disagree; and this is the reason of so many false judgments or mistakes among men. Both these practices are a proof that judgment has fomething of the will in it, and does not merely confift in perception, fince we fometimes judge (though unhappily) without perceiving, and fometimes we perceive without immediate judging.

As an idea is the refult of our conception or apprehenfion, fo a propofition is the effect of judgment. The foregoing fentences which are examples of the act of judgment are properly called propofitions.

is a philofopher, &c.

Here let us confider,

Plato

1. The general nature of a propofition, and the parts of which it is compofed.

2. The various divifions or kinds of propofitions. 3. The fprings of falfe judgment, or the doctrine of prejudices.

4. General directions to affift us in judging aright. 5. Special rules to direct us in judging particular objects.

CHAP. I.

OF THE NATURE OF A PROPOSITION, AND ITS SEVE

A

PROPOSITION is a fentence wherein two or more ideas or terms are joined or disjoined by one affirmation or negation, as Plato was a philofopher every angle is formed by two lines meeting: no man living on earth can be completely happy. When there are ever fo many ideas or terms in the fentence, yet if they are joined or disjoined merely by one fingle affirmation or negation, they are properly called but one propofition though they may be refolved into fe-. veral propofitions which are implied therein, as will. appear hereafter.

In defcribing a propofition I use the word terms as well as ideas, because when mere ideas are joined in the mind without words, it is rather called a judgment, but when cloathed with words, it is called a propofition, even though it be in the mind only, as well as when it is expreffed by speaking or writing.

There are three things which go to the nature and conftitution of a propofition, (viz.) the fubject, the predicate and the compula.

The subject of a propofition is that concerning which any thing is affirmed or denied: fo Plato, angle, man, living on earth, are the fubjects of the foregoing propofitions.

The predicate is that which is affirmed or denied of the subject; fo philofopher is the predicate of the first propofition; formed by two lines meeting, is the predi cate of the fecond; capable of being completely happy, is the proper predicate of the third.

The fubject and predicate of a propofition taken together are called the matter of it; for these are the materials of which it is made.

The copula is the form of a propofition; it reprefents the act of the mind affirming or denying, and it is expreffed by these words, am, art, is, are, &c. or, am not, art not, is not, are not, &c.

It is not a thing of importance enough to create a difpute, whether the words no, none, not, never, &c. which disjoin the idea or terms in a negative propofition, shall be called a part of the subject of the copula, or of the predicate. Sometimes perhaps they may feem most naturally to be included in one, and fometimes in another of these, though a propofition is usually denominated affirmative or negative by its copula, as hereafter.

Note 1. Where each of these parts of a propofition is not expreffed diftinctly in so many words, yet they are all understood, and implicitely contained therein; as Socrates difputed, is a complete propofition, for it fignifies Socrates was difputing. So I die, fignifies I am dying. I can write, that is, I am able to write. Latin and Greek one fingle word is many times a complete propofition.

In

Note 2. Thefe words, am, art, is, &c. when they are used alone without any other predicate fignify both the act of the mind judging, which includes the copula, and fignify alfo actual exiftence, which is the predicate of that propofition. So Rome is, fignifies Rome is exiftent; there are fome ftrange monsters, that is, fome ftrange monsters are exiftent: Carthage is no more, that is, Carthage has no being.

Note 3. The fubject and predicate of a propofition are not always to be known and distinguished by the placing of the words in the fentence, but by reflecting duly on the fense of the words, and on the mind and defign of the fpeaker or writer; as if I fay, in Africa there are many lions, I mean many lions are existent in Africa; many lions is the subject, and existent in Africa is the predicate. It is proper for a philofopher to understand geometry; here the word proper is the predicate, and all the reft is the fubject, except is the copula.

Note 4. The fubject and predicate of a propofition ought always to be two different ideas, or two different terms; for where both the terms and ideas are the fame, it is called an identical propofition, which is mere trifling, and cannot tend to promote knowledge; such as, a rule is a rule, or a good man is a good man.

But there are fome propofitions, wherein the terms of the subject and predicate feem to be the fame; yet the ideas are not the fame; nor can these be called purely indentical; or trifling propofitions; fuch as home is home; that is, home is a convenient or delightful place: Socrates is Socrates ftill; that is, the man Socrates is ftill a philofopher: the hero was not a hero; that is, the hero did not fhew his courage; what I have written, I have written; that is, what I wrote I ftill approve, and will not alter it; what is done, is done; that is, it cannot be undone. It may be easily obferved in these propofitions the term is equivocal, for in the predicate it has a different idea from what it has in the fubject.

There are alfo fome propofitions wherein the terms of the fubject and predicate differ, but the ideas are the fame; and these are not merely indentical or trifling

propofitions; as imprudent is fhameless; a billow is a wave; or fluctus (in Latin) is a wave; a globe is a round body. In thefe propofitions either the words are explained by a definition of the name, or the ideas by a definition of the things, and therefore they are by no means useless when formed for this purpose.

PR

CHAP. II.

OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS.

ROPOSITIONS may be diftributed into various kinds, according to their fubject, their copula, their predicate, their nature or compofition, their fenfe, and their evidence, which diftributions will be explained in the following fections.

SECT. I.

Of univerfal, particular, indefinite, and fingular Propofitions.

PROPOSITIONS may be divided according to

their fubject into univerfal and particular; this is ufually called a divifion arifing from the quantity. An univerfal propofition is when the fubject is taken according to the whole of its extenfion; fo if the subject be a genus, or general nature, it includes all its fpecies or kinds; if the subject be a fpecies, it includes all its individuals. This univerfality is ufually fignified by these words, all, every, no, none, or the like; as, all men muft die: no man is almighty; every creature had a beginning.

A particular propofition is when the subject is not taken according to its whole extenfion; that is, when

M

the term is limited and restrained to fome one or more of thofe fpecies or individuals, whose general nature it expreffes, but reaches not to all; and this is usually denoted by the words, fome, many, a few, there are, which, &c. as, fome birds can fing welk; few men are truly wife there are parrots which will talk a hundred things.

:

Under the general name of univerfal propofitions, we may justly include thofe that are fingular, and for the most part those that are indefinite alfo.

A fingular propofition is when the subject is a fingular or individual term or idea; as Defcartes was an ingenious philofopher : Sir Ifaac Newton has far exceeded all his predeceffors: the palace at Hampton-Court is a pleasant dwelling: this day is very cold. The fubject here must be taken according to the whole of its extension, because being and individual it can extend only to one, and it must therefore be regulated by the laws of univerfal proposition.

Now

An indefinite proposition is when no note, either of univerfality or particularity is prefixed to a fubject, which is in its own nature general; as a planet is ever changing its place; Angels are noble creatures. this fort of proposition, efpecially when it defcribes the nature of things, is ufually counted univerfal also, and it fuppofes the fubject to be taken in its whole extension: for if there were any planet which did not change its place, or any angel that were not a noble creature, thefe propositions would not be strictly true.

Yet in order to fecure us against mistakes in judging of univerfal, particular and indefinite propositions, it is neceffary to make these following remarks.

1. Concerning universal propofitions.

Note. 1. Universal terms may either denote a metaphysical, a physical, or a moral univerfality.

A metaphysical or mathematical univerfality is when all the particulars contained under any general idea have the fame predicate belonging to them without any exception whatsoever; or when the predicate is fo effential to the univerfal fubject, that it deftroys the very nature of the subject to be without it; as, all circles