wrote: St Paul is an apoftle: therefore chriftianity requires us to believe what St Paul wrote.

No human artift can make an animal; a fly or a worm is an animal: therefore no human artist can make a fly or a worm.

The father always lived in London; the fon always lived with the father: therefore the fon always lived in London.

The bloffom foon follows the full bud; this peartree hath many full buds: therefore it will shortly have many blooms.

One hail-stone never falls alone; but a hail-ftone fell just now; therefore others fell with it.

Thunder feldom comes without lightning; but it thundered yesterday: therefore probably it lightened

alfo.

Mofes wrote before the Trojan war; the first Greek hiftorians wrote after the Trojan war: therefore the firft Greek hiftorians wrote after Mofes.*

Now the force of all these arguments is fo evident and conclusive, that though the form of the fyllogifm be never fo irregular, yet we are fure the inferences are juft and true, for the premises, according to the realon of things, do really contain the conclusion that is deduced from them, which is a never-failing test of true fyllogifms, as fhall be fhewn here-after.

The truth of most of these complex fyllogifms may also be made to appear (if needful) by reducing them either to regular, simple fyllogifins, or to fome of the conjunctive fyllogifms, which are defcribed in the next fection. I will give an inftance only in the first, and leave the rest to exercise the ingenuity of the reader. The first argument may be reduced to a fyllogifm in Barbara, thus,

The fun is a fenseless being;

What the Persians worthipped is the fun:

Therefore what the Persians worthipped is a fenfe

* Perhaps fome of these fyllogifms may be reduced to those which I call connexive afterwards; but it is of little moment to what ípecies they belong; for it is not any formal fet of rules, fo much as the evidence and force of reafon, that muft determine the truth or falfehood of all fuch fyllogifms.

lefs being. Though the conclusive force of this argument is evident without this reduction.

TH

SECT. V.

Of conjunctive Syllogifms.

HOSE are called conjunctive fyllogifms wherein one of the premifes, namely the major, has diftinct parts, which are joined by a conjunction, or fome fuch particle of fpeech. Most times the major or minor, or both, are explicitly compound propositions and generally the major proposition is made up of two distinct parts or propositions, in fuch a manner, as that by the affertion of one in the minor, the other is either afferted or denied in the conclusion ; or by the denial of one in the minor, the other is either afferted or denied in the conclusion. It is hardly possible indeed to fit any fhort definition to include all the kinds of them; but the chief amongst them are the conditional fyllogifm, the disjunctive, the relative, and the connexive.

I. The conditional or hypothetical fyllogifms is whofe major, or minor, or both, are conditional propositions; as, if there be a God, the world is governed by Providence; but there is a God: therefore the world is governed by Providence.

The fyllogifms admit two forts of true argumentation, where the major is conditional.

1. When the antecedent is afferted in the minor, that the confequence may be afferted in the conclusion; fuch is the preceding example. This is called arguing from the position of the antecedent to the position of the confequent.

2. When the confequent is contradicted in the minor proposition, that the antecedent may be contradicted

in the conclusion; as, if atheifts are in the right, then the world exifts without a caufe; but the world does not exist without a caufe: therefore atheists are not in the right. This is called arguing from the removing of the confequent to the removing of the antecedent.

To remove the antecedent or confequent here does not merely signify the denial of it, but the contradiction of it; for the mere denial of it by a contrary proposition will not make a true fyllogifm, as appears thus if every creature be reasonable, every brute is reasonable; but no brute is reasonable: therefore no creature is reasonable. Whereas, if you fay in the minor, but every brute is not reasonable: then it would follow truly in the conclusion: therefore every creature is not reasonable.

When the antecedent or confequent are negative propositions, they are removed by an affirmative; as, if there be no God, then the world does not discover creating wifdom; but the world does difcover creating wifdom: therefore there is a God. In this inftance the confequent is removed or contradicted in the minor, that the antecedent may be contradicted in the conclusion. So in this argument of St Paul, 1 Cor. xv. ‹‹ lf the dead rife not, Chrift died in vain; but Chrift did not die in vain: therefore the dead fhall rife."

There are alfo two forts of false arguing, viz. (1.) from the removing of the antecedent to the removing of the confequent; or, (2.) from the position of the confequent to the position of the antecedent. Examples of these are easily framed; as,

(1.) If a minifter were a prince, he must be honoured; but a minifter is not a prince :

Therefore he must not be honoured.

(2.) If a minifter were a prince, he must be honoured; but a minifter muft be honoured:

Therefore he is a prince.

Who fees not the ridiculous falfehood of both these fyllogifms?

Obferv. I. If the fubject of the antecedent and the confequent be the fame, then the hypothetical fyllogifm may be turned into a categorical one; as, if Cæfar be a

king, he must be honoured; but Cæfar is a king; therefore, &c. This may be changed thus; every king must be honoured; but Cæfar is a king: therefore, &c.

Obferv. II. If the major proposition only be conditional, the conclusion is categorical: but if the minor or both be conditional, the conclusion is also conditional; as, the worshippers of images are idolaters; if the Papifts worship a crucifix, they are worshippers of an image: therefore, if the Papifts worship a crucifix, they are idolaters. But this fort of fyllogifms fhould be avoided as much as poffible in difputation, because they greatly embarras a caufe: the fyllogifms whofe major only is hypothetical, are very frequent, and ufed with great advantage.

II. A disjunctive fyllogifm is when the major proposition is disjunctive; as, the earth moves in a circle or an ellipsis; but it does not move in a circle; therefore it moves in an ellipsis.

A disjunctive fyllogifm may have many members or parts thus; it is either fpring, fummer, autumn, or winter; but it is not spring, autumn, or winter; therefore it is fummer.

The true method of arguing here is from the affertion of one, to the denial of the reft, or from the denial of one or more, to the affertion of what remains; but the major fhould be fo framed that feveral parts of it cannot be true together, though one of them is evidently true.

III. A relative fyllogifm requires the major proposition to be relative; as, where Chrift is, there shall his fervants be; but Chrift is in heaven; therefore his fervants shall be there also. Or, as is the captain, so are his foldiers; but the captain is a coward: therefore his foldiers are so too.

Arguments that relate to the doctrine of proportion, must be referred to this head; as, as two are to four, fo are three to six; but two make the half of four therefore three make the half of six.

Befides thefe, there is another fort of fyllogifms which

Y

is very natural and common, and yet authors take very little notice of it, call it by an improper name, and describe it very defectively, and that is,

IV. A connective fyllogifm. This fome have called copulative; but it does by no means require the major to be a copulative nor a compound propofition (according to the definition given of it, Part II. Chap II. Sect. 6.) but it requires that two or more ideas be fo connected either in the complex fubject or predicate of the major, that if one of them be affirmed or denied in the minor, common fense will naturally fhew us what will be the confequence. It would be very tedious and ufelefs to frame particular rules about them, as will appear by the following examples, which are very various, and yet may be farther multiplied.

(1.) Meeknefs and humility always go together; Mofes was a man of meeknefs: therefore Mofes was alfo humble. Or we may form this minor, Pharaoh was no humble man; therefore he was not meek.

(2.) No man can ferve God and Mammon? the covetous man ferves Mammon: therefore he cannot ferve God. Or the minor may run thus, the true Christian serves God; therefore he does not serve Mammon.

(3) Genius muft join with ftudy to make a great man; Florino has genius but he cannot study: therefore Florino. will never be a great man. Or thus, Quintus ftudies hard but has no genius: therefore Quintus will never be a great man.

(4) Gulo cannot make a dinner without flesh and fish; there was no fish to be gotten to-day: therefore Gulo this day cannot make a dinner.

(5.) London and Paris are in different latitudes; the latitude of London is 51 deg. 1 half; therefore this cannot be the latitude of Paris.

(6.) Jofeph and Benjamin had one mother; Rachel was the mother of Jofeph: therefore he was Benjamin's mother too.

(7) The father and the fon are of equal ftature; the father is fix feet high: therefore the fon is fix feet alfo,