done, the book will never be answered? Surely, my firm belief that all these things are neceffarily connected, muft convince me of the neceffity of fetting about the work, if I wish to do it at all; and my wish to have it done, is here to be fuppofed, as having arifen from a variety of previous circumstances.

If, therefore, I fhall certainly find myfelf difpofed to act juft as I now do, believing my actions to be neceffary, your objection to my doctrine, on this account, cannot have a fufficient foundation. You fay, that if the thing must be, it must be; if your book is to be anfiered by me, it will be anfwered by me; and that I may, therefore, make myself eafy about it, and do nothing. I anfwer, that fo I fhould, either if I had no defire to have it done, which happens not to be the cafe, or if I thought that no exertions of mine were neceffary to gain my end, which is not the cafe neither. On this confideration depends the capital diftinction that I make between the doctrines of philofophical neceffity, and Calvinistic predeftination.

Dr. Prieftley then proceeds to fhew, that the doctrine of philofophical neceffity fuppofes a neceflary connection between our endeavours and our fuccefs; fo that if only the defire of fuccefs, the first link in this chain, be fufficiently ftrong, all the reft will follow of courfe; and the end will be certainly accomplifhed.'-Whereas, according to the Calvinifts, the defire and the end, have no neceffary connection. In the work of converfion or regeneration, for inftance, they fay, that God is the fole agent, and men altogether paffive ;'-that, without his immediate agency, to which nothing on the part of man can contribute, let a man exert himself ever fo much, in the use of all poffible means; yet all his volitions, and all his actions, would be only finful, and deferving of the wrath and curfe of God to all eternity."

Notwithstanding thefe explanations, and allowing the justice and propriety of these diftinctions, between the doctrine of philofophical neceffity and that of Calviniftic predeftination; ftill, we apprehend, the capital difficulty will appear to many not to be removed by them. We mean that contained in the paffage which we have marked with Italics, in the paragraph_preceding the laft. Notwithstanding all that is here faid, this ftumblingblock ftill feems to rear its head, and this queftion ftill recurs; -If the thing MUST be, it must be; and therefore, how can I prevent it, or why should I exert myself?-Or, in other words,does it depend on me to prevent or produce an event, which cannot poffibly be otherwife than it is to be?' If, in the plan of providence (may an indolent man fay), I am the deftined agent, whofe exertions are neceflary to a certain end; the defire of fuccefs, and other links in the chain of caufes, will neceffarily impel me to thofe exertions; and I will patiently await their REV. Jan. 1780.

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impulfe; which as yet I do not feel. We own, however, that, in the Author's cafe of the farmer- who knows, certainly, that if he does not fow, it is decreed that he shall not reap-as well as in his own cafe, above given, the difficulty has appeared to us to be leffened; on our particularly attending to a circumftance or two, on which Dr. Prieftley has not perhaps fufficiently amplified, to render his doctrine generally intelligible to his readers. Mr. Palmer, at leaft, feems not to have comprehended his former illuftration; by his dwelling fo much on the obfervation, that farmers, in general, do not believe in the doctrine of neceffity:-a remark, which appears to us to be of no confequence in the prefent argument. Dr. Prieftley's principal intention, we apprehend, was to fhew, that a belief in the doctrine of neceffity is not incompatible with, or even unfavourable to, the moft fpirited exertions; and that a farmer, believing in that doctrine ever fo firmly, will nevertheless, without any dereliction of his principles, exert the fame endeavours as another farmer who is an anti-neceffarian. Those who have not perfectly understood Dr. Prieftley's illuftration, may poffibly perceive its drift, by feeing it reprefented in a fomewhat new light, or the light in which it strikes us.

One of the circumftances to which we have alluded above is, the ignorance of men refpecting the decrees of providence. On this ignorance (and the neceflary influence of motives) we apprehend, that our Neceffarian Farmer founds his plan of conduct; for we will fuppofe Dr. Prieftley's active farmer to be as determined a neceffarian as himself; and yet he shall till and fow fields with as much spirit [Dr. Priestley would fay more] as any of his more orthodox neighbours, who think they have a will of their own. Suppofing one of thefe laft to ridicule our farmer, on account of a conduct feemingly fo inconfiftent with his principles; we can conceive him thus anfwering his opponent:

Will you, Sir, be fo kind as to inform me which of these two decrees has paffed ;-whether I fhall fow my fields, and live, or neglect them and ftarve? I firmly believe one of thefe events to be unalterably determined; but I know not which; nor can you inform me. Under this uncertainty (nay, partly because of this uncertainty), but knowing the uniformity of the courfe of nature, and that unless I fow I cannot poibly reap, and feeling moreover a defire to fow; I fhall fow with as much spirit as yourfelf; and half a year hence, my barns and ftacks will inform us both what was the decree.-Nay, even now, I think I can venture to fpecify the decree before-hand, and to pronounce, that it is the favourable one; because I find myself determined (by motives that have a certain and neceffary influence) to exert fuch endeavours to fulfil it, as can fearce fail of producing that effect, according to the ufual courfe of things.

Thus

Thus likewife, in the other instance, Dr. Priestley might fay, I know not, certainly, whether it is decreed, that I fhall, or fhall not write an answer to Mr. Palmer's book: but, ignorant as I am of that decree, I know my own prefent feelings, and am fenfible of a fufficiently strong defire to answer it. I know likewife, that unless I take the pen in my hand, I cannot answer it. Nay, further, though the decree is as yet a secret to me, it fhall not (in confequence of my endeavours) remain a fecret much longer; for I will fit down, and answer it immediately. -And so, in fact, it has turned out.

In thefe amplifications of Dr. Prieftley's two illuftrations, we know not whether we have caught the whole of his mean ing, or only a part of it. If we have erred, in our attempt to illuftrate it ftill farther, we cannot well incur much difgrace in such a dark subject: and befides, we err in very good company. -As to the main queftion, it is ably difcuffed by both the parties; but the cause of liberty is more pertinaciously defended by Mr. Palmer, than by Dr. Prieftley's former amicable antagonist, Dr. Price. For instance, the latter owns, that he cannot see how a contingent event can be the object of fore-knowledge, even to the Deity himfelf. "It carries," fays he, in his correfpondence with Dr. Prieftley, p. 175. " the appearance of a contradiction; it is indeed a difficulty, and I do not pretend to be capable of removing it." - Mr. Palmer, however, in his zeal for liberty, more boldly gives up, in fact, the divine prescience; and endeavours to fhew, that the facrifice is not very great for that, by giving up fuch a notion of prefcience, as is directly inconfiftent with the idea of liberty, or agency in man, we only deny that to belong to the fupreme mind, which is in truth no perfection at all:"

Again, Dr. Price acknowledged it to be abfurd to fuppofe, that men ever at either without, or againft, motives; but he supposed the felf-determining power to exert itself only when the motives. were equal and contrary:-a very rare cafe indeed! -- and which reduces,' as Dr. Priestley obferves, this boafted liberty of man to a very fmall matter, hardly worth contending for.' Mr. Palmer makes no fuch conceffions; but, in general, fuppofes that the mind may act contrary to any motive whatever.-It is difficult, however, to refift the force of Dr. Priestley's argument, that our volitions, and our actions, depending on them, muft always be the fame, cæteris paribus, i. e. every circumftance being equal; or must always be definite, in definite circumftances:—for what, we may afk, is there to produce an alteration, when every affignable circumftance is exactly equal? In phyfics, a propofition of this nature pafles with every one as an axiom;-that fimilar caufes, operating on the fame material fubftance, under fimilar circumftances, muft produce effects pre

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cifely fimilar.-Why it should be falfe in pneumatics remains to be explained; even allowing the mind to be immaterial.

That affection of the mind, called remorfe of confcience, feems to present a plaufible objection to this propofition. Selfaccufation feemingly implies, that a man would not act the very fame part over again, if he were placed in the fame circumstances. Mr. Palmer accordingly obferves, that when a man reproaches himself for any thing that he has formerly done, he certainly confiders himself as having had the power of not doing it;' and that were he to be placed in the fame fituation again, he would act differently. Dr. Priestley had before observed, that, though men may think in this manner, with respect to what is past, they deceive themselves, in fuppofing that they could have acted differently; by their not attending to the change of difpofition, and other circumftances, that have taken place fince the former period. He now adds, that having, fince that time, acquired a different difpofition, and different views of things, they unawares carry them back, and confider how they would have acted with their prefent acquired difpofitions. -Their difpofition being really altered by what has occurred to them fince, they would not now act the fame part over again.'

On the whole, without difcuffing the merits of the present controverfy, which, from the nature of the fubject, and the improbability of any difcoveries being made in it, may, we apprehend, be carried on to the end of the world, without clearing up the difficulties which attend both fides of the argument:-we shall only further obferve, that if Dr. Priestley's antagonists seem to have any advantage over him, it is in thofe particular articles (fuch as refponfibility, merit, and demerit, &c.) where they may allege, with feeming juftice, that a belief in the doctrine of neceffity must have an effect on the bulk of mankind, not fo favourable to morality and religion, as the popular belief on this head: though the moral conduct of the neceffarian philofopher, who comprehends the doctrine in all its parts, may, as Dr. Prieftley alleges, be improved by his belief in it.-For his own part, however, he confiders it as the cleareft of all queftions,' and the truth of it as indubitable as that of any mathematical propofition whatever.— I have no feeling,' he adds, either of fear or arrogance, in challenging the whole world in the defence of it. This argument, I compare to fuch ground as one man may defend against an army.'

Aware, however, of the unconquerable bias which even philofophical men, of the greatest integrity and abilities, neceffarily acquire towards certain opinions impreffed upon them by the courfe of their ftudies, habits, fituations, and connections in life; he frankly owns, that he does not expect that any thing he

has

has now advanced, or is capable of advancing, will make the leaft change in Mr. Palmer's view of things. Our present general fyftem of opinions, whether right or wrong, is probably that which we fhall carry to our graves.'-Younger perfons, whofe opinions are not yet formed, may nevertheless derive an advan tage from these publications, that we cannot derive from them ourfelves.

• Your fuppofed consciousness of liberty,' Dr. Priestley good humouredly adds, and other popular arguments (though, when analised they really make against your hypothefis), will always fecure you nine out of ten of the generality of our readers ;' who, he elsewhere obferves, will never get beyond the very threshold of the business.'- All that I can do, must be to make the most of my tenth man; and, if I poffibly can, fancy his fuffrage equivalent to that of your nine.'

Whether this fpirited letter of Dr. Prieftley's is the termination of the prefent controverfy, is yet in the womb of fate. At the close of it, he thus expreffes himself, like a true Neceffarian, on the subject.— Now, that I have advanced, I verily believe, all that I can, in fupport of my opinion, I ought to acquiefce in the fuccefs of my labours, be it more or lefs.-I do not, however, make any fixed refolutions. If you make a rejoinder, as I think you ought, and will be advised to do, I, true to my principles as a Neceffarian, fhall act as circumftances shall determine me.'

ART. VI. PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS of the Royal Society of London. Vol. LXVIII. Part 2. For the Year 1778. [Concluded from last Month's Review.]

METEOROLOGICA L. Article 32. Comparison between Sir George Shuckburgh and Colonel Roy's Rules for the Measurement of Heights with the Barometer. In a Letter to Colonel Roy, F. R. S. from Sir George Shuckburgh, Bart. F. R. S.

IR George Shuckburgh, in his curious paper, entitled, "Obfervations made in Savoy, in order to afcertain the Height of Mountains by Means of the Barometer," and printed in the Philofophical Tranfactions for 1777, had investigated rules for correcting certain irregularities of the barometer, arifing from the different degrees of heat and cold in the atmosphere, and the expanfion of the different materials of which the inftruments are made, as alfo fome others of lefs moment. About the fame time, and from fimilar experiments, made in different parts of Great Britain, Col. Roy had deduced rules for correcting the fame things. To inveftigate the differences between the

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Colonel's