nor reject any revealed Truths, for want of Natural Ideas to conceive them by.

To fhorten this Difcourfe as much as I can; I fhall at prefent only fhew you what reafon we have to believe thofe Doctrines which are thought the moft myfterious and inconceivable, notwithstanding any Objections from Natural Reason and Philofophy against them. And the account of this must be refölved into the Nature, Ufe, and Authority of Revelation; that Revelation, as to fuch matters as are knowable only by Revelation, muft ferve instead of Senfe, Natural Ideas, and Natural Reason; that is, That we must believe things which we do not fee, things which we have no Natural Notion or Conception of, things which are not evident to Natural Reafon; for without this, there is little ufe of Faith, no Authority of pure Revelation.

It is true, the general Corruption of Mankind made it very neceffary for God to revive the Laws of Nature, and to reinforce the obfervation of them by his own Authority and Command; but the proper work of Revelation is to discover fuch things to us as Nature cannot teach, of which we have no Natural Notion, nor any Natural Evidence; At least, thus it may be, if God knows more than Natural Reafon teaches, or can comprehend; and thinks it fit to reveal fuch Supernatural Truths to us, when he fees it useful for Mankind.

Now if God ever does reveal fuch things to us, if we believe upon God's Authority (which is the ftrict Notion of a Divine Faith), we must believe without any Na tural Evidence, merely because God has revealed it; and then we must believe fuch things as are not evident to Senfe and Reafon; and then it can be no Objection againft Revelation, nor against the belief of any fuch fupernatural Truths, that we have no Natural Notion, nor Na

C &

tural

tural evidence of them, that they are what we cannot conceive and comprehend.

To believe no farther than natural Reafon can conceive and comprehend, is to reject the Divine Authority of Revelation, and to destroy the diftinction between Reafon and Faith. He who will believe no farther than natural Reason approves; believes his Reason, not the Revelation; and is in truth a Natural Philofopher, not a Believer: He believes the Scriptures, as he would believe Plato and Tully; not as infpired Writings, but as agreeable to Reason and the refult of wife and deep Thoughts; and this puts an end to all the disputes about Faith and Revelation at once: For what ufe is there of Faith? What matter whether the Scriptures be divinely Infpired or not, when we are no far ther concerned with them than with other Human Writings, to believe what they teach agreeable to our own Reafon? Let these Men then either reject Faith and Scripture, or confefs, That Revelation, as to all Supernatural Truths, muft ferve us inftead of Senfe and Reafon. I would gladly know of them, Whether they would not believe fuch fu pernatural Truths, as are not evident to Reason, were they fure that God had Revealed them? I guess they will not be fo hardy as to fay, That they would not believe God bimfelf, fhould he Reveal fuch things as their Reafon cannot comprehend; and if they would believe God in fuch matters, Why will they not believe a Revelation, which they themselves acknowledge to be Divine, in fuch mat ters? For is there any difference between believing God, and believing a Divine Revelation? If God does know, and can reveal fuch Mysteries, and is to be believed when he does reveal them, and fuch Doctrines are contained in an undoubted Revelation; then the unconceivableness of them can be no argument against the Truth of the Revelation, or that fenfe of the words, which contains fuch Myfteries.

Let

Let us then confider the natural confequence of this, which is of great moment in this difpute, viz. That we must allow of no Objections against Revealed Myfteries, which we will not allow to be good Objections against Senfe and Reafon; which is a neceffary and unavoidable confequence if Revelation, with refpect to fupernatural Truths, ftand in the place of Senfe and Reafon.

Now no man queftions the truth of what he fees and feels, or what he can prove to be true by plain and undeniable Reason, merely because there are unconceivable diffi- culties in it; as there are in every thing, even the most certain and familiar things in Nature: And if Revealed Truths are not more unconceivable than many natural objects of Senfe and Reafon, Why fhould their being unconceivable be a greater Objection againft believing a Revela-tion, than it is against believing our Sense and Reason in matters equally unconceivable? When God has Revealed to us, That he has an Eternal and Only Begotten Son, though we cannot comprehend the Mystery of the Eternal Generation, Why fhould we not as firmly believe it, as we do, that Man Begets a Son in his own likeness, the Philofophy of which we as little understand? Nor can : we any more conceive the Union of the Soul and Body, than we do the Incarnation of the Son of God, or the Union of the Divine and Human Nature in one Perfon? And if we own the Authority of Revelation, Why should we not as well believe what Revelation teaches, . how unconceivable foever it be, as we do what Senfe and. Reason teaches, though it be alike unconceivable?

All men are fenfible, that it is very abfurd and foolish to deny the Being of any thing which they have certain evidence of, because they cannot comprehend the Nature: and Reasons of it: The Man who rofe up and walked before the Philosopher, who was disputing fubtilly against

the:

the poffibility of Motion, put a fcorn upon all his Arguments, by fhewing him that he could Move: And therefore we fee, that all men believe their Senfes and Reason against all the difficulties in Nature, and will never be perfuaded, by the fubtilleft Difputant, That that is not, which they certainly fee and know to be. Now for the fame reason, if men will allow the Authority of Revelation, they must believe what is Revealed, how unconceivable and incomprehenfible foever its nature be; for when we know that a thing is, (and this may be known by Revelation as well as by Senfe, as those men must confefs, who acknowledge a Divine Revelation) no difficulties in conceiving it, muft perfuade us to deny that it is.

This is very plain in it felf, though few men confider it, That to disbelieve what is Revealed, for the fake of any dif ficulties in understanding or conceiving it, is to reject the certainty of Revelation; For what other account can be given of that difference men make between the Evidence of Senfe and Reafon, and of Revelation, but that they allow Sense and Reafon to be good and certain proofs of the being of fuch things as are evident to Senfe and Reason, how myfterious foever their Natures are; but that mere Revelation is no certain proof of the being of any thing which is not evident alfo to Senfe and Reafon, how plainly foever it be Revealed; that is, that Revelation alone can prove nothing; for if Revelation it felf could prove the certainty of what is Revealed, the difficulties in Nature and Philofophy could no more difprove a Revelation, than confute our Senfes. Now let any man judge, whether this be not unequal ufage,to expect more from Revelation, than they do from Senfe and Reason, and not to believe Revela tion upon the fame terms that they believe their Senfes. Should men refolve to believe nothing which they fee,till they could give a Philofophical account of the Reasons

and

and Causes, and Natures, of all they fee, as they refuse to believe a Revelation any farther than they can conceive and comprehend the thing Revealed, they muft of necef fity be as great Scepticks, as they are Infidels. For as for contradictions, it is an eafy matter to make or find feeming contradictions in what we do not understand; for when we know not the Philofophical Natures of things, nor how they act, and yet will be reafoning and gueffing at them, all our falfe gueffes may be full of contradictions and impoffibilities, because we know not the true Mystery of Nature. It is this vain humour of Criticizing upon Nature which makes fo many Atheifts. They go upon the fame Principle with Infidels and Hereticks, To believe nothing which natural Reafon cannot conceive and comprehend; now they cannot comprehend the Notion and İdea of a God, which they fay, is made up of Contradictions and impoffibilities, and therefore they reject the Being of a God: They cannot conceive a Creating Power, which can give Being to that which had no Being before, which they think a plain Contradiction to make Something of Nothing; and therefore they reject the Creation of the World, and either affert the Eternity of the World, or at least the Eternity of Matter: They can conceive no Subftance but Matter and Body, and therefore reject the Notion of a Spirit, as Nonfenfe and Contradi&tion: They will allow nothing to be wifely made, which they understand not the reafon and uses of, and therefore they fancy a great many botches and blunders in Nature, which cannot be the defigns and contrivance of Wisdom, but the effects of Chance; and then the confequence is plain, That the World was made by Chance, not by a Wife Author.

Now, I confefs, if this way of Reafoning be allowed, it will be impoffible to defend either Senfe, or Reafon, or

Revelation,