religious addresses to Chrift, farther adds, that Dr. Jebb refers his readers to Mr. Lindley's Apology, for the proof thereof." Dr. Jebb thinks it requifite to obferve, that all the affertions and conclufions, proceeding on the idea of his having actually referred his readers to Mr. Lindley's publication, for a procf of his pofition, are abfolutely deftitute of all foundation.'

Dr. Jebb remarks, that the defign of his publication has been entirely misapprehended; fince his intention was not to engage in controverly, but chiefly to affign the reasons which induced him to relinquith his ftation in the Church of England. Had it been my intention,' fays he, to enter into the prin ciples, on which my opinion, respecting the point in question, is founded, it is not probable that I fhould have contented myself with referring to Mr. Lindfey's publication, however highly I approve his arguments, and respect his authority. I fhould also have thought it my duty, to have endeavoured to establish the truth of fo important a pofition, by fuch deductions as at least would have convinced my readers, that I had not taken up my opinion without fome reflection on the fubject; and fhould unquestionably have referred, perhaps very largely, to thofe paffages in the facred writings, which, in my apprehenfion, would enable my readers to determine the question for themselves. It has long been my perfuafion, that we pay too much deference to the opinions of men refpecting religion, and too little to the word of God, from which alone all our ideas refpecting the Gofpel ought to be deduced.'

The Doctor's letter, though fhort, is very fenfible, manifefting a candid and ingenuous mind, warm in the interefts of religious liberty and truth. At the fame time that he endeavours to correct the falle conception entertained of the defign of his pamphlet, he expreffes the highest refpect for Mr. Lindley's abilitics, and approbation of his argument.

There are fome marks of negligence in the pamphlet, one instance of which feems to be in a paffage we have quoted, where the Author obferves, that the name of Socinians might have been applied to the Apoftes of Chrift: His meaning is obvious; but is there not a little Iricifm in fuppofing thofe to be followers of Socinus who lived ages before him?

ART. IV. Objervations in Defence of the Liberty of Man, as a Moral Agent in Anwer to Dr. Presley's Illustrations of Philosophical Necefity. By John Palmer, Miniller of New Broad Street. 8vo.. 3 s. tewed. Johnfon. 1779.

ART. V. A Letter to the Re Mr. John Palmer, in Defence of the Illuftrations of Philofophical Neceffity. By Jofeph Priestley, LL. D. F. R. S. 12mo. 1 s. 6. d Jonnfon. 1779.

Refpectable opponent, as well as an old acquaintance, of A Dr. Priestley's (as we learn from the fecond of thefe articles), attacks the doctrine of Philofophical Neceffity, in the

first of these two publications; which (fays Dr. Priestley in his letter to the Author of it) has been fubmitted to the perufal of perfons of great learning and worth, who, I am informed, think highly of it, and have recommended the publication, not only as excellent in itself, but as very proper to follow that of Dr. Price; who was thought by them to have been too tender of me, in our amicable difcuffion, and to have made fome imprudent conceffions. Your work, it is thought, will fupply the deficiency in his.'

Though Mr. Palmer does not, in this publication, particularly difcufs the question concerning the materiality or immateriality of the foul; one of his principal arguments, in favour of human liberty, or agency, is founded on the immateriality. of that fubftance. If the fentient principle in man be of a material nature, it muft, as we have obferved in the former stages of this difpute, be fubject to the laws of matter or mechanism; and be neceffarily determined by the motives or external causes operating upon it: but, on the other hand, if the foul of man be immaterial, or a fubftance perfectly diftin&t from matter; it may be faid that the fame neceffity may not take place. The foul, thus conftituted, may be conceived endowed with a felf-determining power, imparted to it by the Creator. Motives, or external causes, will indeed have weight or influence over it; but that influence will not be a mechanical, and may not be a neceffitating influence. Motives may occafionally induce, but cannot compel to action, a spiritual fubftance, which is a felfmover, or which has a power imparted to it of beginning motion: a power, which, the Author obferves, as it exifts in the Supreme Being, may by him be communicated to created beings; as all other powers may, which do not imply felfexistence or independency.

Accordingly, as Dr. Prieftley has inferred, that if man be wholly a material, he must be a mechanical being; fo the Author, on the other hand, draws an oppofite conclufion from the contrary fuppofition; and further concludes, that if man be free, or poffeffed of the power of moral agency (as he endeavours to prove in the course of this work), there must be fomething in the conftitution of his nature, to which this power belongs, that is intirely diftinct from matter, and not fubject to its laws; or that the spirit in man is properly immaterial.' In short, the tenour of this part of his argument confifts in fhewing that the neceffity, which must attend the operation of phyfical cautes, is not applicable to, nor can take place with refpect to, a fubftance of a totally different nature from matter.- -But to represent this argument in another light - or rather perhaps only In other words:

The

The Neceffarians, in their arguments drawn from the confideration of caufe and effect, fuppofe, or rather take for granted, a fimilarity in the nature of matter and fpirit; and accordingly apply the fame general maxims to effects mechanically produced, and to effects depending upon the will and choice of a human mind: whereas the Author, as an advocate for human liberty, does not admit what is thus affumed by the Neceffarians. The advocate for liberty allows indeed that every effect must have a caufe; and that every caufe muft be adequate to the effect he admits too that bodies muft produce the fame effects precifely on other bodies, under the fame precife circumstances: but the mind, according to his hypothefis, not being fubjected to the laws of matter, though liable to be influenced by it, and poffeffing a felf-moving or determining power, may will or determine differently, on different occafions, even though the circumftances are the fame.Or, nearly in the words of the Author, the mind not being under the controul of matter, a variety of volition or determination, in the fame fituation or circumftances, may be admitted as poffible, at leaft, without any contradiction, or even seeming difficulty.

In reply to this laft obfervation, Dr. Priestley, in the second of these publications, obferves that the contradiction is not at all the lefs glaring, or the difficulty in any degree diminished, by afcribing immateriality to the mind. It does indeed follow,' fays he, that the mind, being immaterial, is not fubject to the laws of matter; but it does not therefore follow, that it is fubject to no laws at all, and confequently has a felf-determining power, independent of all laws, or rule of its determinations. In fact, there is the very fame reafon to conclude that the mind is fubject to laws as the body.'-He inftances in certain affections and paffions of the mind. Thus, perception invariably follows the prefentation of a proper object: the judgment follows, as certainly, the perceived agreement or difagreement of two ideas. Thefe affections belong to the mind as much as the will; they are invariably determined by a view of the objects prefented to them, and have nothing of felfdetermination belonging to them. The decifions of the will as invariably follow the motives, which are its objects; and it would be ftrange if the will could be afcribed to fome other fubftance, intirely different from that in which perception and judgment inhere--whether that substance be material or immaterial.

It is impoffible for us to follow Mr. Palmer through the various questions into which this difpute has been branched out by Dr. Priestley and his anfwerers. We fhall however take particular notice of that part of his work, in which he treats of the moral influence of the doctrine of neceffity, and confiders

how

how far the general conduct of men will be influenced by the belief of that doctrine. To thefe confiderations we shall fubjoin the fubftance of Dr. Priestley's reply. We choose this fubject, both because we particularly attended to it, when we gave an account of Dr. Prieftley's original work;-[See M. REV. vol. lviii. May 1778, page 361.] and likewise because, if Dr. P. has fucceeded in his new illuftration of it, he has cleared up what has always appeared to us one of the most difficult parts of his doctrine, as applied to the conduct of men believing

in it.

Mr. Palmer afks, what can poffibly have a ftronger tendency towards the rendering men indifferent with respect to their conduct, and preventing all human endeavours, than for a man to believe that he has no power over his actions; fo that" (to ufe Dr. Priestley's own words) no action or event could poffibly be other wife than it has been, is, or is to be? This would be thecafe, Dr. Priestley has before owned, if their own actions and determinations were not necessary links in this chain of caufes and events, and if their good or bad fuccefs did not, in the ftricteft fenfe of the word, depend upon themselves.'

According to Mr. Palmer, the confideration of the actions and determinations of men being neceffary links in this chain of caufes and events,' is the very thing that conftitutes the difficulty, inftead of removing it. If all human actions and determinations are neceffary, what is there,' he asks, that, in any proper fenfe, can be said to depend upon a man's felf? What, on this plan of human nature, are all endeavours or efforts which a man can exert, but impreffions, or the confequences of impreffions, made upon him, in which he has not the leaft concern as an efficient or agent?-To look upon every action and event as necessary, and that nothing could be otherwife than it is, is a much better falvo for all the follies and errors of men, than any other which they have been able to find out. If any, therefore, are to fucceed better, or be happier, in any part of their existence, than others, their fuperior profperity and happinefs will be infallibly fecured to them: and though there is a certain difpofition of mind and courfe of action, which are infeparably connected with their fuccefs and happiness, as means to bring about thefe events; yet the means, as well as the end, are alike neceffary; and having no power to make either the one or the other at all different from what they are, or are to be; their lot, through the whole of their being, is by them abfolutely unalterable.'

Mr. Palmer then alludes to the cafe of the farmer, adduced by Dr. Priestley, as a popular illuftration of his doctrine; and which, on that account, we transcribed into the page of our Review above referred to. In this cafe, Mr. Palmer fays, that

the

the Doctor feems to take the principle of neceffity for ganted, and then reasons upon it, as if it were really true. To make it a cafe in point, it must be fuppofed, not only that "vegetation is fubject to the eftablished laws of nature;" but likewife, that the farmer believes, that he himself is, in the whole of his conduct, fubject to the like phyfical neceffity; and that, if he is to reap, he shall alfo find himself under a neceffary, compulsive, influence to fow. Whether this is a common opinion among that plain fort of men,' fays Mr. Palmer, let the Doctor himfelf, on impartial reflection, determine. But, till that is firft proved, no inference, favourable to the doctrine of neceffity, can be drawn from the pains they take, in making ufe of the means appointed for rendering the earth fruitful.'-The fact, he. doubts not, is, that they do confider themselves as having it in their power to neglect or ufe the means: and, did they believe the contrary, he apprehends, that their belief would be attended with want of exertion, and neglect of their concerns.

In his aufwer to thefe objections and obfervations of Mr. Palmer, Dr. Priestley does not defend himself against the whole of the doctrine here imputed to him. I am confident,' fays he. (treating only of what makes a man's actions his own, and depending on himself), that, in what you say on this fubject, you deceive yourself by the ufe of words, or you could not draw the confequences that you do, from what you fuppofe to be my doctrine on this fubject.' He then proceeds:

Strictly and philofophically fpeaking, my fuccefs in any thing I wish to accomplish, depends upon myself, if my own exertions and actions are neceffary links in that chain of events, by which alone it can be brought about. And, certainly, if I do know this, and the object or end be defirable to me, this defire, (if it be of fufficient ftrength) cannot but produce the exertion that is neceffary to gain my end. This reafoning appears to me extremely easy, and perfectly conclufive; and yet, though I have repeated it feveral times, and have placed it in a variety of lights, you do not feem to have confidered it. I fhall, therefore, give another inftance, and add fome farther illuftrations.'

This other inftance, in which the Author fubftitutes himself in the room of the farmer, feems to us calculated to obviate the objection above made by Mr. Palmer to the former illuftration; and in which he urges, that farmers do not, in general, know, or believe in, the doctrine of neceffity: whereas no one can doubt of Dr. Priestley's believing in his own doctrine.

• Can I, fays he, have a fufficiently ftrong with to anfwer your book, and not of course read it, mark proper extracts from it, arrange them, write my remarks upon them, then transcribe them for the prefs, and put them into the hands of a bookfeller or printer, &c. when I know, that if all this be not

done,