or little but were we to attempt general rules for ranging objects under different claffes, according to thefe qualities, we fhould be much gravelled. A separate cause increases the difficulty of diftinguishing rifible objects by a general character: all men are not equally affected by risible objects; nor the fame man at all times; for in high spirits a thing will make him laugh outright, which fcarce provokes a fmile in a grave mood. Rifible objects, however, are circumfcribed within certain limits; which I fhall fuggeft, without pretending to accuracy. And, in the first place, I obferve, that no object is rifible but what appears flight, little, or trivial; for we laugh at nothing that is of importance to our own interest, or to that of others. A real distress raises pity, and therefore cannot be rifible; but a flight or imaginary distress, which moves not pity, is rifible. The adventure of the fulling-mills in Don Quixote, is extremely rifible; fo is the scene where Sancho, in a dark night, tumbling into a pit, and attaching himfelf to the fide by hand and foot, hangs there in terrible difmay till the morning, when he discovers himfelf to be within a foot of the bottom. A nofe remarkably long or fhort, is rifible: but to want it altogether, far from provoking laughter, raises horror in the fpectator. Secondly, With refpect to works both of nature and of art, none of them are rifible but what are out of rule, fome remarkable defect or excefs; a very long vifage, for example, or a very short one. Hence nothing juft, proper, decent, beautiful, proportioned, or grand, is rifible.

Even from this flight sketch it will readily be conjectured, that the emotion raised by a rifible object is of a nature fo fingular, as fcarce to find_place while the mind is occupied with any other paffion or emo,

P2

tion:

tion and the conjecture is verified by experience for we scarce ever find that emotion blended with any other. One emotion I must except; and that is, contempt raised by certain improprieties: every im proper act infpires us with fome degree of contempt for the author; and if an improper act be at the fame time rifible to provoke laughter, of which blunders and abfurdities are noted inftances, the two emotions of contempt and of laughter unite intimately in the mind, and produce externally what is termed a laugh of derifion or of fcorn. Hence objects that cause laughter may be diftinguished into two kinds: they are either rifible or ridiculous. A rifible object is mirthful only a ridiculous object is both mirthful and contemptible. The first raises an emotion of laughter that is altogether pleasant: the pleafant emotion of laughter raised by the other, is blended with the painful emotion of contempt; and the mixed emotion is termed the emotion of ridicule. The pain a ridiculous object gives me is refented and punished by a laugh of derifion. A rifible object, on the other hand, gives me no pain it is altogether pleafant by a certain fort of titillation, which is expreffed externally by mirthful laughter. Ridicule will be more fully explained afterward the present chapter is appropriated to the

other emotion.

Rifible objects are fo common, and fo well underftood, that it is unneceffary to confume paper or time upon them. Take the few following examples.

Falstaff. I do remember him at Clement's inn, like a man made after fupper of a checfe-paring. When he was naked, he was for all the world like a forked radish, with a head fantastically carved upon it with a knife.

Second Part, Henry IV. act. 3. fc. 5.

The foregoing is of difproportion. The following examples are of flight or imaginary misfortunes.

Falstaff.

Falstaff. Go fetch me a quart of fack; put a toaft in't. Have I liv'd to be carried in a basket, like a barrow of butcher's offal, and to be thrown into the Thames! Well, if I be ferved fuch another trick, I'll have my brains ta'en out and butter'd, and give them to a dog for a new year's gift. The rogues flighted me into the river with as little remorfe as they would have drown'd a bitch's blind puppies, fifteen i'th'litter; and you may know by my fize, that I have a kind of alacrity in finking: if the bottom were as deep as hell, I fhould down. I had been drown'd, but that the fhore was fhelvy and fhallow; a death that I abhor; for the water fwells a man: and what a thing should I have been when I had been fwell'd? I fhould have been a mountain of mummy.

Merry Wives of Windfor, at 3.fc. 15.

Falstaff. Nay, you fhall hear, Master Brook, what I have fuffer'd to bring this woman to evil for your good. Being thus cramm'd in the basket, a couple of Ford's knaves, his hinds, were call'd forth by their mistress, to carry me in the name of foul cloaths to Datchet-lane. They took me on their fhoulders, met the jealous knave their master in the door, who afk'd them once or twice what they had in their basket. I quak'd for fear, left the lunatick knaves would have fearch'd it; but Fate, ordaining he should be a cuckold, held his hand. Well, on went he for a fearch, and away went I for foul cloaths. But mark the sequel, Master Brook. I fuffer'd the pangs of three egregious deaths; firft, an intolerable fright, to be detected by a jealous rotten bell-weather; next, to be compafs'd like a good bilbo, in the circumference of a peck, hilt to point, heel to head; and then to be ftopt in, like a strong diftillation, with ftinking cloaths that fretted in their own greafe. Think of that, a man of my kidney; think of that, that am as fubject to heat as butter; a man of continual diffolution and thaw; it was a miracle to 'fcape fuffocation. And in the height of this bath, when I was more than half stew'd in greafe, like a Dutch difh, to be thrown into the Thames, and cool'd glowing hot, in that furge, like a horfe fhoe; think of that ; hiffing hot; think of that, Malter Brook.

Merry Wives of Windsor, act 3. Sc. 17.

CHA P. VIII.

Refemblance and Diffimilitude.

HAVING difcuffed thofe qualities and circumstances of fingle objects that feem peculiarly connected with criticifm, we proceed, according to the method propofed in the chapter of beauty, to the relations of objects, beginning with the relations of refemblance and diffimilitude.

The connection that man hath with the beings around him, requires fome acquaintance with their nature, their powers, and their qualities, for regulating his conduct. For acquiring a branch of knowledge fo effential to our well-being, motives alone of reafon and intereft are not fufficient: nature hath providently fuperadded curiofity, a vigorous propensity, which never is at rest. This propenfity attaches us to every new object; and incites us to compare objects, in order to discover their differences and refemblances.

Refemblance among objects of the fame kind, and diffimilitude among objects of different kinds, are too obvious and familiar to gratify our curiofity in any degree its gratification lies in difcovering dif ferences among things where refemblance prevails, and resemblances where difference prevails. Thus a difference in individuals of the fame kind of plants or animals is deemed a discovery; while the many par ticulars in which they agree are neglected and in different kinds, any refemblance is greedily remarked,

See chap. 6.

without

without attending to the many particulars in which they differ.

A comparison, however, may be too far ftretched. When differences or resemblances are carried beyond certain bounds, they appear flight and trivial; and for that reafon will not be relished by a man of taste: yet fuch propenfity is there to gratify paffion, curiofity in particular, that even among good writers we find many comparisons too flight to afford fatisfaction. Hence the frequent inftances among logicians of diftinctions without any folid difference: and hence the frequent inftances among poets and orators, of fimilies without any just resemblance. With regard to the latter, I fhall confine myself to one instance, which will probably amufe the reader, being a quotation, not from a poet nor orator, but from a grave author, writing an institute of law. 66. Our ftudent fhall obferve, that the knowledge of the law is like a deep well, out of which each man draweth according to the strength of his understanding. He that reacheth deepest, feeth the amiable and admirable fecrets of the law, wherein I affure you the fages of the law in former times have had the deepest reach. And, as the bucket in the depth is eafily drawn to the uppermoft part of the water, (for nullum elementum in fuo proprio loco eft grave) but take it from the water, it cannot be drawn up but with a great difficulty; fo, albeit beginnings of this study feem difficult, yet, when the profeffor of the law can dive into the depth, it is delightful, eafy, and without any heavy burden, fo long as he keep himself in his own

proper element.*" Shakespear, with uncommon humour, ridicules fuch difpofition to fimile-making, by

* Coke upon Lyttleton, p. 71.