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I.

Terms Defined or Explained.

EVERY

VERY thing we perceive or are con fcious of, whether a being or a quality, a paffion or an action, is with refpect to the percipient termed an object. Some objects appear to be internal, or within the mind; paffion, for example, thinking, volition: Some external; fuch as every object of fight, of hearing, of fmell, of touch, of taste.

2. That act of the mind which makes known to me an external object, is termed perception. That act of the mind which makes known to me an internal object, is termed confcioufnefs. The power or faculty from which confcioufnefs proceeds, is termed an internal fenfe. The power or faculty from which perception proceeds, is termed an external fenfe. This diftinction refers to the objects of our knowledge; for the fenfes, whether external or internal, are all of them powers or faculties of the mind.*

3. But as felf is an object that cannot be termed either external or internal, the faculty by which I have

I have complied with all who have gone before me in defcribing the fenfes internal and external to be powers or faculties; and yet, after much attention, I have not difcovered any thing active in their operations to entitle them to that character. The following chain of thought has led me to helitate. One being operates on another; the first is active, the other paffive. If the first act, it must have a power to aft: if an effect be produced on the other, it must have a capacity to have that ef fect produced upon it. Fire mel's wax, crgo fire has a power to produce that effect; and wax must be capable to have that effect produced in it. Now as to the fenfes. A tree in flourish makes an impreffion or me, and by that means I fee the tree. But in this operation I do not find that the mind is active: fecing the tree is only an effect produced on it by intervention of the rass of o ht. What feems to have led us into an error is the word feing. hich, under the form of an active verb, has a paffive figustication. I feel is a fimilar example; for to feel is cotainly rot to act, but theft of being acted upon the feeling pleaf ue is the effect produced in my mind when a beautiful object is prefented. Peception acceding is net an action, but an effect pres duced in the mind. Senfation is another effect: it is the p'e fare L feel upon perceiving what is agrecable.

have knowledge of myfelf, is a fense that cannot properly be termed either internal or external.

4. By the eye we perceive figure, colour, motion, &c. by the ear we perceive the different qualities of found, high, low, loud, foft: by touch we perceive rough, fmooth, hot, cold, &c. by tafte we perceive fweet, four, bitter, &c. by fmell we perceive fragrant, fetid, &c. Thefe qualities partake the common nature of all qualities, that they are not capable of an independent exiftence, but muft belong to fome being of which they are properties or attributes. A being with respect to its properties or attributes is termed a fubject or fubftratum. Every fubftratum of visible qualities, is termed fubflance; and of tangible qualį, ties, body.

5. Subftance and found are perceived as existing at a distance from the organ; often at a confiderable diftance. But fmell, touch, and tafte, are perceived as exifting at the organ of fenfe.

6. The objects of external fenfe are various. Subflances are perceived by the eye; bodies by the touch. Sounds, taftes, and fmells, paffing commonly under the name of fecondary qualities, require more explanation than there is room for here. All the objects of internal fenfe are attributes: witnefs deliberation, reafoning, refolution, willing, confenting, which are internal actions. Paffions and emotions, which are internal agitations, are alfo attributes. With regard to the former, I am confcious of being active; with regard to the latter, I am confcious of being paflive.

7. Again, we are confcious of internal action as in the head; of pailions and emotions as in the heart.

3. Many actions may be exerted internally, and many fects produced, of which we are unconfcious: when we inveftigate the ultimate caufe of the mo

tion of the blood, and of other internal motions upon which life depends, it is the most probable opinion that fome internal power is the caufe; and if fo, we are unconfcious of the operations of that power. But consciousness being implied in the very meaning of deliberating, reafoning, refolving, willing, confenting, fuch operations cannot escape our knowledge. The fame is the cafe of paffions and emotions; for no internal agitation is denominated a paffion or emotion, but what we are conscious of.

9. The mind is not always the fame; by turns it is cheerful, melancholy, calm, peevish, &c. Thefe differences may not improperly be denominated tones.

10. Perception and fenfation are commonly reckoned fynonimous terms, fignifying that internal act by which external objects are made known to us. But they ought to be diftinguished. Perceiving is a general term for hearing, feeing, tafting, touching, Imelling; and therefore perception fignifies every internal act by which we are made acquainted with external objects: thus we are faid to perceive a certain animal, a certain colour, found, tafte, fmell, &c. Senfation properly fignifies that internal act by which we are made confcious of pleafure or pain felt at the organ of fenfe: thus we have a fenfation of the pleafure arifing from warmth, from a fragrant fmell, from a fweet tafte; and of the pain arifing from a wound, from a fetid finell, from a difagreeable tafte. In perception, my attention is directed to the external ob, ject in fenfation, it is directed to the pleasure or pain I feel.

The terms perception and fenfation are fometimes employed to fignify the objects of perception and fenfation. Perception in that fenfe is a general term for every external thing we perceive; and fenfation a general term for every pleasure and pain felt at the organ of fenfe.

11. Conception

11. Conception is different from perception. The latter includes a conviction of the reality of its object the former does not; for I can conceive the moft extravagant ftories told in a romance, without having any conviction of their reality. Conception differs alfo from imagination. By the power of fancy I can imagine a golden mountain, or an ebony fhip with fails and ropes of filk. When I defcribe a picture of that kind to another, the idea he forms of it is termed a conception. Imagination is active, conception is paffive.

12. Feeling, befide denoting one of the external fenfes, is a general term, fignifying that internal act by which we are made conscious of our pleafures and our pains; for it is not limited, as fenfation is, to any one fort. Thus, feeling being the genus of which fenfation is a fpecies, their meaning is the fame when applied to pleasure and pain felt at the organ of fenfe and accordingly we fay indifferently,

I feel pleasure from heat, and pain from cold," or, "I have a fenfation of pleasure from heat, and of pain from cold." But the meaning of feeling, as is faid, is much more extenfive: It is proper to fay, I feel pleasure in a fumptuous building, in love, in friendfhip; and pain in lofing a child, in revenge, in envy: fenfation is not properly applied to any of thefe.

The term feeling is frequently ufed in a lefs proper fenfe, to fignify what we feel or are confcious of: and in that fenfe it is a general term for all our paffions and emotions, and for all our other pleasures and pains.

13. That we cannot perceive an external objec till an impreffion is made upon our body, is probable from reafon, and is afcertained by experience. But it is not neceffary that we be made fenfible of the impreffion in touching, in tafting, and in smelling, we

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are

are fenfible of the impreffion; but not in feeing and hearing. We know indeed from experiments, that before we perceive a visible object, its image is spread upon the retina tunica; and that, before we perceive a found, an impreffion is made upon the drum of the ear but we are not confcious either of the organic image or of the organic impreffion; nor are we confcious of any other operation preparatory to the act of perception all we can fay, is, that we fee that river, or hear that trumpet.

*

14. Objects once perceived may be recalled to the mind by the power of memory. When I recal an object of fight in that manner, it appears to me precifely the fame as in the original furvey, only lefs diftin&t. For example, having feen yefterday a fpreading oak growing on the brink of a river, I'endeavour to recal these objects to my mind. How is this operation performed? Do I endeavour to form in my mind a picture of them or reprefentative image? Not fo. I transport myself ideally to the place where I faw the tree and river yefterday; upon which I have a perception of thefe objects, fimilar in all refpects to the perception I had when I viewed them with my eyes, only lefs diftinct. And in this recollection, I am not confcious of a picture or reprefentative image, more than in the original furvey: the percep tion is of the tree and river themselves, as at first. I confirm this by another experiment. After attentively furveying a fine ftatue, I clofe my eyes. What follows? The fame object continues, without any

difference

*Yet a fingular opinion that impreffions are the only objects of perception, has been efpouled by fome philofophers of no mean rank; not attending to the foregoing peculiarity in the fenfes of feeing and hearing, that we perceive objects without being confcious of an organic impreffion, or of any impression. See the Treatife upon Human Nature: where we find the following paffage, book 1. p. 4. fe&t. 2. • Properly speaking, it is not our body we perceive when we regard our limbs and members; fo that the afcribing a real and corporeal existence to these impreffions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain, &c."

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