kind according to their civil characters into the rulers and the ruled and a phyfician divides them into the fick or the healthy; but a divine distributes them into Turks, Heathens, Jews, or Chriftians.

Here note, that it is a very ufeless thing to diftribute any idea into fuch kinds or members as have no different properties to be spoken of; as it is mere trifling to divide right angles into fuch whofe legs are equal, and whofe legs are unequal, for as to the mere right angle they have no different properties.

VI. Rule. In all your diftributions obferve the nature of things with great exactness; and do not affect any parti cular form of diftribution, as fome perfons have done, by dividing every genus into two fpecies, or into three fpecies; whereas nature is infinitely various, and human affairs and human fciences have as great a variety, nor is there any one form of distribution that will exactly fuit with all fubjects.

Note, it is to this doctrine of diftribution of a genus into its feveral fpecies, we must also refer the distribution of a cause according to its several effects, as some medicines are heating, fome are cooling; or an effect, when it is diftinguifhed by its caufes, as faith is either built upon divine teftimony or human. It is to this head we refer particular artificial bodies, when they are diftinguished according to the matter they are made of, as a statue is either of brass, of marble, or wood, &c. and any other beings, when they are diftinguished according to their end and defign, as the furniture of body or mind is either for ornament or ufe. To this head alfo we refer fubjects when they are divided according to their modes or accidents; as men are either merry or grave, or fad; and modes, when they are divided by their fubjects, as diftempers belong to the fluids, or to the folid parts of the animal.

It is alfo to this place we reduce the propofals of a dfficulty under its various cafes, whether it be in speculation or practice; as to fhew the reafon of fun-beams burning wood, whether it be done by a convex glass of a concave, or to fhew the conftruction and menfuration of triangles, whether you have two angles and a fide given, or two fides and an angle, or only three

fades. Here it is neceffary to diftribute or divide a difficulty into all its cafes, in order to gain a perfect knowledge of the fubject you contemplate.

It might be obferved here, that logicians have fometimes given a mark or fign to diftinguifh when it is an integral whole, that is divided into its parts or members, or when it is a genus, an univerfal whole, that is dif tributed into its fpecies and individuals. The rule they give is this: whenfoever the whole idea can be directly and properly affirmed of each part, as a bird is an animal, a fifh is an animal; Bucephalus is a horses Peter is a man; then it is a diftribution of a genus into its fpecies, or a fpecies into its individuals: but when the whole cannot be thus directly affirmed concerning every part, then it is a divifion of an integral into its feveral fpecies or members; as we cannot fay the head, the breaft, the hand, or the foot is an animal, but we fay, the head is a part of the animal, and the foot is another part.

This rule may hold true generally in corporeal beings, or perhaps in all fubftances: but when we say the fear of God is wifdom, and fo is human civility: criticism is true learning, and fo is philofophy: to execute a murderer is justice, and to fave and defend the innocent is juftice too: in these cafes it is not fo easily determined, whether an integral whole be divided into its parts, or an univerfal into its fpecies: for the fear of God may be called either one part, or one kind of wifdom: criticism is one part, or one kind of learning; and the execution of a murderer may be called a species of justice as well as part of it. Nor indeed is it a matter of great importance to determine this controverly.

ht

THE

SECT. XI.

Of an orderly Conception of Things.

HE laft rule to direct our conceptions is that we fhould rank and place them in a proper method and juit order. This is of neceffary ufe to prevent L

confufion; for as a trader who never places his goods in his fhop or warehouse in a regular order, nor keeps the accounts of his buying and felling, paying and receiving in a juft method, is in utmost danger of plunging all his affairs into confufion and ruin; so a student who is in the search of truth, or an author or teacher who communicates knowledge to others, will very much obstruct his defign, and confound his own mind or the mind of his hearers, unless he range his ideas in just order

If we would therefore become successful learners or teachers, we muft not conceive of things in a confused heap, but difpofe our ideas in fome certain method, which may be most easy and useful both for the underftanding and memory; and be fure as much as may be to follow the nature of things, for which many rules might be given, viz.

1. Conceive as much as you can of the effentials of any subject, before you confider its accidentals.

2. Survey first the general parts and properties of any fubject, before you extend your thoughts to discourse of the particular kind or fpecies of it.

3. Contemplate things firft in their own fimple natures, and afterwards view them in compofition with other things; unless it be your present purpose to take a compound being to pieces, in order to find out or to fhew the nature of it by fearching and difcovering of what fimples it is compofed.

4. Confider the abfolute modes or affections of any being as it is in itself, before you proceed to confider it relatively, or to furvey the various relations in which it ftands to other beings, &c.

Note, Thefe rules chiefly belong to the method of inftruction which the learned call fynthetic.

But in the regulation of our ideas their is feldom an abfolute neceffity that we fhould place them in this or the other particular method: it is poffible in fome cafes that many methods may be equally good, that is, may equally affiit the understanding and the memory: to frame a method exquifitely accurate, according to the ftrict nature of things, and to maintain 'this accuracy from the beginning to the end of a treatife, is a most

rare and difficult thing, if not impoffible. But a larger account of method would be very improper in this place, left we anticipate what belongs to the fourth part of logic..

I'

SECT. XII..

The five Rules of Conception examplified.

T may be ufeful here to give a fpecimen of the five fpecial rules to direct our conceptions, which have been the fubject of this long chapter, and reprefent them practically in one view.

Suppose the theme of our difcourfe were the paffions of the mind.

It To gain a clear and diftinct idea of paffion, we must define both the name and the thing.

To begin with the definition of the name we are not here to understand the word paffion in its vulgar and most limited fenfe, as it fignifies merely anger or fury; nor do we take it in its moft extenfive philofophical fenfe, for the fuftaining the action of an agent; but in the more limited philofophical fenfe, paffions fignify the various affections of the mind, fuch as admiration, love or hatred; this is the definition of the name..

We proceed to the definition of the thing, paffion is defined a fenfation of fome special commotion in animal nature, occafioned by the mind's perception of fome object fuited to excite that commotion.* Here.

* Since this was written, I have published a short treatife of the paffions, wherein I have fo far varied from this definition as to call them fenfible commotions of our whole nature, both foul and body, occafioned by the mind's perception of the objects, &c. I made this alteration in the defcription of the paffions in that book, chiefly to include in a more explicite manner the paffions of defire and averfion which are acts of volition rather than fenfations. Yet fince fome commotions of animal nature attend all the paffions, and fince there is always a fenfation of these commotions, I fhall not change the definition I have written here: for this will agree to all the paffions whether they include any act of volition or not; nor indeed is the matter of any great importance. Nov. 17, 1738..

the genus or general nature of paffion is a fenfation of fome fpecial commotion in animal nature; and herein it agrees with hunger, thirft, pain, &c. The effential difference of it is, that this commotion arifes from a thought or perception of the mind, and hereby it is. diftinguished from hunger, thirst, or pain.

2dly, We must conceive of it completely, or furvey the feveral parts that compofe it. Thefe are (1.) The mind's perception of fome object.. (2.) The confequent ruffle or special commotions of the nerves, and blood, and animal fpirits. And (3.) The fenfation of this inward commotion.

3dly, We must confider it comprehenfively in its various properties. The most effential attributes that make up its nature has been already mentioned under the foregoing heads. Some of the most confiderable properties that remain are thefe, viz. That paffion belongs to all mankind in greater or leffer degrees: it is not conftantly prefent with us, but upon fome certain occafions: it is appointed by our Creator for various ufeful ends and purposes, viz. to give us vigour in the purfuit of what is good and agreeable to us, or in the avoidance of what is hurtful: it is very proper for our state of trial in this world: It is not utterly to be rooted out of our nature, but to be moderated and governed according to rules of virtue and religion, &c.

4thly, We must take cognizance of the various kinds of it, which is called an extenfive conception of it. If the object which the mind perceives be very uncom mon, it excites the paffion of admiration: if the object appear agreeable it raifes love: if the agreeable object be abfent and attainable it is defirable: if likely to be obtained, it excites hope: if unattainable despair: if it be prefent and poffeffed, it is the paffion of joy: if loft, it excites forrow; if the object be difagreeable it caufes in general hatred or averfion; if it be absent and yet we are in danger of it, it raises our fear: if it be prefent, it is forrow and faduefs, &c.

5thly, All these things and many more which go to compofe a treatife on this fubject must be placed in their proper order: a flight specimen of which is.exhibited in this fhort account of paffion, and which that