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ping the fubject of thofe relations, whether they be corporeal or fpiritual; fuch are our ideas of cause, effect, likeness, unlikeness, fubject, object, indentity, or fameness, and contrariety, order, and other things which are treated of in ontology.

Moft of the terms of art in feveral fciences may be ranked under this head of abstracted ideas, as noun, pronoun, verb, in grammar, and the feveral particles of fpeech, as wherefore, therefore, when, how, although, howfoever, &c. So connections, tranfitions, fimilitudes, tropes, and their various forms in rhetoric.

The abitracted ideas, whether abfolute or relative, cannot fo properly be faid to derive their immediate, complete, and diftinct original, either from sensation or reflection, (1.) because the nature and the actions both of body and fpirit give us occafion to frame exactly the fame ideas of effence, mode, caufe, effect, likeness, contrariety, &c. Therefore these cannot be called either fenfible or fpiritual ideas, for they are not exact reprefentations either of the peculiar qualities or actions of fpirit or body, but feem to be a distinct kind of idea framed in the mind, to reprefent our most general conceptions of things, or their relations to one another, without any regard to their natures, whether they be corporeal or fpiritual. And, (2.) the fame general ideas of caufe and effect, likeness, &c. may be transferred to a thousand other kinds of being, whether bodily or fpiritual, befides thofe from whence we first derived them: even thofe abftracted ideas, which might be first occafioned by bodies, may be as properly after ward attributed to fpirit.

Now, though Mr Locke fuppofes fenfation and reflection to be the only two fprings of all ideas, and these two are fufficient to furnish our minds with all that rich variety of ideas which we have; yet abstrac tion is certainly a different act of the mind, whence thefe abftracted ideas have their original; though per haps fenfation or reflection may furnish us with all the firit objects and occafions whence thefe abftracted ideas are excited and derived. Nor in this fenfe and view of things can I think Mr Locke himself would deny my

representation of the original of abftracted ideas, nor forbid them to ftand for a diftinct fpecies..

Note. THOUGH we have divided ideas in this chap ter into three forts, viz. Senfible, fpiritual, and abftracted, yet it may not be amifs just to take notice here, that as man may be called a compound substance, being made up of body and mind, and the modes which arife from this compofition are called mixed modes, fuch as fenfation, paffion, difcourfe, &c. So the ideas of this fubftance or being called man, and of these mixed modes may be called mixed ideas, for they are not properly and ftrictly fpiritual, fenfible, or abftracted.. See a much larger account of every part of this chape ter in the Philofophical Efiays by I. W. Eflay 3, 4, &..

SECT. II..

Of fimple and complex, compound and collective Ideas..

I'

DEAS, confidered in their nature, are either fimple or complex.

A fimple idea is one uniform idea, which cannot be divided or distinguished by the mind of man into two or more ideas; fuch are a multitude of our fenfations, as the idea of fweet, bitter, cold, heat, white, red, blue, hard, foft, motion, reft, and perhaps extenfion and du ration; such are alfo many of our spiritual ideas; such as thought, will, with, knowledge, &c..

A complex idea is made by joining two or more fimple ideas together; as a fquare, a triangle, a cube, a pen, a table, reading, writing, truth, falfehood, abody, a man, a horse, an angle, a heavy body, a swift horfe, &c. Every thing that can be divided by the mind into two or more ideas is called complex.

Complex ideas are often confidered as fingle and diftinct beings, though they may be made up of several fimple ideas; for a body, a fpirit, a houfe, a tree, a

flower; but when several of these ideas of a different kind are joined together, which are wont to be confidered as diftinct fingle beings, this is called a compound idea, whether thefe united ideas be fimple or complex. So a man is compounded of body and fpirit, fo mithridate is a compound medicine, becaufe it is made of many different ingredients. This I have fhewn under the doctrine of substances. And modes also may be compounded; harmony is a compound idea, made up of different founds united; so several different virtues must be united to make up the compounded idea or character either of a hero or a faint.

But when many ideas of the fame kind are joined together, and united in one name, or under one view, it is called a collective idea; fo an army, or a parliament, is a collection of men; a dictionary, or nomenclature, is a collection of words; a flock is a collection of fheep; foreft or grove a collection of trees; a heap is a collection of fand, or corn, or dust, &c. a city is a collection of houfes; a nofegay is a collection of flowers; a month or a year is a collection of days; and a thousand is a collection of units.

The precife difference between a compound and collective idea is this, that a compound idea unites things of a different kind, but a collective idea things of the fame kind; though this distinction in fome cafes is not accurately obferved, and cuftom oftentimes ufes the word compound for collective.

SECT. III.

Of univerfal and particular Ideas, real and imaginary.

IDEAS

DEAS, according to their objects, may first be divided into particular or universal.

A particular idea is that which reprefents one thing only.

Sometimes the one thing is represented in a loose

and indeterminate manner, as when we fay fome man, any man, one man, another man; fome horse, any horfe one city, or another, which is called by the fchools individuum vagum.

Sometimes the particular idea reprefents one thing in a determinate manner, and then it is called a fingular idea; fuch is Bucephalus, or Alexander's horfe, Cicero the orator, Peter the apostle, the palace of Verfailles, this book, that river, the new foreft, or the city of London. That idea, which reprefents one particular determinate thing to me, is called a fingular idea, whether it be fimple, or complex, or compound.

The object of any particular idea, as well as the idea itself, is sometimes called an individual; so Peter is an individual man, London is an individual city, So this book, one horfe, another horse, are all individuals; though the word individuals is more ufually limited to one fingular, certain, and determined object.

An univerfal idea is that which reprefents a common nature agreeing to feveral particular things; fo a horse, a man, or a book, are called univerfal ideas, because they agree to all horses, men, or books.

And I think it not amifs to intimate, in this place, that these univerfal ideas are formed by that act of the mind which is called abftraction, that is, a withdrawing fome part of an idea from other parts of it; for when fingular ideas are first let into the mind by fenfation or reflection, then, in order to make them univerfal, we leave out or drop all thofe peculiar and determinate characters, qualities, modes, or circumftances, which belong merely to any particular individual being, and by which it differs from other beings; and we only contemplate thofe properties of it wherein it agrees with other beings.

Though it must be confeffed, that the name of abftracted ideas is fometimes attributed to univerfal ideas, both fenfible or fpiritual, yet this abftraction is not fo great, as when we drop out of our idea every fenfible or fpiritual reprefentation, and retain nothing but the most general and abfolute conceptions of things, or their mere relations to one another, without any regard to their particular natures, whether they be fen

fible or fpiritual. And it is to this kind of conceptions we more properly give the name of abstracted ideas, as in the firft fection of this chapter.

An univerfal idea is either general or special.

A general idea is called by the schools a genus; and it is one common nature agreeing to feveral other common natures. So animal is a genus, because it agrees to horfe, lion, whale, butterfly, which are alfo common ideas; fo fifh is a genus, because it agrees to trout, herring, crab, which are common natures alfo.

A fpecial idea is called by the schools a fpecies; it is one common nature that agrees to feveral fingular in dividual beings;, fo horfe is a fpecial idea, or a fpecies, because it agrees to Bucephalus, Trott, and Snowball. City is a fpecial idea, for it agrees to London, Paris, Bristol.

Note. 1, SOME of thefe univerfals are genufes, if compared with natures more common. So bird is a genus, if compared with eagle, fparrow, raven, which are also common natures; but it is a fpecies, if compared with the more general nature, animal. The fame be faid of fish, beast, &c.

This fort of univerfal ideas, which may either be confidered as a genus or a species, is called fubaltern 5. but the highest genus, which is never a fpecies, is called the most general; and the loweft fpecies, which is never a genus, is called the moft fpecial.

It may be obferved here also, that, that general nature or property wherein one thing agrees with most other things, is called its more remote genus; fo fubftance is the remote genus of bird or beast, because it agrees not only to all kinds of animals, but also to things inanimate, as fun, ftars, clouds, metals, ftones, air, water, &c. But animal is the proximate or neareft genus of bird, becaufe it agrees to feweft other things. Thofe general natures which stands between the nearest and most remote are called intermediate. Note. 2dly, In univerfal ideas it is proper to confider their comprehenfion and their extenfion*.

* The word extenfion here is taken in a mere logical fense, and not in a physical and mathematical sense.

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