Duncan Pritchard offers an original defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p, the subject's rational support for believing that p is that she sees that p, where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). Such an account of perceptual knowledge poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology, since by the lights of standard views in epistemology this proposal is simply incoherent. Pritchard's aim in Epistemological Disjunctivism is to show that this proposal is theoretically viable (i.e., that it does not succumb to the problems that it appears to face), and also to demonstrate that this is an account of perceptual knowledge which we would want to endorse if it were available on account of its tremendous theoretical potential. In particular, he argues that epistemological disjunctivism offers a way through the impasse between epistemic externalism and internalism, and also provides the foundation for a distinctive response to the problem of radical scepticism.
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access problem accessibilism accessible rational support account of perceptual agent anti-sceptical proposal assertion bad++ barn fašade chicken sexer cleverly disguised mule closure principle competent deduction contrastivism conversational implicature corresponding bad denials of radical discriminating epistemic support discussion distinction between favouring distinguishability problem Dretske entailment thesis epistemic basis epistemic externalist epistemic internalism epistemic standing epistemological disjunctivism epistemological disjunctivist error-possibility evil genius thesis example explicit knowledge claim fact factive rational support factive reason favouring and discriminating good+ highest common factor hypothesis internalist epistemic support introspectively indistinguishable intuition know by reflection know the denials looking McDowell McDowell’s Moorean motivated neo-Moorean object at issue objectively epistemically offer one’s belief perceptual knowledge perceptually discriminate philosophical position possession premise Pritchard problem of radical quietism radical sceptical argument radical sceptical hypotheses radical sceptical problem rational basis recently envatted physical reflectively accessible rational relevant alternatives account relevant alternatives theory scenario standard epistemic internalist target proposition thinking Zula Zula’s