fr

thes

III. The third divifion of modes fhews us, they are either intrinsical or extrinfical. Intrinsical modes are conceived to be in the fubject or fubftance, as when we fay a globe is round, or Swift, rolling, or at reft: or when we fay, a man is tall, or learned, thefe are intrinfick modes: but extrinfick modes are fuch as arife from fomething that is not in the fubject or fubftance itfelf; but it is a manner of being, which fome fubstances attain by reason of fomething that is external or foreign to the fubject; as, this globe lies within two yards of the wall; or, this man is beloved or hated. Note, fuch fort of modes, as this laft example, are called external denominations.

IV. There is a fourth divifion much a-kin to this, whereby modes are faid to be inherent or adherent, that is, proper or improper. Adherent or improper modes arife from the joining of fome accidental substance to the chief fubject, which yet may be feparated from it; fo when a bowl is wet, or a boy is clothed, thefe are adherent modes; for the water and the clothes are diftinct fubftances, which adhere to the bowl or to the boy: but when we fay, the bowl is fwift or round; when we fay the boy is ftrong or witty, thefe are proper or in herent modes, for they have a fort of in-being in the fubftance itself, and do not arife from the addition of any other fubftance to it.

V. Action and paffion are modes or manners which belong to fubftances, and fhould not entirely be omitted here. When a fmith with a hammer ftrikes a piece of iron, the hammer and the Smith are both agents, or fubjects of action; the one is the prime or fupreme, the other the fubordinate: the iron is the patient, or the fubject of paffion, in a philofophical fenfe, because it receives the operation of the agent; though this

B

fenfe

1

fenfe of the words paffion and patient differs much from the vulgar meaning of them.*

VI. The fixth divifion of modes may be into phyfi cal, i. e. natural, civil, moral, and fupernatural. "So when we confider the apostle Paul, who was a little man, a Roman by the privilege of his birth, a man of virtue or honefty, and an infpired apoftle; his low ftature is a phyfical mode, his being a Roman is a civil privilege, his honesty is a moral confideration, and his being infpired is fupernatural.

VII. Modes belonging either to body or to fpirit, or to both. Modes of body belong only to matter or to corporal beings; and these are shape, fize, fituation, or place, &c. Modes of Spirit belong only to minds; fuch are, knowledge, affent, diffent, doubting, reafoning, &c. Modes which belong to both have been fometimes called mixt modes, or human modes, for these are only found in human nature, which is compounded both of body and fpirit; fuch are fenfation, imagination, passion, &c. in all which there is a concurrence of the operations both of mind and body, that is, of animal and intellectual nature.

But the modes of body may be yet farther distinguished. Some of them are primary modes or qualities, for they belong to bodies confidered in themfelves, whether there were any man to take notice of them or no ; fuch are thofe before-mentioned, namely, shape, fize, fituation, &c. fecondary qualities, or modes, are fuch ideas as we afcribe to bodies on account of the various impreffions which are made on the fenfes of men by them and these are called fenfible qualities, which are very

numerous;

*Note, Agent fignifies the doer, patient the fufferer, action is doing, paffion is suffering : agent and action have retained their original and philofophical fenfe, though patient and passion have acquired a very different meaning in common language.

8

numerous; fuch are all colours, as red, green, blue, &c. fuch are all founds, as sharp, fhrill, loud, boarfe; all taftes, as fweet, bitter, four; all fmells, whether pleafant, offenfive, or indifferent; and all tactile qualities, or fuch as affect the touch or feeling, namely, heat, cold, &c. These are properly called fecondary qualities, for though we are ready to conceive them as exifting in the very bodies themselves which affect our fenfes, yet true philofophy has most undeniably proved, that all these are really various ideas or perceptions excited in human nature, by the different impreffions that bodies make upon our fenfes by their primary modes, that is, by means of the different shape, fize, motion, and position, of thofe little invifible parts that compofe them. Thence it follows, that a fecondary quality, confidered as in the bodies themfelves, is nothing else but a power or aptitude to produce fuch fenfations in us: See Locke's Effay on the Understanding, Book II. Chap. 8.

VIII. I might add, in the last place, that as modes belong to fubftances, fo there are fome alfo that are but modes of other modes: for though they fubfift in and by the fubftance, as the original fubject of them, yet they are properly and directly attributed to fome mode of that fubftance. Motion is the mode of a body; but the fwiftnefs, or flowness of it, or its direction to the North or South, are but modes of motion. Walking is the mode or manner of a man, or of a beaft; but walking gracefully implies a manner or mode fuperadded to that action. All comparative and fuperlative degrees of any quality, are the modes of a mode, as fwifter implies a greater measure of fwiftnefs.

It would be too tedious here to run through all the modes, accidents, and relations at large that belong to various beings, and are copioufly treated of in general in the fcience called metaphyficks, or more properly ontology: they are also treated of in particular in those fciences which have affumed them feverally as their proper fubjects.

B 2

SECT

SECT. V.

Of the ten Categories. Of Subftance modified.

WE Juhtances and modes,

E have thus given an account of the two chief

and their various kinds: and in thefe laft Sections we have briefly comprised the greateft part of what is neceffary in the famous ten ranks of being, called the ten predicaments, or categories of Ariftotle, on which there are endless volumes of difcourfes formed by feveral of his followers. But that the reader may not utterly be ignorant of them, let him know the names are thefe fubftance, quantity, quality, relation, action, paffion, where, when, fituation, and clothing. It would be mere lofs of time to fhew how loofe, how injudicious, and even ridiculous, is this ten-fold divifion of things and whatsoever farther relates to them, and which may tend to improve useful knowledge, fhould be fought in ontology, and in other fciences.

:

Befides fubftance and mode, fome of the moderns would have us confider the fubftance modified, as a diftinct object of our ideas; but I think there is nothing more that need be faid on this fubject than this, namely, There is fome difference between a fubftance when it. is confidered with all its modes about it, or clothed in all its manners of existence, and when it is diftinguifhed from them, and confidered naked without them

SECT. VI.

Of Not-Being.

S being is divided into fubfiance and mode, fo we may confider not-being with regard to both thefe.

I. Not-being is confidered as excluding all fubftance,

and

and then all modes are also neceffarily excluded; and this we call pure nihility, or mere nothing.

This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a philofo phical fenfe; fo we fay, there is nothing in the cup, in a vulgar fense, when we mean there is no liquor in it; but we cannot fay there is nothing in the cup, in a strict philofophical fenfe, where there is air in it, and per haps a million of rays of light are there.

II. Not-being, as it has relation to modes or manners of being, may be confidered either as mere negation, or as a privation.

A negation is the abfence of that which does not naturally belong to the thing we are speaking of, or which has no right, obligation, or neceflity to be prefent with it; as when we fay a ftone is inanimate, or blind, or deaf, that is, it has no life nor fight, nor hearing; nor when we fay a carpenter or a fisherman is unlearned, these are mere negations.

But a privation is the absence of what does naturally belong to the things we are fpeaking of, or which ought to be prefent with it, as when a man or a horfe is deaf, or blind, or dead, or if a phyfician or a divine be unlearned, these are called privations; fo the finfulness of any human action is said to be a privation; for fin is that want of conformity to the law of God, which ought to be found in every action of man.

Note, There are fome writers who make all fort of relative modes or relations, as well as all external denominations, to be mere creatures of the mind, and entia rationis, and then they rank them alfo under the general head of not beings; but it is my opinion, that whatsoever may be determined concerning mere mental relations and external denominations which feem to have fomething lefs of entity or being in them, yet there are many real relations, which ought not to be reduced to. fo low a class, fuch are the fituation of bodies, their mutual diftances, their particular proportions, and meafares, the notions of fatherhood, brotherhood, fonship,

B 3

&c.