 6. Of univocal and equivocal words, CHAP. V. General directions relating to our ideas, 69 §. 1. Of acquiring a treasure of ideas, 2. Of retaining ideas in memory, 4. Of the government of our thoughts, CHAP. VI. Special rules to direct our concep- 1. Of gaining clear and diftinct ideas, 98 105 гоб § 9 Of a comprehenfive conception of things, 6. Obfervations concerning the definition of 7. Of a complete conception of things, 8. Of divifion, and the rules of it, The Second Part, namely, Of Judgment 2. Of affirmative and negative propofitions, 136 3. Of the oppofition and conversion of pro- 4. Of pure and moral propofitions, CHAP. III. The fprings of falfe judgment, or the 1. Prejudices arifing from things, 2. Prejudices arifing from words, 3. Prejudices arifing from ourselves, 4. Prejudices arifing from other persons, The Third Part, namely, Of Reasoning CHAP. I. Of the nature of a fyllogifm, and of with particular rules relating to them, 237 § Of univerfal and particular fyllogifms, both negative and affirmative, § 2. Of plain, fimple fyllogifms and their 7. Of the middle terms, of common places or topics, and invention of arguments, 155 2. Two general tefts of true fyllogifms, and methods of folving all fophifms, The Fourth Part, namely, Of Method. CHAP. I. The nature and kinds of method, viz. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL SCHEME. OGIC of REASON * well in our Linquiries after truth, and the communication of it to others. REASON is the glory of human nature, and one of the chief eminencies whereby we are raised above our fellow-creatures, the brutes, in this lower world. Reafon, as to the power and principle of it, is the common gift of God to all men, though all are not favoured with it by nature in an equal degree; but the acquired improvements of it in different men, make a much greater diftinction between them than nature had made. I could even venture to say, that the improvement of reafon hath raised the learned and the prudent in the European world, almost as much above the Hottentots, and other favages of Africa, as those favages are by nature fuperior to the birds, the beafts, and the fishes. Now the defign of Logic is to teach us the right ufe of our reafon, or intellectual powers, and the improvement of them in ourselves and others? This is not only neceffary in order to attain any competent knowledge in the fciences, or the affairs of learning but to govern both the greater and the meaner actions of life. It is the cultivation of our reason by which we are better enabled to distinguish good from evil, as well *The word Reafon in this place is not confined to the mere fa culty of reafoning, or inferring onc thing from another, but includes all the intellectual powers of man. B as truth from falfehood; and both these are matters of the highest importance, whether we regard this life, or the life to come. The purfuit and acquifition of truth is of infinite concernment to mankind. Hereby we become acquainted with the name of things both in heaven and earth, and their various relations to each other. It is by this means we difcover our duty to God and our fellow-creatures; by this we arrive at the knowledge of natural religion, and learn to confirm our faith in divine revelation, as well as to understand what is revealed. Our wifdom, prudence, and piety, our prefent conduct and our future hope, are all influenced by the ufe of our rational powers in the fearch after truth. There are feveral things that make it very neceffary that our reason fhould have fome affiftance in the exercife or use of it. The first is, the depth and difficulty of many truths and the weakness of our reafon to fee far into things at once, and penetrate to the bottom of them. It was a faying among the ancients, Veritas in puteo, truth lies in a well; and, to carry on this metaphor, we may very juftly fay, that logic does, as it were, fupply us with fteps whereby we may go down to reach the water or it frames the links of a chain, whereby we may draw the water up from the bottom. Thus, by the means of many reafonings well connected together, philofophers in our age have drawn a thoufand truths out of the depths of darkness, which our fathers were utterly unacquainted with. Another thing that makes it neceffary for our reafon to have fome affiftance given it, is the difguife and falfe colours in which many things appear to us in this prefent imperfect state. There area thousand things which are not in reality what they appear to be, and that both in the natural and moral world; fo that the sun appears to be flat as a plate of filver, and to be less than twelve inches in diameter; the moon appears to be as big as the fun; and the rainbow appears to be a large fubftantial arch in the fky; all which are in reality grofs falfehoods. So knavery puts on the face of justice; hypocrify and fuperftition wear the vizard of piety, |