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religious addresses to Chrift, farther adds, that Dr. Jebb refers his readers to Mr. Lindsey's. Apology, for the proof thereof.' Dr. Jebb thinks it requisite to observe, that all the affertions and conclusions, proceeding on the idea of his having actually referred his readers to Mr. Lindsey's publication, for a procf of his position, are absolutely deftitute of all foundation.'

Dr. Jebb remarks, that the design of his publication has been entirely misapprehended ; fince his intention was not to engage in controverly, but chiefly to aflign the reasons which induced him to relinquith his station in the Church of England. • Had it been my intention,' says he, to enter into the principles, on which my opinion, respecting the point in question, is founded, it is not probable that I should have contented myself with referring to Mr. Lindsey's publication, however highly I approve his arguments, and respect his authority. I should also have thought it my duty, to have endeavoured to establish the truth of to important a position, by such deducLions as at least would have convinced my readers, that I had not taken up my opinion without some reflection on the subject; and Mould unquestionably have referred, perhaps very largely, to those passages in the facred writings, which, in my apprehenfion, would enable my readers to determine the question for themselves. It has long been my persuasion, that we pay too much deference to the opinions of men respecting religion, and too litile to the word of God, from which alone all our ideas refpecting the Gospel ought to be deduced.'

The Doctor's letter, though thort, is very fenfible, manifest- . ing a candid and ingenuous mind, warm in the interests of religious liberty and truth. Àe the same time that he endeavours to correct the false conception entertained of the design of his pamphlet, he expresses the highest respect for Mr. Lindsey's abilities, and approbation of his argument.

There are fore marks of negligence in the pamphlet, one instance of which seems to be in a pallage we have quoted, where the Aurhor observes, that the name of Socinians might have been applied to the Apoitis of Chrift: His meaning is obvious; but is there not a little Iricism in fuppofing those to be followers of Socinus who lived ages before him? ART. IV. Objer vations in D:fence of the Liberty of Alan, as a Maral

Agent ; in Anwer to Dr. Prieitley's Illuftrations of Philojophical Necefiry By John Palmer, Minidier of New. Broad Surces. 8vo.. 35. lewed. Johnson.

Johnson. 1979 ART. V. 4 Litrer to the Reo Mr. John Palmer, in Defence of the

IlluArations of Philosophical Neerljity. By Joseph Priestley, LL. D. F. R. S.

i's. 6.2 Joonron. 1779. Respectable opponent, as well as an old acquaintance, of

Dr. Priestley's (as we learn from the second of these ariicies), attacks the doctrine of Philosophical Neceflity, in the

1 2 no.




first of these two publications; which (lays Dr. Priestley in his letter to the Author of it) has been submitted to the perusal of persons of great learning and worth, who, I am informed, think highly of it, and have recommended the publication, not only as excellent in itself, but as very proper to follow that of Dr. Price; who was thought by them to have been too tender of me, in our amicable discullion, and to have made fome imprudent concessions. Your work, it is thought, will supply the deficiency in his.'

Though Mr. Palmer does not, in this publication, particularly discuss the question concerning the materiality or immateriality of the soul; one of his principal arguments, in favour of human liberty, or agency, is founded on the immateriality. of that substance. If the fentient principle in man be of a material nature, it must, as we have observed in the former stages of this dispute, be subject to the laws of matter or mechanism; and be necessarily determined by the motives or external causes operating upon it: but, on the other hand, if the foul of man be immaterial, or a substance perfectly distinct from matter; it may be said that the fame necessity may not take place. The soul, thus constituted, may be conceived endowed with a self-determining power, imparted to it by the Creator. Motives, or external causes, will indeed have weight or influence over it;, but chat influence will not be a mechanical, and may not be a necessitating influence. Motives may occasionally induce, but cannot compel to action, a spiritual substance, which is a felf. mover, or which has a power imparted to it of beginning motion: — a power, which, the Author observes, as it exists in the Supreme Being, may by him be communicated to created beings; as all other powers may, which do not imply selfexistence or independency.

Accordingly, as Dr. Priestley has inferred, that if man be wholly a material, he must be a mechanical being; so the Author, on the other hand, draws an oppofite conclusion from the contrary supposition; and further concludes, that if man be free, or post-ited of the power of moral agency (as he endeavours to prove in the course of this work), there must be fomething in che constitution of his nature, to which this power belongs, that is intirely distinct from matter, and not subject to its lass; or that the spirit in man is properly immaterial.' In short, the tenour of this part of his argument consists in fnewing thac the neceffity, which must attend the operation of physical caules, is not applicable to, nor can take place with respect to, a lubStance of a totally different nature from matter.

But to represent this argument in another light -- or rather perhaps only th other words:


The Neceffarians, in their arguments drawn from the confideration of cause and effect, suppose, or rather take for granted, a fimilarity in the nature of matter and spirit; and accordingly apply the same general maxims to effe&ts mechanically produced, and to effects depending upon the will and choice of a human mind: whereas the Author, as an advocate for human liberty, does not admit what is thus assumed by the Necessarians. The advocate for liberty allows indeed that every effect must have a cause; and that every cause muft be adequate to the effect: he admits too that bodies must produce the same effects precisely on other bodies, under the same precise circumstances : but the mind, according to his hypothesis, not being subjected to the laws of matter, though liable to be influenced by it, and porfeffing a self-moving or determining power, may will or determine differently, on different occasions, even though the circumftances are the fame.Or, nearly in the words of the Author, the mind not being under the controul of matter, a variety of volition or determination, in the same situation or circumstances, may be admitted as possible, at least, without any contradiction, or even seeming difficulty.

In reply to this last observation, Dr. Priestley, in the second of these publications, observes that the contradiction is not at all the less glaring, or the difficulty in any degree diminished, by ascribing immateriality to the mind... It does indeed fol. low,' says he, that the mind, being immaterial, is not subject to the laws of matter ; but it does not therefore follow, that it is subject to no laws at all, and consequently has a self-determining power, independent of all laws, or rule of its determinations. In fact, there is the very same reason to conclude that the mind is fubject to laws as the body.'-He instances in certain affections and passions of the mind. Thus, perception invariably follows the presentation of a proper object : the judgment follows, as certainly, the perceived agreement or disagreement of two ideas. Thefe affections belong to the mind as much as the will; they are invariably determined by a view of the objcits presented to them, and have nothing of selfdetermination belonging to them. The decisions of the will as invariably follow the motives, which are its obje&ts; and it would be strange if the will could be ascribed to some other substance, intirely different from that in which perception and judgment inhere -- whether that substance be material or immaterial.

It is impossible for us to follow Mr. Palmer through the various questions into which this dispute has been branched out by Dr. Priestley and his answerers. We shall however take parricular notice of that part of his work, in which he treats of the moral influence of the doctrine of necellity, and considers


how far the general conduct of men will be influenced by the belief of that doctrine. To these considerations we shall subjoin the fubftance of Dr. Priestley's reply. We choose this subject, both because we particularly attended to it, when we gave an account of Dr. Priestley's original work ;- {See M. Rev. vol. Iviii. May 1778, page 361.) and likewise because, if-Dr. P. has succeeded in his new illustration of it, he has cleared up whac has always appeared to us one of the most difficult parts of his doctrine, as applied to the conduct of men believing in it.

Mr. Palmer asks, what can possibly have a stronger tendency towards the rendering men indifferent with respect to their conduct, and preventing all human endeavours, than for a man to believe that he has no power over his actions; fo that' (to ufe Dr. Priestley's own words) · no action or event could pollably be otherwise than it has been, is, or is to be? This would be the cafe, Dr. Priestley has before owned, if their own actions and determinations were not necesary links in this chain of causes and events, and if their good or bad success did not, in the ftricteft sense of the word, depend upon themselves.'

According to Mr. Palmer, the confideration of the actions and determinations of men being necessary links in this chain of causes and events,' is the very thing that constitutes the difficulty, instead of removing it. If all human actions and determinations are necesary, what is there,' he asks, that, in any proper sense, can be said to depend upon a man's self? What, on this plan of human nature, are all endeavours or efforts which a man can exert, but impressions, or the consequences of impreffions, made upon him, in which he has not the least concern as an efficient or agent ?-To look upon every action and event as necessary, and that nothing could be otherwise than it is, is a much better falvo for all the follies and errors of men, than any other which they have been able to find out. If any, therefore, are to succeed better, or be happier, in any part of their existence, than others, their superior prosperity and happiness will be infallibly secured to them: and though there is a certain difpofition of mind and course of action, which are inseparably connected with their success and happiness, as means to bring about these events; yet the means, as well as the end, are alike necessary; and having no power to make either the one or the other at all different from what they are, or are to be; their lot, through the whole of their being, is by them abfolutely unalterable.'

Mr. Palmer then alludes to the case of the farmer, adduced by Dr. Priestley, as a popular illustration of his doctrine; and which, on that account, we transcribed into the page of our Rrview above referred to. In this case, Mr, Palmer says, that


the Doctor seems to take the principle of neceffity for ganteds and then reasons upon it, as if it were really true. To make it a case in point, it must be supposed, not only that “ vegetation is subjcet to the established laws of nature;" but likewise, that the farmer believes, that he himself is, in the whole of his conduct, subject to the like physical necessity; and that, if he is to reap, he shall also find himself under a necessary, compulsive, inAuence to low.-" Whether this is a common opinion among that plain fort of men,' says Mr. Palmer, let the Doctor himfelf, on impartial reflection, determine. But, till that is first proved, no inference, favourable to the doctrine of neceffity, can be drawn from the pains they take, in making use of the means appointed for rendering the earth fruitful.' The fact, he, doubts not, is, that they do consider themselves as having it in their power to neglect or use the means: and, did they believe she contrary, he apprehends, that their belief would be attended with want of exertion, and neglect of their concerns.

In his answer to these objections and observations of Mr. Palmer, Dr. Priestley does not defend himself against the whole of the doctrine here imputed to him.-' I am confident,' says he. (treating only of what makes a man's actions his own, and dipending on himself), that, in what you say on this subject, you deceive yourself by the use of words, or you could not draw the consequences that you do, from what you suppose to be my doctrine on this subject.' He then proceeds :

• Strictly and philosophically speaking, my success in any thing I wish to accomplish, depends upon myself, if my own exertions and actions are necessary links in that chain of events, by which alone it can be brought about. And, certainly, if I do know this, and the object or end be desirable to me, this defire (if it be of sufficient strength) cannot but produce the exertion that is necessary to gain my end. This reasoning appears to me extremely easy, and perfectly conclusive ; and yet, though I have repeated it several times, and have placed it in a variety of Jights, you do not seem to have considered it. I shall, therefore, give another instance, and add some farther illustrations,

This other instance, in which the Author substitutes himself in the room of the farmer, seems to us calculated to obviaie the objection above made by Mr. Palmer to the former illustration; and in wbich he urges, that farmers do not, in general, know, or believe in, the doctrinc of necellity: whereas no one can doubt of Dr. Priestley's believing in his own doctrine.

• Can I,' says he, have a fufficiently strong wih to anfwer your book, and not of course read it, mark proper extracts from it, arrange them, write my remarks upon them, then transcribe them

for the press, and put them into the hands of a bookseller or printer, &c. when I know, that if all this be not


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