this disposition give way, in the mass of the people, to a fondness for prating about abstract principles, we cannot but think that the inattention to abstract principles chargeable on our professional and political men, is attended with the inconvenience and evils inseparable from all sorts of ignorance. So far as regards metaphysical abstractions, to which our Writer means chiefly, we presume, to refer, we entirely agree with him. But unfortunately, owing to this same mercantile character, extending itself to the ranks even of professional life, scientific principles, the principles of jurisprudential and political economy, are, in this country, so little studied and so ill understood, that we are perpetually exposed to the evils of crude legislation, and society lies at the mercy of every empiric who succeeds for a while in passing himself off for a political authority. The controversy respecting Necessity, however, in whichever way determined, can have no practical result. Supposing it to be exploded, the result would be simply, that the course of 'nature is what it seems to be; that the actions of men are what they have ever been thought to be,' the actions of moral and accountable agents, and that the common sense of mankind is in truth a reasonable guide. On the other hand, suppose the doctrine of fatalism established by demonstration, then would it be found, remarks our Author, That while it is the auspicious property of natural philosophy to diffuse itself safely and kindly, and, like a fountain of healing water, from its sources in colleges and seats of learning, to flow out among the multitude, as a pure blessing;-this other science, this abstract demonstration, is (by the confession of those who darkly divulge it) a dire mystery, an esoteric truth, fit only for sages, and one which it is wise to hide from the populace. In fact, it proves itself, when it comes among the vulgar, to be susceptible of no interpretation that is not pernicious. It is a philosophy which, by no ingenuity, by no refinements, can safely be broken up into morsels for distribution among the people. How, then, shall a choice be made between the two demonstrated, but incompatible philosophies? How, but by an indignant rejection of the dark and hostile science, as a sophism, even though to prove it such were impossible? This doctrine, we say, even though it could not be disproved, would be overwhelmed, silenced, and scouted, by the concurrent suffrages of all other sciences. It is contradicted by the number or quantity of proofs; and surpassed in the quality of its evidence: it may then properly be driven home to the cavern whence first it issued, and for ever forbidden to approach the precincts of hu manity, or to infect the atmosphere of knowledge, action, and virtue. In a word, the question of necessity may be pronounced as nothing to human nature; for if it be decided in the manner that is favourable to ordinary notions, it merges in a void-disappears, and becomes the most nugatory and idle of all learned trifles. But, if determined in the other manner, then it assumes an aspect which places it in contrariety to every other science-demonstrable and experimental; and therefore may be spurned as a lie, because it speaks as an enemy.' Pp. xli, xlii. Is the question of liberty and necessity important to Theology and Christian Doctrine? The third section of the Essay is devoted to this second position of the inquiry; and the conclusion to which it leads us, is, that it is one in which Christi'anity has no peculiar interest, and from the determination of 'which it can neither derive permanent advantage, nor receive 'lasting damage.' An opposite opinion has, indeed, been nearly universal among theologians and philosophers of all ages, who have seemed to agree in acknowledging, (agreeing in this alone,) that the controversy involves the very existence of religion. Our Author appeals from this venerable decision, to the common sense of the present generation, and to the sounder views of a happier era. In thus boldly challenging as error, what all parties have for ages taken for granted, it behoved him to account, in some measure, for the origin and inveteracy of the mistake. This he has done, by very concisely indicating both the physiological and the historical causes of the metaphysical corruption of Christianity. The natural history' of the fatal alliance between religion and metaphysics, resolves itself, it is remarked, into a few well-known facts or usages of the human mind. It is common to human nature, to throw itself off from the familiar ground of proximate and intelligible causes, and to seek such as are abstruse, difficult, and ultimate, whenever it is agitated by powerful emotions. We have in this fact, one of the sources of superstition; and as it is in a sense true, that Fear is the mother of the Gods, so, in a sense, it is also true, that anxiety, despondency, and the impatience of pain and sorrow, are teachers of metaphysics. It may be doubted, whether certain profound speculations would at all have suggested themselves to the human mind, if life had been a course of equable prosperity. It may be questioned, whether the inhabitants of worlds unvisited by evil, how large soever their intelligence may be, have thought of asking, What is Virtue ? or, What is the liberty of a moral agent?' p. xliii. With how much philosophical propriety, then, has our great Poet represented some of the lost spirits as seeking to solace themselves with reasonings high Of providence, foreknowledge, will and fate; What follows shews that this was not intended for mere satire, ، but was most correctly inferred from the operations of fallen human minds. Vain wisdom all and false philosophy! Yet, with a pleasing sorcery, could charm May we not say, that Metaphysics have originated in an attempt to escape intellectually from the physical world?-to get rid of what is, by some theory which may explain away its reality, and to get rid of what will be, as the physical consequence of what is, by arguing away their moral connexion. Unintelligent causation, let it be necessity or contingency, destiny or chance, is a refuge to the thoughts of him who is seeking to escape from the insupportable idea of an Intelligent, Unchanging First Cause, with which his own mind is not in moral harmony. But does the province of Theology extend into this extraphysical region of shadowy abstractions? Our Author denies that the Christian divine has any more to do with such questions, than the lawyer, the physician, or the merchant. He maintains, and we apprehend most reasonably, that the Christian doctrine is no more dependent upon the resolving of any metaphysical problem, than are the most vulgar interests of commerce, or political institutions, so dependent. The teacher of religion, therefore, in suffering himself to be drawn from his proper ground, is the author of his own discomfiture or perplexity. All the difficulty in the argument for Christianity proceeds *On this point, we must recommend to the reader's especial attention, the remarks in Note K, part of which we must transcribe. Hume was far too sagacious not to perceive, what he was far too astute to tell his reader, that his argument against Christianity, if good for anything, ought to pass as a ploughshare of destruction over 'the entire field of human affairs. It is amazing that so much im'portance should have been attached to so puerile a conceit; a conceit which, if divested of its garb of philosophic gravity, is vapid nonsense, that does not recommend itself even by the ingenuity that often 'makes a foolish sophism amusing. And yet, such are the immu'nities and privileges granted to any sort of sceptical argument, that the same sophism, refuted a hundred times, is still respectfully re'garded by writers of repute. The proper answer, or at least a 'sufficient one, has very recently been given (Edinburgh Rev. No. CIV. Art. 6.) to a new expression of Hume's quibble, but given with a reserve in favour of infidelity, and with a closing insinuation against the Christian evidences, for which it would have been far more manly to substitute a candid avowal of unbelief.' 'from the refusal of the opponent to abide by the established 'conditions of documentary proof;' a species of evidence which, in every other branch of physical science, is held to be decisive. It is a more delicate question, whether the abstractions of 'pure metaphysics can at all avail for the purpose of determining those controversies which arise among Christians, in 'consequence of a different interpretation of certain portions of 'the Document of Faith.' Whoever should undertake to answer this question in the negative, might, if he chose to argue the point by an appeal to facts, find abundant materials fitted to his purpose in the whole course of church history, commencing with the Platonic fathers, and ending with the last writers on both sides of the Calvinistic controversy. Nothing, we say, would be more easy than, in this way, to throw immense disgrace upon the venerable practice of converting Christianity into a quibble of metaphysics. But the fruitlessness and inexpediency of this method of conducting Biblical controversy, might be forcibly argued alone from the instance of the "Inquiry concerning Freedom of Will." Its acknowledged superiority to any theological work with which it might properly be compared-a superiority confessed, as well by philosophers as divines-and its exemption from the vulgar sins of polemical literature, point it out as an instance of the most unexceptionable sort. Yet, what has been the result? A real and signal service, as we have already granted, has been rendered by it to the cause of important truths; but the service has accrued indirectly; while it has utterly failed to bring the controversy between Calvinists and Arminians to a satisfactory issue. The metaphysics of Edwards demolished the metaphysics of Whitby. This was natural and fit; for the philosophy of Arminianism could no more endure a rigid analysis, than a citadel of rooks could maintain its integrity against a volley of musketry. And, moreover, the metaphysics of Edwards imposed a degree of respect upon the flippancy of philosophers. But then (not again to insist upon the fact, that the "Inquiry" has become almost the text book of infidelity) it has not in any sensible degree brought home the abstract argument to the purely theological difficulty. It has left things where they were, in this respect, only with the disadvantage of suggesting a tacit conviction-that, what Edwards could not effect, can never be effected. The apparently incompatible propositions may therefore be affirmed, that, while our author, as the champion of Calvinism, has achieved a victory, and driven his antagonists from the ground they had unwisely occupied; he has confirmed and perpetuated the religious difference, by the mere fact of having failed in his attempt to compose it. Is it, then, at all to be desired, that a second philosophic Calvinist should undertake the task of leading Arminians on the path of scientific demonstration, to a cordial acquiescence in the plain meaning of certain portions of the Scriptures? We think not. Nevertheless, it ought not to be regarded as an improbable event, that pious Calvinists should at length meet pious Arminians on com VOL. VI.-N.S. I I mon ground; and that the difference between the two parties should for ever be merged in a Biblical doctrine.' pp. 1-lii. But a consummation like this, so devoutly to be desired, will be the result, our Author adds, ' not of the perfection of meta' physical theology, but of a better understanding of the special nature of the Document of Faith,' as, ' in the fullest sense, a 'Divine work.' Metaphysical reasoning, how rigid and exact soever, is not to be looked to as the means of adjusting Biblical controversies. It is one thing, to silence and confound an antagonist by force of logical strength;' it is quite another thing, to produce a permanent conciliation of differences. In the following section, the Writer proceeds to inquire, in what manner, and to what extent, the question of liberty and necessity belongs to the Physiology of the Human Mind. If that branch of physiology is indeed to rank among the Physical Sciences, if the study of mental phenomena is to be conducted upon the same principles of sound and careful induction from observation and experiment, that are now applied to every other branch of scientific investigation,-then, it is obvious, that the question of causation, or of free-will, can have no more to do with Intellectual Philosophy, than it has with comparative anatomy or botany, or than Berkeley's idealism has to do with chemistry. Whether the amiable Bishop's theory respecting the material world be true or false, it remains true, that sulphuric acid will change a vegetable blue to red, and that combustion goes on more rapidly in oxygen gas, than in common air. In like manner, it is, to the naturalist, a matter of ab'solute indifference, while informing himself of the internal structure of animals, or of their dispositions, faculties, and 'habits, in what way the systems of idealists, of materialists, of 'necessitarians, or of sceptics are disposed of,' So, in conducting a scientific inquiry respecting the mental processes of perception, the laws of volition, or the nature and operation of moral emotions,-all pure matters of physiological fact,-it ought to be felt, that the results of such investigation are as absolutely independent of metaphysical dogmas and abstract truths, as are the affinities of acids and the crystallization of 'salts. There would indeed,' continues the Writer, never have been occasion even so much as to affirm this independence of physics and metaphysics, were it not that the immemorial practice of confounding the science of the human mind with pure abstractions, has filled both departments of 'intellectual philosophy with absurdity, and has detained both, 'to the present day, in a state of infancy.' * * In a note to a former page, the Writer adverts to Dr. Brown's |