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for when we have recourfe to general opinion and general practice, we are betrayed into endlefs pelplexities. Hiftory informs us, that nothing is more variable than taste in the fine arts: judging by numbers, the Gothic taste of architecture muft be preferred before that of Greece, and the Chinese tafte probably before either. It would be endless to recount the various tastes that have prevailed in different ages. with refpect to gardening, and ftill prevail in different countries. Defpifing the modeft colouring of nature, women of fafhion in France daub their cheeks with a red powder; nay, an unnatural fwelling in the neck, peculiar to the inhabitants of the Alps, is relished by that people. But we ought not to be difcouraged by fuch untoward inftances, when we find as great variety in moral opinions; was it not among fome nations held lawful for a man to fell his children for flaves, to expofe them in their infancy to wild beafts, and to punish them for the crime of their parents? was any thing more common than to murder an enemy in cold blood? nay more, did not law once authorife the abominable practice of human facrifices, no lefs impious than immoral? Such aberrations from the rules of morality prove only, that men, originally favage and brutal, acquire not rationality nor delicacy of tafte till they be long difciplined in fociety. To afcertain the rules of morality, we appeal not to the common fenfe of favages, but of men. in their more perfect ftate: and we make the fame appeal in forming the rules that ought to govern the fine arts in neither can we fafely rely on a local or tranfitory tafte; but on what is the most general and the moft lafting among polite nations.

In this very manner, a ftandard for morals has been afcertained with a good deal of accuracy, and is daily applied by able judges with general fatisfaction. The ftandard of tafte in the fine arts, is not yet brought

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to fuch perfection; and we can account for its flower progrefs the fense of right and wrong in actions is vivid and diftinct, because its objects are clearly diftinguishable from each other; whereas the fenfe of right and wrong in the fine arts is faint and wavering, because its objects are commonly not fo clearly diftinguishable from each other, and there appears to me a ftriking final caufe in thus diftinguifhing the moral fenfe from the fenfe of right and wrong in the fine arts. The former, as a rule of conduct, and as a law we ought to obey, must be clear and authoritative. The latter is not entitled to the fame privilege, because it contributes to our pleas ure and amufement only: were it ftrong and lively, it would ufurp upon our duty, and call off the attention from matters of greater moment: were it clear and authoritative, it would banish all difference of tafte, leaving no diftinction between a refined taste and one that is not fo: which would put an end to rivalfhip, and confequently to all improvement.

But to return to our fubject. However languid and cloudy the common sense of mankind may be as to the fine arts, it is notwithstanding the only ftandard in these as well as in morals. True it is indeed, that in gathering the common fenfe of mankind, more circumfpection is requifite with refpect to the fine arts than with refpect to morals: upon the latter, any perfon may be confulted: but in the former, a wary choice is neceflary, for to collect votes indifferently would certainly mislead us. Those who depend for food on bodily labour, are totally void of tafte; of fuch a tafte at least as can be of ufe in the fine arts. This confideration bars the greater part of mankind; and of the remaining part, many by a corrupted tafle are unqualified for voting. The commen fefe of mankind muft then be confined to the few

few that fall not under thefe exceptions. But as fuch felection seems to throw matters again into uncertainty, we must be more explicit upon this branch of our fubject.

Nothing tends more than voluptuoufness to corrupt the whole internal frame, and to vitiate our tafte, not only in the fine arts, but even in morals: Voluptuoufnefs never fails, in courfe of time, to extinguish all the fympathetic affections, and to bring on a beastly selfishness, which leaves nothing of man but the fhape about excluding fuch perfons there will be no difpute. Let us next bring under trial, the opulent who delight in expenfe: the appetite for fuperiority and refpect, inflamed by riches, is vented upon costly furniture, numerous attendants, a princely dwelling, fumptuous feafts, every thing fuperb and gorgeous, to amaze and humble all beholders: . fimplicity, elegance, propriety, and things natural, fweet or amiable, are defpifed or neglected: for these are not appropriated to the rich, nor make a figure in the public eye in a word, nothing is relished, but what ferves to gratify pride, by an imaginary exaltation of the poffeffor above those who furround him. Such fentiments contract the heart, and make every principle give way to felf-love,: benevolence and public fpirit, with all their refined emotions, are little felt, and lefs regarded; and if thefe be excluded, there can be no place for the faint and delicate emotions of the fine arts.

The exclufion of claffes fo many and numerous, reduces within a narrow compafs thofe who are qualified to be judges in the fine arts. Many circumftances are neceflary to form fuch a judge: There must be a good natural tafle; that is, a tafle approaching, at leaft in fome degree to the delicacy of tafte above defcribed :* that tafle mut be im

Chap. 2. part g

proved

proved by education, reflection, and experience:* it must be preferved in vigour by living regularly, by using the goods of fortune with moderation, and by following the dictates of improved nature, which give welcome to every rational pleasure without indulging any excess. This is the tenor of life which of all contributes the moft to refinement of taste ; and the fame tenor of life contributes the most to happiness in general.

If there appear much uncertainty in a standard that requires fo painful and intricate a felection, we may poffibly be reconciled to it by the following confideration, That, with respect to the fine arts, there is lefs difference of taste than is commonly imagined. Nature hath marked all her works with indelible characters of high or low, plain or elegant, ftrong or weak thefe, if at all perceived, are feldom mitapprehended; and the fame marks are equally perceptible in works of art. A defective tafte is incur

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able;

That thefe particulars are ufeful, it may be faid neceffary, for ac quiring a difcerning tafle in the fine arts, will appear from the following facts, which show the influence of experience fingly. Thofe who live in the world and in good company, are quick-fighted with refpect to every defect or irregularity in behaviour: the very flighteft fingularity in motion, in fpeech, or in dress, which to a peasant would be invisible, escapes not their obfervation. The most minute differences in the human countenance, fo minute as to be far beyond the reach of words, are diftinctly perceived by the plaineft perfon; while at the fame time, the generality have very little difcernment in the faces of other animals to which they are lefs accufiomed: Sheep, for example, appear to have all the fame face, except to the fhepherd, who knows every individual in his flock as he does his relations and neighbours. The very populace in Athens were critics in language, in pronunciation, and even in eloquence, harrangues being their daily entertainment. In Rome, at prefent, the moft illiterate fhopkeeper is a better judge of flatues and of pictures, than perfons of refined education in London. Thefe facts afford convincing evidence, that a difcerning tafte depends ftill more on experience than on nature. But thefe facts merit peculiar regard for another reason, that they open to us a fure method of improving our taste in the fine arts; which, with those who have leifure for improvements, ought to be a powerful incitement to cultivate a tafte in these arts: an occupation that cannot fail to embellish their manners, and to fweeten fociety.

able; and it hurts none but the poffeffor, because it carries no authority to impofe upon others. I know not if there be fuch a thing as a tafte naturally bad or wrong; a tafte for example, that prefers a groveling pleasure before one that is high and elegant groveling pleafures are never preferred; they are only made welcome by those who know no better. Differences about objects of taste, it is true, are endless; but they generally concern trifles, or poffibly matters of equal rank, where preference may be given either way with impunity : if, on any occafion, perfons differ where they ought not, a depraved tafte will readily be difcovered on one or other fide, occafioned by imitation, cuftom, or corrupted manners, fuch as are defcribed above. And confid ering that every individual partakes of a common nature, what is there that fhould occafion any wide difference in taste or fentiment? By the principles that constitute the fenfative part of our nature, a wonderful uniformity is preferved in the emotions and feelings of the different races of men; the fame object making upon every perfon the fame impreffion, the fame in kind, if not in degree. There have been, as above obferved, aberrations from these principles; but foon or late they prevail, and restore the wanderer to the right tract.

I know but of one other means for afcertaining the common sense of mankind; which I mention, not in defpair, but in great confidence of fuccefs. As the taste of every individual ought to be governed by the principles above mentioned, an appeal to thefe principles must neceffarily be decifive of every controverfy that can arife upon matters of tafte. In general, every doubt with relation to the common fenfe of man, or standard of tafte, may be cleared by the fame appeal; and to unfold thefe principles is the declared purpofe of the prefent undertaking.

Appendix.

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