§ 136. Of the undefinableness of the term freedom.

Now if such be the origin of the abstract notion of freedom, and if it be the name of a simple and not a complex idea, (as certainly there is every reason to believe it to be so,) then every one who speaks of freedom, or enters into a discussion upon it, must be supposed to know of himself what freedom is. Certain it is, if he pleads ignorance of the import of the term, we shall find ourselves wholly unable to make it known to him by any statements in language. It being the name of a simple idea, if we attempt to define it, we must necessarily employ synonymous terms, and which require an explanation no less than the one in question. Every definition of the name of a simple idea, which is not a synonym of the word itself or a synonymous phrase, is necessarily erroneous. Nature and truth never contradict themselves. And if it be true that the idea is simple, then any attempted analysis of it, which goes upon the supposition of its be'ng complex, which is the case with all real in distinction from synonymous definitions, must evidently lead us into some mistake.

And as to a synonym or synonymous phrase, it is entirely clear that it cannot give us any new light in the matter; and, accordingly, we are necessarily thrown back upon our own experience for a knowledge of the thing under inquiry.

§ 137. Supposed definitions of freedom are either mere synonyms, or embrace some element which itself requires explanations.

It may perhaps be useful to introduce one or two instances of definitions, which have been given by leading

writers on the subject, in illustration and proof of our remark, that the term in question cannot be defined. Mr. Hobbes defines it as follows. Liberty is the absence of all impediments to action, that are not contained in the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent." But the phrase absence of all impediments is obviously synonymous with liberty, and conveys no new idea. So that the definition, substituting other terms, amounts to this, and this only, that freedom is that liberty to action which is contained in or permitted by the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent.

Buffier gives the following definition. "Liberty is the disposition a man feels within himself, of his capacity to act or not to act, to choose or not to choose a thing, at the same moment." Here the term CAPACITY appears to be the synonymous expression. So that if we carefully reflect upon this definition, we shall probably find it amounting to merely this: Liberty is the consciousness a man has of his freedom to act or not to act, to choose or not to choose. And if we suppose the term CAPACITY is not synonymous with liberty, it still remains a matter of doubt what precise idea it conveys. And the mind, consequently, remains unsatisfied.

The definition given by Dr. Reid is this. "By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand a POWER Over the determinations of his own Will." It is difficult to make anything of this definition, because it seems to imply the existence of a volitive power or Will back of that, whose decisions are the immediate precursors of our actions. If it do not imply this, then all that is meant is, that the liberty of a moral agent is his POWER to put forth voluntary determinations or acts of the will. And in that case, POWER is the synonymous expression; and, of course,

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gives us no new light in the case. And if it be not so, the difficulty is not at all removed; for, if we suppose the term power to have a distinct meaning from liberty, that idea or meaning, whatever it may be, is simple and undefinable.

But it is unnecessary to remark further. According to the best reflections we have been able to bestow, it is altogether useless to give a definition of liberty, because it is, in the nature of the case, impossible to do it; and is unadvisable also, because every supposed definition, so far from settling the subject, has been generally found to leave it open to long controversies and disputes.

§ 138. Distinction between the idea and reality of liberty.

But a distinction is to be made, which has already been hinted at, between the mere notion, the abstract idea of freedom, and freedom itself; between the conception of it as an object of thought, and the possession of it as a reality and a matter of personal experience. We may have the abstract idea of freedom just as we have the abstract conception of power; and we may reason upon the abstraction of freedom just as we reason upon the abstract idea or abstraction of power, without possessing either freedom or power in ourselves.

The idea of liberty in the abstract is the result, the suggestion, or the creature even, of what is sometimes called the pure intellect; that is to say, it is the result or suggestion of intellectual operations, which appear to be the most disconnected and removed from external material impressions. And as such, it is truly an intellectual entity; a real and distinct object of contemplation, of knowledge, of reasoning. But, after all, it is to be noticed,

that this is merely the idea of the thing, and not the thing itself; it is the intellectual representative of liberty, but not the experience and the reality of liberty; it is that which the veriest mental slave may conceive of and may speculate upon, as an object nakedly and coldly suspended in the distance; but which is very different from that which the person who actually possesses freedom, realizes as a thing near at hand, and enjoys as his own valued and personal possession.

§ 139. Of the source of our knowledge of liberty itself in distinction from the abstract idea of liberty.

Of liberty in itself, in distinction from the abstract idea of liberty; in other words, of freedom in the actual state of realization, we can have a knowledge by Consciousness, and by that alone. If a man (we speak now of the mind of man, and not of his body, and of the mind in a condition of mental soundness, and not in a state of either total or partial insanity) truly feels himself to be free, we seem to have no alternative but to take it for granted that he is so. This is something ultimate; we cannot go beyond nor around it; being based upon an original and ultimate feeling, it is, of course, founded in one of the deepest and surest sources of knowledge; and we are under a sort of necessity, therefore, of admitting that the consciousness and the realization, the knowledge and the fact, go together.

And, in connexion with this view, we shall not hesi tate to assume, that each one is not only disposed to consult his consciousness, but to rely confidently on its intimations. We make this assumption, because we know of no other way in which it is possible for him, on a subject

of this nature, to arrive at distinct and satisfactory conclusions for himself, or to understand the statements of others. If freedom, in its essence and realization, is what it is known to be in our consciousness, and that, too, without the possibility of its being anything else, then surely, however difficult it may be to give a definition of the abstract idea of freedom, we may enter on the examination of the subject-matter before us with entire confidence, since it is one, according to the view now given, which necessarily comes within the range of each one's personal knowledge.

§ 140. Of the precise import of the phrase moral liberty.

We close the suggestions of this chapter with a single remark more. It is not uncommon to hear persons using the phrase moral liberty; and particularly in its applications to man. But the thought naturally arises, what is the distinction between moral liberty and any other liberty? To this inquiry it may be answered, that the phrase moral liberty indicates, not a difference in the essence of liberty or in the liberty itself, which we have reason to believe is the same, so far as it exists at all, in all beings whatever, from the highest to the lowest; but must be understood chiefly to express, in connexion with the fact of liberty, a difference in the capacity or sphere of the mind of which it is predicable. The liberty of brutes is as perfect in its sphere as that of men or angels. As they roam in forests and mountain wildernesses, or swim in the depths of the ocean, or fly and gayly sing in the radiant fields of the summer's sky, they are free; they rejoice in their freedom, and prize it as one of heaven's best gifts. But we never think of ascribing to them moral liberty,