Phenomenal IntentionalityUriah Kriegel Since the late 1970's, the main research program for understanding intentionality -- the mind's ability to direct itself onto the world -- has been based on the attempt naturalize intentionality, in the sense of making it intelligible how intentionality can occur in a perfectly natural, indeed entirely physical, world. Some philosophers, however, have remained skeptical of this entire approach. In particular, some have argued that phenomenal consciousness - - the subjective feel of conscious experience -- has an essential role to play in the theory of intentionality, a role missing in the naturalization program. Thus a number of authors have recently brought to the fore the notion of phenomenal intentionality, as well as a cluster of nearby notions. There is a vague sense that their work is interrelated, complementary, and mutually reinforcing, in a way that suggests a germinal research program. With twelve new essays by philosophers at the forefront of the field, this volume is designed to launch this research program in a more self-conscious way, by exploring some of the fundamental claims and themes of relevance to this program. |
Contents
| 1 | |
2 The Access Problem | 27 |
3 Indexical Thought | 49 |
4 Phenomenal Presence | 71 |
5 Consciousness and Synthesis | 93 |
6 Constructing a World for the Senses | 99 |
In Defense of a Kantian Account | 116 |
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Common terms and phrases
A-consciousness actual afterimages appear argue argument basic beliefs and desires blindsight Cambridge capsaicin causal claim cognitive phenomenal properties cognitive phenomenology cognitive qualia conscious thought content determinacy CP-determination determinacy determined directedness distinct durian enal ence example experience’s experiential explain external externalist fact gestalt higher-order holism Horgan and Tienson Husserl idea indexical concepts indexical thoughts instantiated intentional content intentional objects intentionalists interpretation intrinsic intuition involves kind Kriegel Kripkenstein Loar Lycan mental metaphysically narrow content nomenal non-phenomenal notion occurrent occurrent belief one’s Oxford University Press pain Pautz perceptual experience phenom phenomenal character phenomenal consciousness phenomenal features phenomenal intentionalists phenomenal intentionality phenomenal objectivity phenomenal presence phenomenally intentional Philosophy of Mind plausible present primitivist principle problem proposal question referents relation represent representation representationalism rience schematic dynamical unity scious sense sensory experiences sensory-functional sensuous elements shed Strawson supervenience theory thing tion tional token true unconscious visual experience