But when it concludes alfo the way and manner wherein the predicate is connected with the fubject, it is called a modal propofition; as, when I fay, it is neceflary that a true christian should be an honest man.

Logical writers generally make the modality of this propofition to belong to the copula, because it fhews the manner of the connection between subject and predicate. But if the form of the fentence as a logical propofition be duly confidered, the mode itself is the very predicate of the propofition, and it muft run thus: that a true christian fhould be an honest man is a neceffary thing, and then the whole primary propofition is included in the fubject of the modal propofition.

There are four modes of connecting the predicate with the subject, which are usually reckoned up on this pccafion (viz.) Neceflity and contingency which are two opponites, poffibility and impoflibility which are alio two oppofites; as, it is neceffary that a globe fhould be round; that a globe be made of wood or glafs is an unneceffary or contingent thing: it is impoffible that a globe fhould be fquare: it is impoffible that a globe hould be of water.

With regard to the modal propofitions which the schools have introduced, I would make these two remarks:

Remark 1. These propofitions in English are formed by the refolution of the words, muft be, might not be, can be, and cannot be, unto thofe more explicate forms of a logical copula and predicate, is neceffary, is contingent, is poffible, is impoffible; for it is neceffary that a globe fhould be round, fignifies no more than that a globe must be round.

Remark 2. Let it be noted that this quadruple modality is only an enumeration of the natural modes or manners wherein the predicate is connected with the fubject: we might also describe feveral moral and civil modes of connecting two ideas together (viz.) lawfulnefs and unlawfulnefs, conveniency and inconveniency, &c. whence we may form fuch modal propofitions as thefe. It is unlawful for any perfon to kill an innocent man: it is unlawful for chriftians to eat flesh in lent to tell all that we think is inexpedient: for a

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man to be affable to his neighbour is very convenient, &c.

There are feveral other modes of fpeaking whereby a predicate is connected with a fubject: fuch as, it is certain, it is doubtful, it is probable, it is improbable, it is agreed, it is granted, it is faid by the ancients, it is written, &c. all which will form other kinds of modal propofitions.

But whether the modality be natural, moral, &c. yet in all thefe propofitions it is the mode is the proper predicate, and all the reft of the propofition, except the copula (or word is) belongs to the fubject; and thus they become pure propofitions of a complex nature, of which we fhall treat in the next section, fo that there is no great need of making modals a diftinct fort.

There are many little fubtleties which the schools acquaint us with concerning the converfion and oppofition and equipollence of these modal propofitions, fuited to the Latin or Greek tongues rather than the English, and fit to pass away the idle time of a ftudent, rather than to enrich his understanding.

SECT. V.

Of Single Propofitions, whether fimple or complex.

WH

HEN we confider the nature of propofitions, together with the formation of them, and the materials whereof they are made, we divide them into fingle and compound.

A fingle propofition is that which has but one subject and one predicate, but if it has more subjects or more predicates, it is called a compound propofition, and it contains two or more propofitions in it.

A fingle propofition (which is alfo called categorical) may be divided again into fimple and complex*.

* As fimple ideas are opposed to complex, and single ideas to compound, fo propofitions are diftinguifhed in the fame manner;

the

A purely fimple propofition is that whofe fubject and. predicate are made up of fingle terms; as, virtue is desirable every penitent is pardoned; no man is in

nocent.

When the fubject or predicate, or both, are made up: of complex terms, it is called a complex proposition; as, every sincere penitent is pardoned; virtue is desirable for its own fake; no man alive is perfectly innoT

cent.

If the term which is added to the fubject of a complex proposition be either effential or any way neceffary to it, then it is called explicative, for it only explains the fubject; as every mortal man is a fon of Adam. But if the term added to make up the complex fubject does not neceffarily or conftantly belong to it, then it is: determinative, and limits the fubject to a particular part of its extension; as, every pious man fhall be happy. In the first proposition the word mortal is merely explicative in the fecond proposition the word pious is determinative.

Here note, that whatsoever may be affirmed or denied concerning any fubject, with an explicative addition, may be alfo affirmed or denied of that fubject without it; as we may boldly fay, every man is a fon of Adam, as well as every mortal man: but it is not fo, where the addition is determinative, fo we cannot fay, every man fhall be happy, though every pious man shall be fo.

In a complex proposition the predicate or fubject is fometimes made complex by the pronouns who, which, whofe, to whom, &c, which make another proposition; as every man who is pious, fhall be faved: Julius,. whofe sirname was Cæfar, overcame Pompey: bodies, which are transparent, have many pores. Here the whole proposition is called the primary or chief, and the additional proposition is called an incident proposition. But it is still to be esteemed in this cafe merely as a part of the complex term; and the truth or falfhood of the whole complex proposition is not to be

English tongue in this refpect having fome advantage above the learn ed languages, which have no ufual word to diitinguished fingle from fimple.

judged by the truth or falfhood of the incident proposition, but by the connection of the whole fubject with the predicate. For the incident proposition may be falfe, and abfurd, or impoffible, and yet the whole complex proposition may be true, as a horfe, which has wings, might fly over the Thames.

Beside this complection which belongs to the fubject or predicate, logical writers ufe to fay, there is a complection which may fall upon the copula alfo; but this I have accounted for in the fection concerning modal propositions; and indeed it is not of much importance whether it were placed there or here.

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SECT VI.

Of compound Propofitions..

COMPOUND proposition is made up of two or more fubjects or predicates, or both; and it contains in it two or more propositions, which are either plainly expreffèd, or concealed and implied.

The first fort of compound propositions are those wherein the composition is expreffed and evident, and they are diftinguifhed into thefe six kinds, (viz.) copulative, disjunctive, conditional, caufal, relative and dif cretive.

1. Copulative propofitions are thofe which have more fubjects or predicates connected by affirmative or negative conjuctions; as, riches and honours are tempta tions to pride; Cæfar conquered the Gauls and the Britons; neither gold nor jewels will purchase immortality. Thefe propositions are evidently compounded, for each of them may be refolved into two propositions, (viz) riches are temptations to pride, and honour is a temptation to pride; and fo the reft.

The truth of copulative propositions depends upon the truth of all the parts of them; for if Cæfar had

conquered the Gauls, and not the Britons, or the Britons and not the Gauls, the fecond copulative proposition had not been true.

Here note, thofe propofitions, which cannot be refolved into two or more fimple propositions, are not properly copulative, though two or more ideas be connected and coupled by fuch conjunctions, either in the fubject or predicate: as, two and three make five: majesty and meekness do not often meet: the fun,. moon, and stars are not all feen at once. Such propositions are to be efteemed merely complex, becaufe the predicate cannot be affirmed of each single fubject, but: only of all of them together as a collective subject.

II. Disjunctive propofitions are when the parts are disjoined or oppofed to one another by disjunctive particles; as, it is either day or night the weather is either fhining or rainy; quantity is either length, breadth or depth..

:

The truth of disjunctives depends on the neceffaryand immediate opposition of the parts; therefore only the last of these examples is true: but the two first are not ftrictly true, because twilight is a medium between. day and night; and dry, cloudy weather is a medium. between fhining and rainy..

III. Conditional or hypothetical propofitions are those whole parts are united by the conditional particle if; as, if the fun be fixed, the earth must move: if there be no fire, there will be no fmoke..

Note, the first part of these propositions, or that wherein the condition is contained, is called the antecedent, the other is called the confequent.

The truth of thefe propositions depends not at all on the truth and falfhood of their two parts, but on the truth of the connection of them; for each part of them. may be false, and yet the whole proposition true; as, if there be ne providence, there will be no future judg

ment.

IV. Caufal propofitions are where two propositions are joined by caufal particles: as, houfes were not built that they might be deftroved: Rehoboam was unhappy because he followed evil

The truth of a caufal p

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nfel.

tion arifes not from the