pride and envy. put a man perpetually in oppofition to others; and difpofe him to relish bad more than good qualities, even in a companion. How different that difpofition of mind, where every virtue in a companion or neighbour is, by refinement of tafte, fet in its ftrongest light; and defects or blemishes, natural to all, are fuppreffed, or kept out of view!

In the next place, delicacy of tafte tends no lefs to invigorate the focial affections, than to moderate thofe that are felfifh. To be convinced of that tendency, we need only reflect, that delicacy of tafte neceffarily heightens our feeling of pain and pleafure; and of courfe our fympathy, which is the capital branch of every focial paffion. Sympathy invites a communication of joys and forrows, hopes and fears: fuch exercife, foothing and fatisfactory in itfelf, is neceffarily productive of mutual goodwill and affection.

One other advantage of rational criticism is referved to the laft place, being of all the most important; which is, that it is a great fupport to morality. I infift on it with entire fatisfaction, that no occupation attaches a man more to his duty, than that of cultivating a tafte in the fine arts: a juft relifh of what is beautiful, proper, clegant, and ornamental,

in

in writing or painting, in architecture or gardening, is a fine preparation for the fame juft. relith of thefe qualities in character and behaviour. To the man who has acquired a tafte fo acute and accomplished, every action wrong or improper mufl be highly difguftful: if, in any infance, the overbearing power of paffion fway him from his duty, he returns to it with redoubled refolution never to be fwayed a fecond time: he has now an additional motive to virtue, a conviction derived from experience, that happiness depends on regularity and order, and that difregard to juftice or propriety never fails to be punished with fhame and remorfe.*

Rude ages exhibit the triumph of authority over reafon: Philofophers anciently were divided into fects, being Epicureans, Platonifts, Stoics, Pythagoreans, or Sceptics: the fpeculative relied no farther on their own judgment but to choose a leader, whom they implicitly fol lowed. In later times, happily, reafon hath obtained the afcendant: men now affert their native privilege of thinking for themselves and difdain to be ranked in any fect, whatever be

the

Genius is allied to a warm and inflammable conftitution, delicacy of tafte to calmnefs and fedatenefs. Hence it is common to

find genius in one who is a prey to every paflion; but feldom delicacy of rafte. Upon a man pofffed of that bleffing, the moral duties, no less than the fine arts, make a deep impreffion, and couns terbalance every irregular dente: at the fame time, a temper calm and fedate is not easily imoved, eveu by a strong temptation.

the fcience. I am forced to except criticism, which, by what fatality I know not, continues to be no lefs flavifh in its principles, nor lefs fubmiffive to authority, than it was originally. Boffu, a celebrated French critic, gives many rules; but can discover no better foundation for any of them, than the practice merely of Homer and Virgil, fupported by the authority of Ariftotle; Strange! that in fo long a work, he fhould never once have ftumbled upon the queftion, Whether, and how far, do thefe rules agree with human nature. It could not furely be his opinion, that thefe poets, however eminent for genius, were entitled to give law to mankind; and that nothing now remains, but blind obedience to their arbitrary will: if in writing they followed no rule, why should they be imitated? If they ftudied nature, and were obfequious to rational principles, why fhould thefe be concealed from us?

With refpect to the prefent undertaking, it is not the author's intention to compofe a regular treatise upon each of the fine arts; but only, in general, to exhibit their fundamental principles, drawn from human nature, the true fource of criticifm. The fine arts are intended to entertain us, by making pleafant impreffions; and, by that circumftance, are diftinguished

from

from the ufeful arts: but, in order to make pleafant impreffions, we ought, as above hinted, to know what objects are naturally agrees able, and what naturally difagreeable. That fubject is here attempted, as far as neceffary for unfolding the genuine principles of the fine arts; and the author affumes no merit from his performance, but that of evincing, perhaps more diftinctly than hitherto has been done, that thefe principles, as well as every juft rule of criticifm, are founded upon the fenfitive part of our nature. What the author hath difcovered or collected upon that fubject, he choofes to impart in the gay and agreeable form of criticifm; imagining that this form will be more relifhed, and perhaps be no lefs inftructive, than a regular and laboured difquifition. His plan is, to afcend gradually to principles, from facts and experiments; inftead of beginning with the former, handled abftractedly, and defcending to the latter. But, though criticism is thus his only declared aim, he will not difown, that all along it has been his view, to explain the nature of man, confidered as a fenfitive being . capable of pleafure and pain: and, though he flatters himself with having made fome progrefs in that important feience, lie is, however, too fenfible of its extent and difficulty, to under

take

take it profeffedly, or to avow it as the chief purpofe of the prefent work.

To cenfure works, not men, is the juft prerogative of criticifm; and accordingly all perfonal cenfure is here avoided, unlefs where neceffary to illuftrate fome general propofition. No praife is claimed on that account; because cenfuring with a view merely to find fault, cannot be entertaining to any perfon of humanity. Writers, one fhould imagine, ought, above all others, to be referved on that article, when they lie fo open to retaliation. The author of this treatise, far from being confident of meriting no cenfure, entertains not even the flightest hope of fuch perfection. Amusement was at firft the fole aim of his inquiries: proceeding from one particular to another, the fubject grew under his hand; and he was far advanced before the thought ftruck him, that his private meditations might be publicly useful. In public, however, he would not appear in a flovenly drefs; and therefore he pretends not otherwife to apologife for his errors, than by obferving, that in a new fubject no lefs nice than extenfive, errors are infome meafure unavoidable. Neither pretends he to juftify his tafte in every particular that point muit be extremely clear, which admits not variety of opinion; and in

fome