 | Sir Anthony Kenny - History - 1997 - 490 pages
...social as well as natural sciences. And the same circularity appears in his definition of the human will as 'the internal impression we feel and are conscious...any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind'. Given Hume's official theory, what is 'give rise to' doing in this definition? Hume regarded... | |
 | Richard Freadman - Education - 2001 - 416 pages
...characterized by "liberty" in the sense that we can do whatever we want: "By the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious...any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind."*''' Hume's general position commits him to seeing any such impression as a "false sensation"... | |
 | Gordon P. Baker, Katherine J. Morris - Dualism - 2002 - 262 pages
...conclusion that 'his [doctrinel is the same as one more clearly put by Hume, when he defined the will as "the internal impression we feel and are conscious...of when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of the body or new perception of the mind'" 11975: 12l. This seems closer to a flight of fancy than an... | |
 | Frederick Copleston - Philosophy - 2003 - 452 pages
...immediate effects of pleasure and pain. It is not, however, properly speaking, a passion. He describes it as 'the internal impression we feel and are conscious...motion of our body, or new perception of our mind'.4 It cannot be defined, since it 1 T.. 2, I. II, p. 318. * Ibid., p. 320. ' T., 3. 3. i, p. 5?6- * T..... | |
 | Daniel M. Wegner - Philosophy - 2002 - 426 pages
...sufficiently impressed by this idea so that he proposed to define the will in this way, as "nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious...any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind" (1739, 399). This definition puts the person's experience at the very center of the whole concept... | |
 | David Hume - Philosophy - 2003 - 484 pages
...subject of our enquiry. I desire it may be observ'd, that by the will, I mean nothing but the inteinal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly...any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind. This impression, like the prec'ding ones of pride and humility, love and hatred, 'tis impossible... | |
 | Sinkwan Cheng - Law - 2004 - 300 pages
...the early Hegel. 10. Hume, for example, defines the will as follows: "By the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious...any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind" (1978, "Of Liberty and Necessity," book 2, part 3, section 3 of Treatise of Human Nature). 11.... | |
 | Kirsten Huxel - Philosophy - 2004 - 468 pages
...folgendermaßen definiert:2 „I desire it may be observ'd, that by the will, I mean nothing but t he internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion ofour body, or new perception ofour mind."3 Als innerer Eindruck, der sich einstellt, wenn wir eine... | |
 | Robert Devigne - Philosophy - 2008 - 319 pages
...play an independent role in Hume's theory of human conduct either: "By the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious...any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind." But while Hobbes speaks of "nature and the intrinsic quality of the agent," Hume's empiricism... | |
 | Paul Schollmeier - Philosophy - 2006 - 17 pages
...Our will is rather an affect in our minds. The will, he asserts, is "the internal impression which we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give...any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind" (Treatise 2. 3. 399, his italics). I take this "internal impression" to be a secondary, reflective... | |
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I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind. 
