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calculated to dispel misunderstandings based on false readings of history, that it may serve as a fitting end to this argument. It was, he says, only to a very limited extent that the separation of the colonies from Great Britain was produced by a deprivation of civil liberty. But, as the movement resulted from a desire on the part of the colonies to gain complete control of their own destinies, the American Revolution has a distinct place in the history of democracy. He adds, however, that this place is in reality an unduly exalted one, since it is the legend that has developed round the movement, rather than the revolution itself, that has been the influential factor in the development of democratic ideas. In conclusion he says :—

It is too early to decide dogmatically whether the movement spelt progress or reaction, or merely a temporary regression necessary to a further step in advance. It is easily conceivable, and not at all improbable, that the political evolution of the next centuries may take such a course that the American Revolution will lose the great significance that is now attached to it, and will appear merely as the temporary separation of two kindred peoples whose inherent similarity was obscured by superficial differences, resulting from dissimilar economic and social conditions.

It may be so. But the American people, far more than the English people, has undergone many and great changes since the days when John Quincy Adams could argue, during the negotiations which led up to the Peace of Ghent, that the Treaty of 1783 was no ordinary treaty, but an agreement between two parts of one nation to divide the sovereignty.

W. ALISON PHILLIPS

B

VOL. 244. NO.497.

Now

CANADIAN NATIONALISM

that another Imperial Conference has been definitely fixed for October of the present year, the problem of the future of the British Empire will present itself once more for consideration. Since 1923 that problem has been in a state of repose; but its fundamental difficulties have not in any way been diminished, and the policy of drift which has been pursued has aggravated some of them. The politicians and public of Great Britain have the excuse of the distractions of their own domestic problems, and they have taken the attitude that the Empire problem is a sleeping dog which should not be disturbed. But in Canada, the largest, most populous and most influential of the Dominions, this same Empire problem is a constant factor of disturbance in politics, and the impression grows that nothing but harm to Canada's future can result from any further postponement of the attempt to tackle some of the outstanding difficulties which to-day reduce the internal relations of the Empire to a state of dangerous confusion and are productive of intermittent misunderstanding and friction. Therefore it seems opportune to offer some account of the more recent tendencies and shifts of opinion in Canada, while for their proper appreciation some recapitulation of bygone history is necessary.

The magnificence of the common effort made in the Great War seemed at the time to provide a complete demonstration of the solidarity of the Empire, and there was a confident anticipation that, after peace came, plans for the political and economic consolidation of its loose fabric would be devised and meet with general acceptance. But since the peace the tendencies have been in the contrary direction, and instead of a gradual consolidation a process of friendly disintegration has been making rapid headway. The old conception of the British Empire, whereby the United Kingdom had been allowed to act as the trustee of the Dominions in international issues, could not survive the impact of the war and the advance in political status which the Dominions had deservedly won. Accordingly the statesmen who attended the Imperial Conference of 1917 made a careful exploration of the problem and, having decided that neither the ideal of Imperial

Federation nor the plan of an Imperial Council was feasible, fell back upon what some authorities styled a project of Imperial Co-operation. Its essence was that the separate partners in the Empire should preserve complete autonomy in their domestic affairs and be accorded an equal political status in relation to each other; at the same time their Governments should maintain a diplomatic unity, and endeavour, by continuous consultation, to achieve a common policy on issues involving the security of the Commonwealth. It was also decided that as soon as possible after the peace a special conference should be held to consider plans for the re-adjustment of mutual constitutional relations, many of which had become obsolete, and to devise the machinery imperative for adequate consultation and fruitful co-operation. But when the Conference of 1921 met, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Hughes (of Australia), fearful of adverse effects upon their own political fortunes, conspired to shelve the special conference, and their colleagues peacefully acquiesced. Warnings were uttered by Sir Robert Borden and others that a serious error had been made; subsequent events have justified their forebodings.

However, at the Conference of 1921, certain very important decisions were taken. A general agreement was reached that if there was to be a common foreign policy for the British Commonwealth it should conform to certain definite principles; that serious commitments in Europe should be avoided as far as possible; that there would be sympathetic co-operation in international affairs with the United States, and that every effort should be made to utilize the resources of the Commonwealth for the economic betterment of its peoples. Under pressure from Canada the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abrogated, and as a result the Disarmament Conference at Washington became possible. But the delegates, after cordially re-endorsing the idea of Imperial Co-operation, blithely adjourned without making any effort to provide the adequate machinery which alone could give it practical reality.

It is true that the Foreign Office has lived faithfully up to its undertakings to forward regular and comprehensive information about the policies decided upon by the British Government and their developments in conferences and treaties; but the Chanak affair in the autumn of 1922 gave ample demonstration of the

complete inadequacy of the existing means of communication and consultation. The High Commissioners, who are supposed to be the eyes of the Dominion Governments in Europe, are all estimable people, but they are not usually selected for their diplomatic talents, and they are not clothed with any authority for dealing with political problems, while despatches sent by cable and mail leave many lacunæ, and are demonstrably inadequate without the personal contacts and oral discussions by which diplomatic relations with foreign countries are conducted.

During the past year, Australia and New Zealand have made a praiseworthy effort to remedy the deficiencies of the situation by appointing competent diplomatic representatives, who are attached to the Secretariat of the British Cabinet and serve the dual purpose of keeping their Governments informed about events and tendencies in Europe and of apprising British ministers of the currents of opinion in their respective countries. But Canada and South Africa have not followed their example and profess themselves quite satisfied with the existing machinery of communication.

It is idle now to speculate on what might have happened if certain conditions had been altered. Mr. Meighen, the Canadian Premier, was a strong protagonist of the idea of Imperial Cooperation, but as soon as he returned from London he went down to defeat in a general election and was succeeded by a Liberal Government, headed by Mr. Mackenzie King, and dominated by a French-Canadian bloc. It must be realized that the FrenchCanadians have always been suspicious of the Imperial tie, and the Conscription Act and other consequences of a war supposed to be of England's making created a sense of embittered grievance and increased their antagonism to the British connection. So Mr. Mackenzie King, who was also smarting under campaign charges of indifference to the war, was only too ready to acquiesce in the views of his French-Canadian followers, and at Ottawa the idea of Imperial Co-operation was speedily jettisoned. The defeat of General Smuts let loose parallel tendencies in South Africa.

Even more important was the fact that during most of these fateful years the late Marquess Curzon reigned at the Foreign Office. He could not get on with the sort of amateur diplomats whom the Dominions appointed as their representatives, and discouraged their interference in every possible way. The result

was that the Home Government got into the habit of taking decisions upon foreign policy without any serious consideration of their palatability to the Dominions, and the Dominions made no effort to assert themselves and force a change in policies which they disliked. Sometimes they were invited to conferences and sometimes they were not; sometimes their Cabinets expressed opinions upon one or other of Downing Street's policies, and sometimes they maintained a silence which was wrongfully interpreted as acquiescence. Occasional wrangles with the British Government were very helpful to the domestic political exigencies of Mr. Mackenzie King, and he indulged in them on different occasions-over Chanak, over the Treaty of Lausanne and over the Inter-Allied Conference on the Dawes Report. Whenever the King Government wanted an excuse for an attitude of isolation, some British politician was always ready to furnish it. Few more unfortunate despatches have ever been penned than Mr. Churchill's clarion call to the Dominions at the time of the Chanak affair, and a minimum of tact and finesse marked Mr. Thomas's attitude at the time of the Inter-Allied Conference on the Dawes Report. The net result was an abundance of nagging and friction and a conspicuous absence of the spirit and practice of co-operation.

In the negotiations preceding the Treaties of Locarno the British Dominions did not participate, and when challenged in the House of Commons at Westminster, Sir Austen Chamberlain offered the very unconvincing excuse that the need for immediate action had left inadequate time for the steps necessary to secure consent. But the recollection that at the time of the Inter-Allied Conference on the Dawes Report, the hectic protest of Ottawa forced Mr. Ramsay Macdonald to concede the Dominions one of the three places on the British panel, generates the suspicion that, if some Dominions had not signified their unwillingness to become involved in the negotiations, their representatives would have been invited. In their absence, however, it was expressly provided by Article 9 of the chief treaty that it imposes no obligations upon any British Dominion or upon India unless their Governments signify acceptance thereof.

It was open to the King Government to follow a precedent established in connection with the Treaty of Lausanne, when Mr. Mackenzie King secured exemption for Canada from its

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