fon; from the Act using it well, and from its two great Ends or Defigns, viz. the fearch of Truth, and the Communication of it: Nor can it be justly defcribed and explained in fewer Ideas.

V. If we add a fifth Rule, it must be that neither the thing defined, nor a mere fynonymous Name fhould make any part of the Definition, for this would be no Explication of the Nature of the Thing; and a fynonymous Word at best could only be a Definition of the Name.

SECT. IV.

Obfervations concerning the Definition of Things.

Efore I part with this Subject I must propose B feveral Observations which relate to the Defi

nition of Things.

Ift Obferve. There is no need that in Definitions we should be confined to one fingle Attribute or Property, in order to exprefs the Difference of the Thing defined, or fometimes the effential Difference confifts in two or three Ideas or Attributes. So a Grocer is a Man who buys and fells Sugar and Plumbs and Species for Gain. A Clock is an Engine with Weights and Wheels, that fhews the Hour of the Day both by pointing and striking: And if I were to define a Repeating Clock I must add another Property, viz. that it alfo repeats the Hour. So that the true and primary effential Difference of fome complex Ideas confifting in several diftinct Properties cannot be well expreffed without conjunctive Particles of Speech.

2d Obferv. There is no need that Definitions fhould always be pofitive, for fome things differ

from

from others merely by a Defect of what others have; as if a Chair be defined a Seat for a fingle Perfon with a Back belonging to it, then a Stool is a Seat for a fingle Perfon without a Back; and a Form is a Seat for feveral Perfons without a Back: These are negative Differences. So Sin is a want of Conformity to the Law of God; Blindness is a want of Sighi. A Vagabond is a Perfon without a Home. Some Ideas are negative, and their Definitions ought to be fo too.

3d Obferv. Some things may have two or more Definitions, and each of them equally just and good; as a Mile is the Length of eight Furlongs, or it is the third part of a League. Eternal is that which ever was and ever fhall be; or it is that which had no Beginning and fhall have no End. * Man is usually defined a rational Animal: But it may be much better to define him a Spirit united to an Animal of fuch a Shape, or an Animal of fuch a peculiar Shape united to a Spirit, or a Being compofed of fuch an Animal or a Mind.

4th Obferv. Where the Effences of Things are evident, and clearly diftinct from each other, there we may be more exact and accurate in the Definitions of them: But where their Effences approach nearer to each other, the Definition is more difficult. A Bird may be defined a feathered Animal with Wings, a Ship may be defined a large hollow Building made to pass over the Sea with Sails: But if you ask me to define a Batt, which is between a Bird and a Beaft, or to define a Barge and Hoy,

*The common Definition of Man, viz. a rational Animal, is very faulty, 1. Because the Animal is not rational; the Rationality of Man arises from the Mind to which the Animal is united. 2. Because if a Spirit should be united to a Horfe and make it a rational Being, furely this would not be a Man: It is evident therefore that the peculiar Shape must enter into the Definition of a Man to render it juft and perfect; and for want of a full Defcription thereof all our Definitions are defective.

H 2

which are between a Boat and a Ship, it is much harder to define them, or to adjust the Bounds of their Effence. This is very evident in all monftrous Births and irregular Productions of Nature, as well as in many Works of Art, which partake fo much of one Species and fo much of another, that we cannot tell under which Species to rank them, or how to determine their fpecifick Difference.

The feveral Species of Beings are feldom precifely limited in the Nature of Things by any certain and unalterable Bounds: The Effences of many Things do not confift in indivifibili, or in one evident indivifible Point, as fome have imagined; but by various Degrees they approach nearer to, or differ more from others that are of a Kindred Nature. So (as I have hinted before) in the very middle of each of the Arches of a Rainbow the Colours of green, yellow, and red are fufficiently diftinguifhed; but near the Borders of the feveral Arches they run into one another, fo that you hardly know how to limit the Colours, nor whether to call it red or yellow, green, or blue.

5th Obferv. As the highest or chief Genus's, viz. Being and Not-Being can never be defined, because there is no Geuus fuperior to them; so neither can fingular Ideas or Individuals be well defined, becaufe either they have no effential Differences from other Individuals, or their Differences are not known; and therefore Individuals are only to be defcrib'd by their particular Circumstances: So King George is diftinguifh'd from all other Men and other Kings, by defcribing him as, the first King of Great Britain of the House of Brunswick : and Westminster-ball is defcribed by its Situation and its Ule, &c.

That individual Bodies can hardly have any effential Difference, at leaft within the Reach of our Knowledge, may be made thus to appear; Methuselah, when he was nine hundred and fixty Years old, and perhaps worn out with Age and Weakness, was the fame Perfon as when he was in his full Vigour of Manhood, or when he was an Infant, newly born; but how far was his Body the fame? who can tell whether there was any Fibre of his Flesh or his Bones that continued the fame throughout his whole Life? or who can determine which were those Fibres? The Ship in which Sir Francis Drake failed round the World might be new built and refitted fo often, that few of the fame Timbers remained; and who can fay whether it must be called the fame Ship or no? and what is its effential Difference? How fhall we define Sir Francis Drake's Ship, or make a Definition for Methuselah?

To this Head belongs that moft difficult Queftion, What is the Principle of Individuation? or what is it that makes any one Thing the fame as it was sometime before? This is too large and laborious an Enquiry to dwell upon it in this Place: Yet I cannot forbear to mention this Hint, viz. Since our own Bodies muft rife at the laft Day for us to receive Rewards or Punishments in them, there may be perhaps fome original Fibres of each human Body, fome Stamina Vitæ, or primeval Seed of Life, which may remain unchanged thro' all the Stages of Life, Death and the Grave; these may become the Springs and Principles of a Refurrection, and fufficient to denominate it the fame Body. But if there be any fuch conftant and vital Atoms which distinguish every human Body, they are unknown to God only.

6th Obferv. Where we cannot find out the Ef fence or effential Difference of any Species or Kind of Beings that we would define, we must content our felves with a Collection of fuch chief Parts or Properties of it as may best explain it fo far as it is known, and beft diftinguish it from other Things: Soa Marigold is a Flower which hath many long yellow Leaves round a little Knot of Seeds in the midst with fuch a peculiar Stalk, &c. So if we would define Silver, we fay it is a white and hard Metal, next in Weight to Gold: If we would define an Elder-Tree, we might fay it is one among the leffer Trees, whofe younger Branches are foft and full of Pith, whofe Leaves are jagged or indented, and of fuch a particular Shape, and it bears large Clusters of small black Berries: So we muft define Water, Earth, Stone, a Lyon, an Eagle, a Serpent, and the greatest part of natural Beings, by a Collection of thofe Properties, which according to our Obfervation distinguish them from all other Things. This is what Mr. Locke calls nominal Effences, and nominal Definitions. And indeed fince the effential Differences of the various natural Beings or Bodies round about us arise from a peculiar Shape, Size, Motion and Situation of the fmall Particles of which they are compofed, and fince we have no fufficient Method to inform us what these are, we must be contented with fuch a fort of Definition of the Bodies they compofe.

Here note that this fort of Definition, which is made up of a mere Collection of the most remarkable Parts or Properties, is called an imperfect Definition or a Defcription; whereas the Definition is called perfect when it is compofed of the effential Difference added to the general Nature or Genus.