Very respectfully, Further instructions will be given you at that point. Forage and rations are expected to arrive to-night, and if so, they will be issued with all dispatch. M. A. RENO, Captain and Chief of Staff. Abstract from field return of the Third Division, Cavalry Corps, commanded by Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson, for August 24, 1864. A scouting party of twenty-four men started yesterday to Loudoun County, crossing the river at Point of Rocks ford; from there went to Waterford, thence to Wheatland and Southerville, Va., and Short Hill Mountain; returned this morning, having seen or heard of no rebels except a few straggling guerrillas. I hear from reliable authority that up to noon of the 23d there was no force east of Blue Ridge. Another scout is out. A. N. DUFFIE, Brigadier-General Commanding. HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY, MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION, Brigadier-General AVERELL, Shepherdstown, Va., August 24, 1864. Commanding Second Division: GENERAL: The chief of cavalry directs me to inform you that a reconnaissance sent out from the First Division arrived in Martinsburg yesterday morning and found no enemy. Their pickets were on the Winchester pike, about five miles out. There has been no enemy in the town, except a small party on Saturday. Lieutenant Finley, son of surgeon general, was found there. Do you know anything of him? The railroad is destroyed pretty effectually near Kearneysville. You can withdraw the pickets on the Sharpsburg pike, leaving, as you suggested, a small party at the ferry to report what may be going on in our General Averell was at Sharpsburg yesterday. His pickets are at all the fords along the river from McCoy's Ferry, on the Maryland side. The fight on Sunday was near Berryville. I will come up this p. m. Gilmor's forces reported near Martinsburg while I was there. F. B. MILLER. SPECIAL ORDERS, HEADQUARTERS, Cumberland, Md., August 24, 1864. I. The One hundred and fifty-fourth Regiment Ohio National Guard, Col. R. Stevenson commanding, will proceed to Camp Chase, Ohio, for the purpose of being mustered out of service. The quartermaster's department is directed to provide transportation. Rebels surprised and captured the picket-post at Huttonsville this morning. N. WILKINSON, Colonel. Major-General KELLEY: CLARKSBURG, August 24, 1864. The following received from Beverly: About 100 dismounted men came across the mountains, stepped into the camp of the pickets at Huttonsville at 3 o'clock this morning, and captured about seventy horses, seventy sets horse equipments, seventy carbines, and accouterments. They made off in great haste toward Crab Bottom. They captured forty men, but could not get them along as fast as they demanded, and let them go. No one killed; one man seriously wounded. Major Shaw, of the Eighth Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, is in pursuit. R. YOUART, Lieutenant-Colonel. N. WILKINSON, HEADQUARTERS FORCES IN KANAWHA VALLEY, Col. H. CRAMPTON, Commanding Post, Fayetteville: Move all government stores immediately to Camp Piatt. As soon as this is done report with your regiment at Camp Piatt for transportation home. Abandon nothing. J. C. SULLIVAN, Brigadier-General, Commanding. CITY POINT, VA., August 25, 1861—2.30 p. m. Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C.: (Received 6 p. m.) You can say this to General One regiment from each of detached a couple of weeks Pickett's and Field's divisions are here. Sheridan, and that there is no doubt about it. the four brigades of Pickett's division were ago, and for some time I did not know but that they had gone to the Valley. These regiments are now back. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. CITY POINT, VA., August 25, 1861—11 a. m. Major-General SHERIDAN, Harper's Ferry, Va.: I have good authority for believing that orders have gone to the Valley for the return of Fitz Lee's cavalry. This is the general talk among the Southern soldiers, and a man sent to Richmond by the provost-marshal learns the same fact. It is also natural that this should be so after the reverse of the enemy's cavalry met with on the evening of the 23d. Our troops have quietly destroyed the Weldon road, working south, the enemy's cavalry falling back before ours without offering resistance. If this should be so, it will give you a great advantage in harassing the enemy, and probably might send entirely around to his rear, and destroy his trains, supplies, &c. U. S. GRANT, HALLTOWN, August 25, 1864—11 p. m. Lieutenant-General GRANT: There is not much doubt of the presence here of two divisions of Longstreet's corps, General Anderson commanding. The enemy succeeded this evening in getting Shepherdstown. I do not know whether they will attempt to cross or not. I ordered two divisions of cavalry to make a reconnaissance this morning on the enemy's flank; they met Breckinridge's corps at Blue Spring or Leetown, marching toward Shepherdstown. Our cavalry skirmished with this corps sharply dur ing the afternoon, with but little loss. The cavalry were forced to give up Shepherdstown, all but one brigade coming back to Halltown; this brigade, it is supposed, crossed at the Shepherdstown Ford. I can. not say whether or not the enemy will attempt to cross in the morning; they must be very strong to do so. My information is that Early marched with that intention, but reports are very unreliable. The enemy are in very strong force. I will not give up this place, and hope to be able to strike the enemy divided. I hardly think that they will attempt to go to Washington. P. H. SHERIDAN, HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, Major-General SHERIDAN, Middle Military Division: Scouts report that no troops had moved to or from the Valley up to Tuesday night, 23. Rebels are hauling considerable grain from Beaver Dam Station. All information brought here by scouts is communi cated to you. GEO. K. LEET, Assistant Adjutant-General. [AUGUST 25, 1864.-For Sheridan to Halleck, reporting operations, &c., see p. 21.] CIRCULAR. HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION, Near Halltown, Va., August 25, 1864. Corps and other independent commanders will keep their commands constantly supplied with three days' rations in haversacks, upon which rations the men of the several commands may be required to subsist four days. By command of Major-General Sheridan: JAS. W. FORSYTH, Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief of Staff. Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War: HARPER'S FERRY, August 25, 1864. SIR: I desire to submit a few observations with regard to the pres ent military status here. When General Sheridan received General Grant's dispatch inform ing him of Early's re-enforcement and directing him to assume a defensive attitude, the design of further pursuit and giving Early battle somewhere in the Valley had not been relinquished by General Sheridan, but was about being vigorously executed. The position at Cedar Creek, though strong in the immediate line of battle front, was a most indefensible one, nevertheless, as numerous gaps through both ranges of mountains opened ready ingress to the enemy in our rear, and, besides, was flankable on the right of the road leading down the base of the mountains west of the Valley and protected on the east by Cedar Creek and a heavy growth of timber. With all these advantages given the enemy, General Sheridan showed no trepidation, but gave Early's men opportunity to try his powers, and at his leisure took up the retrogade down the Valley. At Winchester General Sheridan halted, remained long enough to give the enemy a chance to fight, and without being driven, or seemingly being compelled, again dropped back to Berryville, where he again halted until the enemy came up, and here gave him every opportunity to attack, which, declining to do, Sheridan again moved back, halting at Charlestown and offering the same inducements to battle. It seemed pretty well established that the enemy would have given battle here had Sheridan remained another day. Early had developed our line by the fight of Sunday, and at night it is said massed his forces for a sudden assault. Monday morning daylight, however, found Sheridan in position where he now is. Dur ing this march to the rear the cavalry have carefully watched the right and left, and at no time has it been possible for the enemy to have passed through the Blue Ridge for Washington, or to the right and into Pennsylvania, without General Sheridan being almost immediately apprised of it. The movements of our army have been such as to deceive even its own officers, and it is thought thus far have baffled the enemy, who has acted as though he thought Sheridan inviting rather than avoiding battle, and ready at any time to assume the offensive should Early for a moment weaken his force or uncover himself. The impression in our army, and it seems to have reached the enemy, is that our force numbers about 50,000, and this may account for the caution Early uses, and the fact that he holds his army solidly and in close hand. The advantages are now all with Sheridan, as they were all with Early at Cedar Creek. Early cannot cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown into Pennsylvania, as its proximity would enable Sheridan to strike his column in flank at a moment of his own choosing. He will not attempt a like movement at Williamsport, as Sheridan could immediately put his army in their rear and close all lines of communication south, and, with such aid as could be readily given him, annihilate the enemy. He cannot pass through Snicker's Gap toward Washington without his movement being known in six hours from its commencement; he would enter a country lately made desolate and wholly incapable of subsisting an army, and could not reach Washington so soon as could Sheridan by the north side. It was necessary for Early, designing either of these objects, to have first beaten Sheridan, and at least temporarily to have rendered his army powerless. This he has failed to do, and it is no longer possible for him to do it. But one course is left him (many miles from his supplies in a country recently devastated by the torch), viz, go back up the Valley and abandon the campaign wholly, or commence a new one under more favorable auspices; and having learned by the experience of this one, every evidence indicates that the enemy will within a very few hours take up the line of retreat. Sheridan's army is in splendid condition, well in hand and manifesting the greatest anxiety for a fight. There is a feeling of entire confidence in their leader, and regiments talk about being able to whip brigades. Sheridan really has a very fine army here, and the universal good spirits that prevail and anxiety to fight manifested would make it a hard army to compete with. As this is the campaign of the enemy, and not of our army, I think it may be set down as a failure, and therefore a success to our arms. Sheridan will begin from this time to harass them, and cannot fail to inflict severe punishment before they leave the Valley. |