iraqualities of a perfon raife in me a pleasant emotion; to which, by reiterated views, is fwelled into a paffion involving defire of that perfon's happiness: this defire, WI being freely indulged, works gradually a change internally, and at laft produceth in me a fettled habit of affection for that perfon now my friend. Affection thus produced operates precifely like an original propenfity; for to enliven it into a paffion, no more is required but the real or ideal presence of the object. The habit of averfion or of hatred is brought on in the fame manner. And here I muft obferve by the way, that love and hatred fignify commonly affection and averfion, not paffion. The bulk of our paffions are indeed affection or averfion inflamed into a paflion by differ ent circumstances, the affection I bear to my fon, is inflamed into the paffion of fear when he is in danger; becomes hope when he hath a profpect of good fortune; becomes admiration when he performs a laudable action; and fhame when he commits any wrong; averfion becomes fear when there is a profpect of good fortune to my enemy; becomes hope when he is in danger; becomes joy when he is in diftrefs; and forrow when a laudable action is performed by him."

2

Fourthly, paffions generally have a tendency to excefs, occafioned by the following means. The mind. affected by any paffion, is not in a proper ftate for diftinct perception, nor for cool reflection: it hath al- ways a ftrong bias to the object of an agreeable paffion, and a bias no lefs ftrong against the object of a difagreeable paffion. The object of love, for example, however indifferent to others, is to the lover's conviction a paragon; and of hatred, is vice itfelf without alloy. What lefs can fuch delufion operate, than to fwell the paffion beyond what it was at first ? for if the feeing or converfing with a fine woman, haye had the effect to carry me from indifference to

love;

love; how much stronger muft her influence be, when now to my conviction fhe is an angel? and hatred as well as other paffions muft run the fame course. Thus between a paffion and its object there is a natural operation, resembling action and reaction in phyf ics a paffion acting upon its object, magnifies it greatly in appearance; and this magnified object reacting upon the paffion, fwells and inflames it mightily.

Fifthly, the growth of fome paffion depends often on occafional circumftances: obftacles to gratification, for example, never fail to augment and inflame a paffion; because a conftant endeavour to remove an obftacle, preferves the object of the paffion ever in view, which fwells the paffion by impreffions frequently reiterated thus the restraint of confcience, when an obstacle to love, agitates the mind and inflames the paffion :

Quod licet, ingratum eft: quod non licet, acrius urit.
Si nunquam Danaën habuiffet ahenea turris,
Non effet Danaë de Jove facta parens.

Ovid, Amor. 1. 2.

At the fame time, the mind, diftreffed with the obftacles, becomes impatient for gratification, and confequently more defirous of it. Shakespear expreffes this obfervation finely:

All impediments in fancy's courfe,
Are motives of more fancy.

We need no better example than a lover who hath many rivals. Even the caprices of a mistress have the effect to inflame love; thefe occafioning uncertainty of fuccefs, tend naturally to make the anxious lover overvalue the happiness of fruition.

So

30

So much upon the growth of paffions their continuance and decay come next under confideration. And, firft, it is a general law of nature, That things fudden in their growth, are equally fudden in their decay. This is commonly the cafe of anger. And, with refpect to wonder and furprise, which alfo fuddenly decay, another reafon concurs, that their caufes are of fhort duration: novelty foon degenerates into familiarity; and the unexpectedness of an object is foon funk in the pleasure that the object affords. Fear, which is a paffion of greater importance as tending to felf prefervation, is often instantaneous: and yet is of equal duration with its caufe: nay, it frequently fubfifts after the cause is removed.

In the next place, a paffion founded on a peculiar propenfity, fubfifts generally for ever; which is the cafe of pride, envy, and malice: objects are never wanting to inflame the propenfity into a paffion.

Thirdly, it may be laid down as a general law of nature, That every paffion ceases upon attaining its ultimate end. To explain that law, we muft diftinguifh be tween a particular and a general end. I call a particular end what may be accomplished by a fingle act: a general end, on the contrary, admits acts without number because it cannot be faid, that a general end is ever fully accomplished, while the object of the paffion fubfifts. Gratitude and revenge are examples of the first kind; the ends they aim at may be accomplifhed by a fingle act; and, when that act is performed, the paffions are neceffarily at an end. Love and hatred are examples of the other kind; defire of doing good or of doing mischief to an individual is a general end, which admits acts without number, and which feldom is fully accomplished: therefore thefe paffions have frequently the fame duration with their objects.

Laftly,

Laftly, it will afford us another general view, to confider the difference between an original propensity, and an affection or averfion produced by cuftom. The former adheres too clofe to the conftitution ever to be eradicated; and for that reason, the paffions to which it gives birth, continue during life with no remarkable diminution. The latter, which owe their birth and increment to time, owe their decay to the fame caufe: affection and averfion decay gradually as they grow; and accordingly hatred as well as love are extinguished by long abfence. Affection decays more gradually between perfons, who, living together, have daily occafion to testify mutually their good-will and kindness : and, when affection is decayed, habit fupplies its place; for it makes these perfons neceffary to each other, by the pain of feparation.* Affection to children hath a long endurance, longer perhaps than any other affection its growth keeps pace with that of its objects: they difplay new beauties and qualifications daily, to feed and augment the affection. But whenever the affection becomes ftationary, it must begin to decay; with a flow pace indeed, in proportion to its increment. In fhort, man with refpect to this life is a temporary being he grows, becomes stationary, decays; and fo muft all his powers and paffions.

PART IV.

Coexiftent Emotions and Paffions.

FOR

a thorough knowledge of the human paffions and emotions, it is not fufficient that they be examined fingly and separately: as a plurality of them

See chap. 14.

are

*

are fometimes felt at the fame inftant, the manner of their coexistence, and the effects thereby produced, -ought alfo to be examined. This fubject is extenfive; and it will be difficult to trace all the laws that govern its endless variety of cafes: if fuch an undertaking can be brought to perfection, it must be by degrees. The following hints may fuffice for a first attempt.

We begin with emotions railed by different founds, as the fimpleft cafe. Two founds that mix, and, as it were, incorporate before they reach the ear, are faid to be concordant. That each of the two founds, even after their union, produceth an emotion of its own, must be admitted: but these emotions, like the founds that produce them, mix fo intimately, as to be rather one complex emotion than two emotions in conjunction. Two founds that refufe incorporation or mixture, are faid to be difcordant: and when heard at the fame inftant, the emotions produced by them are unpleasant in conjunction, however pleafant feparately.

Similar to the emotion raised by mixed founds is the emotion raised by an object of fight with its feveral qualities: a tree, for example, with its qualities of colour, figure, fize, &c. is perceived to be one object; and the emotion it produceth is rather one complex emotion than different emotions combined.

With refpect to coexiftent emotions produced by different objects of fight, it must be obferved, that however intimately connected fuch objects may be, there cannot be a concordance among them like what is perceived in fome founds. Different objects of fight, meaning objects that can exift each of them independent of the others, never mix nor incorporate in the act of vifion each object is perceived as it exifts, feparately from others; and each raifeth an emotion different from that raised by the other. And the fame holds in

all