ity among creatures of the fame kind, and a deformity no lefs remarkable among creatures of different kinds. This common nature is conceived to be a model or standard for each individual that belongs to the kind. Hence it is a wonder to find an individual deviating from the common nature of the fpecies, whether in its internal or external conftruction: a child born with averfion to its mother's milk, is a wonder, no less than if born without a mouth, or with more than one.* This conviction of a common nature in every fpecies, paves the way finely for diftributing things into genera and fpecies; to which we are extremely prone, not only with regard to animals and vegetables, where nature has led the way; but alfo with regard to many other things, where there is no ground for fuch distribution, but fancy merely.

With refpect to the common nature of man in particular, we have a conviction that it is invariable not lefs than univerfal; that it will be the fame hereafter as at prefent, and as it was in time paft; the fame among all nations and in all corners of the earth. Nor are we deceived; becaufe, giving allowance for the difference of culture and gradual refinement of manners, the fact correfponds to our conviction.

We are so constituted, as to conceive this common nature, to be not only invariable, but also perfect or right; and confequently that individuals ought to be made conformable to it. Every remarkable deviation from the standard, makes accordingly an impreffion upon us of imperfection, irregularity, or diforder: it is difagreeable, and raises in us a painful emotion: monftrous births, exciting the curiofity of a philofopher, fail not at the fame time to excite a fort of horror.

This

* See Ellays on Morality and Natural Religion, part 1. effay 2. ch. 1.

This conviction of a common nature or standard and of its perfection, accounts clearly for that remarkable conception we have, of a right and a wrong fenfe or tafte in morals. It accounts not lefs clearly for the conception we have of a right and a wrong fense or taste in the fine arts. A man who, avoiding objects generally agreeable, delights in objects generally difagreeable, is condemned as a monfter: we difapprove his taste as bad or wrong, because we have a clear conception that he deviates from the common ftandard. If man were fo framed as not to have any notion of a common ftandard, the proverb mentioned in the beginning would hold univerfally, not only in the fine arts, but in morals: upon that fuppofition, the taste of every man, with refpect to both, would to himself be an ultimate standard. But as the conviction of a common ftandard is univerfal and a branch of our nature, we intuitively conceive a taste to be right or good if conformable to the common standard, and wrong or bad if difconformable.

No particular in human nature is more univerfal, than the uneafinefs a man feels when in matters of importance his opinions are rejected by others: why fhould difference in opinion create uneafinefs, more than difference in ftature, in countenance, or in drefs? The conviction of a common ftandard explains the mystery every man, generally speaking, taking it for granted that his opinions agree with the common fenfe of mankind, is therefore difgufted with those who think differently, not as differing from him, but as differing from the common ftandard: hence in all difputes, we find the parties, each of them equally appealing conftantly to the common fenfe of mankind as the ultimate rule or standard. With refpect to points arbitrary or indifferent, which are not fuppofed to be regulated by any ftandard, individuals are perVOL. II. mitted

A a

CH. XXV. mitted to think for themselves with impunity the fame liberty is not indulged with refpect to points that are reckoned of moment; for what reafon, other than that the standard by which thefe are reg ulated, ought, as we judge, to produce an uniformity of opinion in all men? In a word, to this conviction of a common standard must be wholly attributed, the pleasure we take in those who efpouse the same principles and opinions with ourselves, as well as the averfion we have at those who differ from us. In matters left indifferent by the ftandard, we find nothing of the fame pleasure or pain: a bookish man, unlefs fwayed by convenience, relifheth not the contemplative man more than the active; his friends and companions are chofen indifferently out of either clafs a painter conforts with a poet or musician, as readily as with those of his own art; and one is not the more agreeable to me for loving beef, as I do, nor the lefs agreeable for preferring mutton.

I have ventured to fay, that my difguft is raised, not by differing from me, but by differing from what I judge to be the common ftandard. This point, being of importance, ought to be firmly established. Men, it is true, are prone to flatter themselves, by taking it for granted that their opinions and their taste are in all refpects conformable to the common standard; but there may be exceptions, and experience fhows there are fome: there are inftances without number, of perfons who are addicted to the groffer amufements of gaming, eating, drinking, without having any relifh for more elegant pleafures, fuch, for example, as are afforded by the fine arts; yet these very persons talking the fame language with the reft of mankind, pronounce in favour of the more elegant pleasures, and they invariably approve those who have a more refined tafte, being afhamed of their

own

own as low and fenfual. It is in vain to think of giving a reafon for this fingular impartiality, other than the authority of the common ftandard with refpect to the dignity of human nature:* and from the inftances now given, we discover that the authority of that standard, even upon the moft grovelling fouls, is fo vigorous, as to prevail over felf-partiality, and to make them defpife their own tafte compared with the more elevated tafte of others.

Uniformity of taste and fentiment refulting from our conviction of a common ftandard, leads to two important final causes: the one refpecting our duty, the other our pastime. Barely to mention the first fhall be fufficient, because it does not properly belong to the present undertaking. Unhappy it would be for us did not uniformity prevail in morals: that our actions should uniformly be directed to what is good and against what is ill, is the greatest blefling in fociety; and in order to uniformity of action, uniformity of opinion and fentiment is indifpenfable.

With refpect to pastime in general, and the fine arts in particular, the final caufe of uniformity is illuftrious. Uniformity of tafte gives opportunity for fumptuous and elegant buildings, for fine gardens, and extenfive embellishments, which please univerfally; and the reafon is, that without uniformity of tafte, there could not be any fuitable reward, either of profit or honour, to encourage men of genius to labour in fuch works, and to advance them toward perfection. The fame uniformity of tafte is equally neceffary to perfect the art of mufic, fculpture, and painting, and to fupport the expenfe they require after they are brought to perfection. Nature is in every particular confiftent with herfelf: we are framed by Nature to have a high relish for the fine

* See chap. 11.

arts,

arts, which are a great fource of happinefs, and friendly in a high degree to virtue: we are, at the fame time, framed with uniformity of tafte, to furnish proper objects for that high relish; and if uniformity did not prevail, the fine arts could never have made any figure.

And this fuggefts another final cause no lefs illuftrious. The feparation of men into different claffes, by birth, office, or occupation, however neceffary, tends to relax the connection that ought to be among members of the fame ftate; which bad effect is in fome measure prevented by the accefs all ranks of people have to public fpectacles, and to amufements that are beft enjoyed in company. Such meetings, where every one partakes of the fame pleafures in common, are no flight fapport to the focial affections.

Thus, upon a conviction common to the fpecies is erected a standard of tafte, which without hesitation is applied to the taste of every individual. That ftandard, afcertaining what actions are right, what wrong, what proper, what improper, hath enabled moralifts to establish rules for our conduct, from which no perfon is permitted to fwerve. We have the fame ftandard for afcertaining in all the fine arts, what is beautiful or ugly, high or low, proper or improper, proportioned or difproportioned: and here, as in morals, we juftly condemn every tafte that deviates from what is thus afcertained by the common ftandard.

That there exifts a rule or ftandard in nature for trying the taste of individuals, in the fine arts as well as in morals, is a difcovery; but is not fufficient to complete the task undertaken. A branch ftill more important remains upon hand; which is, to afcertain what is truly the ftandard of nature, that we may not lie open to have a falfe ftandard impofed on

But what means fhall be employed for bringing to light this natural ftandard? This is not obvious:

for