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otherwife call them, Body and Spirit; at leaft, we have no Ideas of any other Subftance but thefe*.

Among Subftances, fome are called Simple, fome are Compound, whether the Words be taken in a philofophical or a vulgar Senfe.

Simple Subftances in a philofophical Senfe, are either Spirits which have no manner of Compofition in them, and in this Senfe God is called a fimple Being; or they are the firft Principles of Bodies, which are ufually called Elements, of which all other Bodies are compounded: Elements are fuch Subftances

* Because Men have different Ideas and Notions of Substance, I thought it not proper entirely to omit all Accounts of them, and therefore have thrown them into the Margin.

Some Philofophers fuppofe that our Acquaintance with Matter or Mind reaches no farther than the mere Properties of them, and that there is a fort of unknown Being, which is the Sabftance or the Subject by which these Properties of folid Extenfion and of Cogitation are fupported, and in which. thefe Properties inhere or exift. But perhaps this Notion arifes only from our turning the mere abftracted or logical Notion of Substance or Self subsist=" ing into the Notion of a diftin&t physical or natural Being, without any Neceffity. Solid Extenfion feems to me to be the very Subftance of Matter or of all Bodies: and a Power of thinking, which is always in act, seems to be the very Subftance of all Spirits; for God himself is an intelligent, almighty Power; nor is there any need to feek for any other fecret and unknown Being, or abftracted Subftance entirely diftinct from thefe, in order to fupport the feveral Modes or Properties of Matter or Mind, for these two Ideas are fufficient for that Purpose; therefore I rather think these are Substances.

It must be confett, when we fay, Spirit is a thinking Subftance, and Matter is an extended folid Subftance, we are fometimes ready to imagine that Extenfion aud Solidity are but mere Modes and Properties of a certain unknown Subftance or Subject which fupports them, and which we call Body; and that a Power of thinking, is but a mere Mode and Froperty of fome unknown Subftance or Subject which fupports it, and which we call Spirit: But I rather take this to be a mere Mistake, which we are led into by the grammatical Form and Ufe of Words; and perhaps our logical Way of thinking by Subftances and Modes, as well as our grammatical Way of talking by Subftantives and Adjectives, help to delude us into this Suppofition.

However, that I may not be wanting to any of my Readers, I would let them know Mr. Locke's Opinion, which has obtained much in the prefent Age, and it is this: "That our Idea of any particular Subftance, is only "fuch a Combination of fimple Ideas as reprefents that Thing as fubfifting by "itself, in which the fuppofed or confufed Idea of Subftance (such as it is) is "always ready to offer itself. It is a Conjunction of Ideas co-exifting in "fuch a Cause of their Union, and makes the whole Subject fubfift by itself, "though the Caufe of their Union be unknown; and our general idea of "Subftance arifes from the Self-fubfiftence of this Collection of Ideas."

Now if this Notion of Subftance reft here, and be confidered merely as an unknown Cause of the Union of Properties, it is much more easy to be ad

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stances as cannot be refolved, or reduced, into two or more Substances of different Kinds.

The various Sects of Philofophers have attributed the Honour of this Name to various Things. The Peripateticks, or Followers of Ariftotle, made Fire, Air, Earth and Water to be the four Elements, of which all earthly Things were compounded; and they fuppofed the Heavens to be a Quinteffence, or fifth fort of Body distinct from all thefe: But, fince experimental Philosophy and Mathematics have been better understood, this Doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The Chymifts make Spirit, Salt, Sulphur, Water and Earth to be their five Elements, because they can reduce all terreftrial Things to these five: This feems to come nearer the Truth; though they are. not all agreed in this Enumeration of Elements. In fhort, our modern Philofophers generally fuppose Matter or Body to be one fimple Principle, or folid Extenfion, which being diverfified by its various Shapes, Quantities, Motions and Situations, makes all the Varieties that are found in the Universe; and therefore they make little Ufe of the Word Element.

Compound Substances are made up of two or

mitted: But if we proceed to fuppofe a fort of real, fubftantial, distinct Being, different from folid Quantity or Extenfion in Bodies, and different from a Power of thinking in Spirits, in my Opinion it is the Introduction of a needless scholaftical Notion into the real Nature of Things, and then fancying it to have a real Exiftence.

Mr. Locke in his Effay of Hum. Und. Book II. Ch. 22. §2. feems to ridicule this common Idea of Subftance, which Men have generally fuppofed to be a fort of Subftratum diftinct from all Properties what foever, and to be the Support of all Properties. Yet in Book IV. Ch. 3. §. 6. he feems to fuppofe there may be fome fuch unknown Subftratum, which may be capable of receiving the Properties both of Matter and of Mind, (viz.) Extenfion, Solidity, and Cogitation; for he fuppofes it poffible for God to add Cogitation to that Subftance which is corporeal, and thus to caufe Matter to think. If this be true, then Spirits (for ought we know) may be corporeal Beings or thinking Bodies, which is a Doctrine too favourable to the Mortality of the Soul. But I leave thefe Debates to the Philofophers of the Age, and will not be too pofitive in my Opinion of this abftrufe Subject.

See more of this Argument in Philosophical Essays before cited.

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more fimple Substances: So every Thing in this whole material Creation, that can be reduced by the Art of Man into two or more different Principles or Substances, is a compound Body in the philofophical Senfe.

But if we take the Words Simple and Compound in a vulgar Sense, then all those are fimple Subftances which are generally esteemed uniform in their Natures. So every Herb is called a Simple; and every Metal and Mineral; tho' the Chymift perhaps may find all his feveral Elements in each of them. So a Needle is a fimple Body, being made only of Steel; but a Sword or a Knife is a Compound, because its Haft or Handle is made of Materials different from the Blade. So the Bark of Peru, or the Juice of Sorrel is a fimple Medicine: But when the Apothecaries Art has mingled feveral Simples together, it becomes a Compound, as Diafcordium or Mithridate.

The Terms of pure and mixt, when applied to Bodies, are much akin to fimple and compound. So a Guinea is pure Gold, if it has nothing but Gold in it, without any Alloy or bafer Metal: But if any other Mineral or Metal be mingled with it, it is called a mixt Subftance or Body,

Substances are alfo divided into animate and inanimate. Animated Subftances are either animal or vegetable *.

Some of the animated Substances have various organical or inftrumental Parts, fitted for a Variety of Motions from Place to Place, and a Spring of Life within themselves, as Beafts, Birds, Fishes, and Infects; thefe are called Animals. Other animated Substances are called Vegetables, which have within themselves the Principles of another

*Note, Vegetables as well as Animals have gotten the Name of animated Subftances, because some of the Antients fuppofed Herbs and Plants, Beafts and Birds, &c. to have a fort of Souls diftinét from Matter or Body.

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fort of Life and Growth, and of various Productions of Leaves, Flowers and Fruit, fuch as we fee in Plants, Herbs and Trees.

And there are other Substances, which are call'd inanimate, because they have no fort of Life in them, as Earth, Stone, Air, Water, &c.

There is alfo one fort of Subftance, or Being, which is compounded of Body and Mind, or a rational Spirit united to an Animal; fuch is Mankind. Angels, or any other Beings of the fpiritual and invifible World, who have affum'd visible Shapes for a Seafon, can hardly be reckon'd among this order of compounded Beings; because they drop their Bodies, and divest themselves of those vifible Shapes, when their particular Meffage is perform'd, and thereby fhew that thefe Bodies do not belong to their Natures.

SECT. III.

Of Modes and their various Kinds, and first of effential and accidental Modes.

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"HE next fort of Objects which are reprefented in our Ideas, are called Modes, or Manners of Being †.

A Mode is that which cannot fubfift in and of itself, but is always efteem'd as belonging to, and fubfifting by, the help of fome Substance, which for that Reason, is called its Subject. A Mode muft depend on that Substance for its very Exiftence and Being; and that not as a Being depends on its Cause, (for so Substances themselves depend

† Note, The Term Mode is by fome Authors applied chiefly to the Rela tions or relative Manners of Being. But in logical Treatifes it is often used in a larger Senfe, and extends to all Attributes whatsoever, and includes the moft effential and inward Properties, as well as outward Refpects and Relations, and reaches to Actions themselves as well as Manners of Action.

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on God their Creator; (but the very Being of a Mode depends on fome Subftance for its Subject, in which it is, or to which it belongs; fo Motion, Shape, Quantity, Weight, are Modes of Body; Knowledge, Wit, Folly, Love, Doubting, Judging, are Modes of the Mind; for the one cannot subfift without Body, and the other cannot fubfift without Mind.

Modes have their feveral Divifions, as well as Subftances.

I. Modes are either effential, or accidental.

An effential Mode or Attribute, is that which belongs to the very Nature or Effence of the Subject wherein it is; and the Subject can never have the fame Nature without it; fuch is Roundness in a Bowl, Hardness in a Stone, Softness in Water, vital Motion in an Animal, Solidity in Matter, Thinking in a Spirit; for tho' that piece of Wood which is now a Bowl may be made fquare, yet if Roundness be taken away, it is no longer a Bowl: So that very Flesh and Bones, which is now an Animal, may be without Life or inward Motion; but if all Motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an Animal, but a Carcass: So if a Body or Matter, be divested of Solidity, it is a mere void Space Nothing; and if Spirit be entirely without Thinking, I have no Idea of any Thing that is left in it; therefore so far as I am able to judge, Confcioufnefs must be its effential Attribute: Thus all the Perfections of God are called his Attributes, for he cannot be without them.

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*Note, When I call folid Extenfion an effential Mode or Attribute of Matter, and a Power of Thinking an effential Mode or Attribute of a Spirit, I do it in compliance with common Forms of Speech: but perhaps in reality thefe are the very Effences or Subftances themselves, and the moft fubitantial Ideas that we can frame of Body and Spirit, and have no need of any (we know not what) Subftratum or unintelligible Subftance to fupport them in their Existence or Being.

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