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otherwise call them, Body and Spirit ; at least, we have no Ideas of any other Substance but these *.
Among Substances, some are called Simple, soine are Compound, whether the Words be taken in a philosophical or a vulgar Sense.
Simple Substances in a philosophical Sense, are either Spirits which have no manner of Composition in them, and in this Sense God is called a simple Being ; or they are the first Principles of Bodies, which are usually called Elements, of which all other Bodies are compounded : Elements are such Sub
stances * Because Men have different Ideas and Notions of Substance, I thought it not proper entirely to omit all Accounts of them, and therefore have thrown them into the Margin.
Some Philosophers suppose that our Acquaintance with Matter or Mind reaches no farther than the mere Properties of them, and that there is a sort of unknown Being, which is the Sabftance or the Subject by which these Properties of solid Extension and of Cogitation are supported, and in which. these Properties inhere or exist. But perhaps this Nocion arises only from our curning the mere abstracted or logical Notion of Substance or Self Sublisting into the Notion of a distinct physical or natural Being, without any Necellity. Solid Extension seems to me to be the very Substance of Matter or of all Bodies: and a Power of thinking, which is always in all, seems to be very
Substance of all Spirits ; for God himself is an intelligent, almighty Power; nor is there any need to seek for any other secret and unknown Bee ing, or abstracted Subfiance entirely distinct from these, in order to support the several Modes or Properties of Matter or Mind, for these two Ideas are sufficient for chat Purpose ; therefore I rather think these are Substances.
It must be confeit, when we say, Spirit is a thinking Substance, and Mate ter is an extended solid Substance, we are sometimes ready to imagine thac Extension and Solidity are but mere Modes and Properties of a certain unknown Substance or Subje&t which supports them, and which we call Body; and that a Power of thinking, is but a mere Mode and Froperty of some unknown Substance or Subject wbich supports it, and which we call Spirit : But I rather take this to be a mere Mistake, which we are led into by the grammatical Form and Use of Words; and perhaps our Ingical way of thinking by Substances and Modes, as well as our grammatical Way of talking by Subsiantives and Adjectives, help to delude us into this Suppoiscion.
However, that I may not be wanting to any of my Readers, I would let them know Mr. Locke's Opinion, which has obtained much in the present Age, and it is this : “ That our Idea of any particular Substance, is only “ such a Combination of simple Ideas as represents that Thing as fubfitting by “ itself, in which the supposed or confused Idea of Substance (such as it is) is “ always ready to offer itself. It is a Conjunction of Ideas co-existing in “ such a Cause of their Union, and makes the whole Subje& subsift by itself, “ chough the Cause of their Union be unknown; and our general idea of “ Subfiance arises from the Self-subsistence of this Collection of Ideas.”
Now if this Notion of Substance reft here, and be considered merely as an unknown Cause of the Union of Properties, it is much more easy to be ad.
stances as cannot be resolved, or reduced, into two or more Substances of different kinds.
The various Sects of Philosophers have attributed the Honour of this Name to various Things. The Peripatetisks, or Followers of Aristotle, made Fire, Air, Earth and Water to be the four Elements, of which all earthly Things were compounded ; and they supposed the Heavens to be a Quintessence, or fifth fort of Body distinct from all thele: But, since experimental Philosophy and Mathematics have been better understood, this Doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The Chymists make Spirit, Salt, Sulphur, Water and Earth to be their five Elements, because they can reduce all terrestrial Things to these five: This seems to come nearer the Truth ; though they are not all agreed in this Enumeration of Elements. In short, our modern Philosophers generally fuppose Matter or Body to be one simple Principle, or solid Extension, which being diversified by its various Shapes, Quantities, Motions and Situations, makes all the Varieties that are found in the Universe ; and therefore they make little Use of the Word Element.
Compound Substances are made up of two or mitted : But if we proceed to suppose a sort of real, fubftantial, diftinct Being, different from solid Quantity or Extension in Bodies, and different from a Power of tbinking in Spirits,
in my opinion it is the Introduction of a needless scholaftical Notion into the real Nature of Things, and then fancying it to have a real Existence.
Mr. Locke in his Elay of Hum. Und. Book II. Ch. 22. §2. seems to ridicule this common Idea of Substance, which Men have generally supposed to be a sort of Substratum diftinct from all Properties whatsoever, and to be the Support of all Properties. Yet in Book IV. Ch. 3. §.6. he seems to fuppose there may be some such unknown Substratum, which may be capable of receiving the Properties both of Master and of Mind, (viz.) Extension, solidity, and Cogitation ; for he supposes it possible for God to add Cogitation to that Subfance which is corporeal, and thus to cause Matter to ibink. If this be true, then Spirits (for ought we know) may be corporeal Beings or thinking Bodies, which is a Ductrine too favourable to the Mortality of tbe Soul. But I leave these Debates to the Philosophers of the Age, and will not be too positive in my Opinion of this abstruse Subject. See more of this Argument in Pbilosopbical Elays before citede En. 2d.
more simple Substances : So every Thing in this whole material Creation, that can be reduced by the Art of Man into two or more different Principles or Substances, is a compound Body in the philosophical Sense.
But if we take the Words Simple and Compound in a vulgar Sense, then all those are simple Subfiances which are generally esteemed uniform in their Natures. So every Herb is called a Simple ; and every Metal and Mineral ; tho' the Chymist perhaps may find all his several Elements in each of them. So a Needle is a simple Body, being made only of Steel ; but a Sword or a Knife is a Compound, because its Haft or Handle is made of Materials different from the Blade. So the Bark of Peru, or the Juice of Sorrel is a simple Medicine : But when the Apothecaries Art has mingled several Simples together, it becomes a Compound, as Diascordium or Mitbridate.
The Terms of pure and mixt, when applied to Bodies, are much akin to simple and compound. So a Guinea is pure Gold, if it has nothing but Gold in it, without any Alloy or baser Metal : But if any other Mineral or Metal be mingled with it, it is called a mixt Substance or Body.
Substances are also divided into animate and inanimate. Animated Substances are either animal or vegetable *
Some of the animated Substances have various organical or instrumental Parts, fitted for a Variety of Motions from Place to Place, and a Spring of Life within themselves, as Beasts, Birds, Fishes, and Inseits ; these are called Animals. Other animated Substances are called Vegetables, which have within themselves the Principles of another
Note, Vegetables as well as Animals have gotten the Name of animated Substances, because some of the Antients supposed Herbs and Plants, Beasts and Birds, &c. to have a sort of Souls distinct from Matter or Body. B 3
sort of Life and Growth, and of various Productions of Leaves, Flowers and Fruit, such as we fee in Plants, Herbs and Trees.
And there are other Substances, which are call'd inanimate, because they have no sort of Life in them, as Earth, Stone, Air, Water, &c.
There is also one sort of Substance, or Being, which is compounded of Body and Mind, or a rational Spirit united to an Animal; such is Mankind. Angels, or any other Beings of the spiritual and invisible World, who have assum'd visible Shapes for a Seafon, can hardly be reckon'd anong this order of compounded Beings; because they drop their Bodies, and divest themselves of those visible Shapes, when their particular Message is perform’d, and thereby shew that these Bodies do not belong to their Natures.
Of Modes and their various kinds, and first of effen
tial and accidental Modes.
HE next sort of Objects which are repre
sented in our Ideas, are called Modes, or Manners of Being t.
A Mode is that which cannot fubfift in and of itself, but is always esteem'd as belonging to, and subsisting by, the help of some Substance, which for that Reason, is called its Subject. A Mode muft depend on that Substance for its very Existence and Being; and that not as a Being depends on its Cause, (for fo Substances themselves depend
† Note, The Term Mode is by fome Authors applied chiefly to the Rela tions or relative Manners of Being. But in logical Treatises it is often used in a larger Sense, and extends to all Attributes whatsoever, and includes the most essential and inward Properties, as well as outward Respects and Relatia ons, and reaches to Allians themselves as well as Manners of Action.
on God their Creator ; (but the very Being of a Mode depends on some Substance for its Subject, in which it is, or to which it belongs ; so Motion, Shape, Quantity, Weight, are Modes of Body; Knowledge, Wit, Felly, Love, Doubting, Judging, are Modes of the Mind ; for the one cannot subsist without Body, and the other cannot subsist without Mind.
Modes have their several Divisions, as well as Substances.
I. Modes are either essential, or accidental.
An esential Mode or Attribute, is that which belongs to the very Nature or Efience of the Subject wherein it is; and the Subject can never have the same Nature without it ; such is Roundness in a Bowl, Hardness in a Stone, Softness in Water, vital Motion in an Animal, Solidity in Matter, Thinking in a Spirit ; for tho' that piece of Wood which is now a Bowl may be made square, yet if Roundness be taken away, it is no longer a Bowl: So that very Flesh and Bones, which is now an Animal, may be without Life or inward Motion ; but if all Motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an Animal, but a Carcass: So it a Body or Matter, be divested of Solidity, it is a mere void Space or Nothing; and if Spirit be entirely without Thinking, I have no idea of any Thing that is left in it; therefore so far as I am able to judge, Consciousness must be its essential Attribute*: Thus all the Perfe&tions of God are called his Attributes, for he cannot be without them.
* Note, When I call folid Extenfion an essential Mode or Attribute of Matter, and a Power of Thinking an essential Mode or Attribute of a Spirit, I do it in compliance with common Forms of Speech : but perhaps in reality these are the very Essences or Substances themselves, and the most subítantial Ideas that we can frame of Body and Spirit, and have no need of any (we know not what) Substratum or unintelligible Substance to support them in their Existence or Being.