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related in his “New Principles of Gunnery,” publilhed in 1742, From these experiments it incontestably appeared that the reliftance made by the air to projectiles, which have a rapid motion, is much greater than had been supposed even by Newton and Huygens themselves; and that it is indeed so great that the path described by any fhot whatever is very different from the curve of a parabola ; and, consequently, that all applications of that conic fe&tion to gunnery are false, and totally useless.
But Mr. Robins's experiments being made with lot of an ounce weight only, it was much to be wished that such perfons as had opportunity, might repeat the same experiments with balls of a larger size, and also with balls of different fizes. This was undertaken by Mr. Hutton : and in the course of his experiments be used balls from 20 to 50 ounces weight; the result of which confirmed Mr. Robins's principles in the most ample manner, as may be seen at large in his paper; some account of which was given in vol. Ix. p. 417 of our Review.
Some persons having objected to the subject of Mr. Hutton's paper, as being not lo immediately an object of the Society's institution as others of a different nature; we shall tran. scribe the concluding paragraph of this sensible and well-written discourse, to fhew that the question did not escape the confideration of this learned body, before they conferred the greatest mark of honour which they have to bestow, on the Author of it.
• Some,' says this humane and benevolent man, "may think, that the object of this Society are the arts of peace alone, not those of war, and that considering how numer rous and how keen the instruments of death already are, iç would better become us to discourage than to countenanie their farther improvement. Thele naturally will be the fir it thoughes of the best disposed minds. But when upon a closer examina, tion we find, that since the invention of arms of the quickest execution, neither battles nor fieges have been more frequent nor more destructive, indeed apparently otherwise; may we not thence infer, that such means as have been employed to sharpen the sword, have tended more to diminish than to increase the number of its vi&ims, by shortening contests, and making them more decisive. I shall not however insist on maintaining so great a paradox ; but only surmile that whatever state would adopt the Utopian maxims, and profcribe the study of arms, would soon, I fear, become a prey to those who best knew how to use them. For yet, alas ! far seem we to be removed from those promised times, when nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither fall they learn war any more.'
ART. VI. An Enquiry into the Policy of making Conquests for the Ma
bometans in India by the British Arms; in Answer to a Pamphleteuitled, Confiderations on the Conquest of Tanjore. 4to. 35. Dodfley. 1779.
E have here an ingenious and spirited apology for the
conduct of the Directors of the East India Company, in taking the kingdom of Tanjore from the Nabob of Arcot, and restoring it to its former sovereign. In justice to the Author, and for the fatisfaction of our Readers, we shall give a summary of the principal arguments which are here adduced in justification of this measure.
Our Author considers the conquest of Tanjore, first on the ground of authority, and then on that of reason and justice. On the former ground, he observes--that there is no evidence of the truth of any material charge against the Rajah, which could Jay the Company under an obligation to make this conquest for the Nabob of Arcot. The authorities produced as records in support of the Nabob's right are, for the moft part, nothing more than the mere representations of those servants of the Company who have assisted the Nabob in bis ufurpation. Of this nature is the correspondence of the Select Committee of Madras. And even these authorities do not come up to the purpose for which they are produced; for the Select Committee never either informed the Directors that they had the conqueft of Tanjore in view, or recommended that measure; and, befides, they confess explicitly, that they acted in this affair againit their own judgment.-- The orders of the Company do not amount to an authority to make this conqueft; they only express the Company's disapprobation of the Rajah's conduct, in some instances, and their wish, that when convenient he may be chastised, and the Nabob's pretensions againft him rendered effectual. These pretenfions, communicated to the Directors, were only that the Nabob might receive the arrears of his pishcuth or tribute money, and a reasonable fum towards the charges of the war with Hyder Ali. The Prefidency themselves expressly acknowledge, that they had no cause to infer from any orders of the Company, that it was their with the country of 'Tanjore thould be conquered for the Nabob; and they expressly informed the Nabob, that any measures taken for this purpose could only be temporary, till the Company's pleasure be known; and declare it to be the Company's wish, not to fubvert the established government of any power, with which they have connection.- Whatever errors the Company may have fallen into in this affair, have been owing to their giving too
See Revicw for April, 1779, p. 296.
cary easy credit to their servants abroad, who scrupled not to millead them by the most unjustifiable misrepresentations, of which the Directors have frequently complained.
Our Author next confiders the conquest of Tanjore on the ground of reason and justice.-When the Company first began to interfere in the politics of India, they found the then king of Tanjore an hereditary sovereign, formed their first regular alliance with him, and, by his allistance, gave the first turn to the war with France. The exertions of the king of Tanjore were immediately in support of the Nabob against his rival Chunda Saheb, and put him in peaceable possession of his government. But the wealth and splendour in which the king then lived, excited the envy of the Nabob, and led him to formi the design of extirpating him. This the Presidency acknowledged. When he was compelled by necellity to relinquish this design, he formed a plan for the extirpation of Hyder Ali, the Nabob of Mysore, and engaged the arms of the Company in tbis wicked scheme. Still, however, he kept in view the conquest of Tanjore, and omitted no means to bring on a rupture with that kingdom. At length, having failed in his attempt againft Hyder Ali, that he might balance the lofles that he had sustained, and accomplish his favourite object, he engaged in the war of 1771 against Tanjore, supported by the Presidency.
After this account of the real motives of the war, our Author proceeds to examine the pretexts on which it was undertaken. The first pretext was, that in the war with Hyder Ali, the Rajah had not sent aslistance to the Nabob. To this it is replied, that the King of Tanjore was not bound by any treaty whatever to take part in this war, as even his enemies confess. The war was undertaken, without consulting the Rajah, and in direct opposition to his interests : had it been successful, it would have left Tanjore entirely at the mercy of the Nabob. Yet, notwithstanding this, from a desire of being on good terms with the English, the Rajah sent 3000 men, under Colonel Wood, to the affiftance of the Nabob. Beside, if he had incurred any blame in this transaction, it was wiped off by the treaty of peace with Hyder Ali, in which the Rajah was included.
The second pretext was, the non-payment of the pilhcuth to the Mogul, through the hands of the Nabob, according to the treaty of 1762. Here no proof of the refusal of payment is brought. The payment was only delayed for three months, on account of the expence the Rajah had sustained from the war with Hyder Ali. The Company had been themselves in the fame situation with respect to the Rajah, having neglected for five years to pay a pilhcush for the town of Devicota.
The third pretext was, that the Rajah had made war on the princes or Polygars of Marawar and Nalcooty, whom the Nabob alleged to be his dependants. The fact of the war is admitted; but the fovereignty of the Rajah being acknowledged, (which was allowed by the Presidency in 1772, and by the Nabob himself in 1762) he must be at liberty to right himself on his neighbours who had injured him. The Nabob had before expressed, in the strongest terms, his desire that no protection should be given to the Marawar princes : he even acknowledged the justice of the war by calling the territories in dispute the King of Tanjore's country.
Yet he clandestinely incited the Polygars to hoftilities, while he was preparing to make war with the Rajah for having a quarrel with them. On inquiry, it has appeared that there is no proof of these Polygars having any dependence on the Nabob, and their sovereignty is found to be ancient and hereditary.
The result of this war, undertaken on such frivolous pretexts, was, that Tanjore, after fuffering great devastation and plunder, was obliged, in 1771, to submit to pay near 700,000 l. and to such other terms as the Nabob thought fit to exact.
At the very inftant in which this treaty, so advantageous to the Nabob, was concluded, the Presidency rent orders not to restore or demolish the fort of Vallum, according to the agreement, but to have it fufficiently garrisoned, under the pretext of an apprehenfion that the Rajah would not perform all the articles of the agreement: they asserted that he equivocated, and immediately annulled the treaty. But no proof or explanation is given of this equivocation. And the truth is, the Rajah did not equivocate, or hesitate to fulfil the agreement. On the evidence of the Nabob's own minifter, Nazib Khan, it appears that the jewels taken from the Marawars were delivered to the Nabob's eldest son, and that the King of Tanjore offered bills, the same day, for nine lacks out of the fourteen agreed to be paid, and engaged to pay the remainder the Monday following:
On this the Nabob's eldest son hefitated on the infraction of the treaty; but his younger brother broke through it at once, on no other pretence than that his father's pleasure must, by all means, be preserved.' In this manner the treaty of 1771 was broken, and a second made agreeable to the Nabob's pleafure, which however, two years after, he found means to difsolve. The Prefidency, having only agreed to, not ratified the last treaty, thought themselves at liberty to act contrary to it, as guardians of the public peace.
Solely on the charge of the Rajah's enemy, the Nabob himfelf, with only four days deliberation, the Presidency declared his right to protection forfeited, and that it was dangerous to
suffer him to exist as a power. The first particular of the Na. bob's charge is, that by advice confirmed by the Company's resident at Poonah, the Rajah had endeavoured to bring the Ma. rattas into the Carnatic. This charge is made without any direct information to the Presidency, and rests wholly on the word of the Nabob : and from the account sent by the Pretidency to the Company it appears, that whatever was the negociation, it arose from a juít dread which the Rajah entertained of the Nabob's infincerity and evil designs against Tanjore. The second charge is, that the Rajah had given the Nabob no afstance against the Polygars, but had received them, and supa. plied them with ammunition. Of this no proof-is given : befide, it must be remembered, that the Nabob had just quarrel-. led with the Rajah, for making war on these very Polygars, and now, for not making war upon them, and that these contradice tory charges were made at the interval of about two months, without alleging any act of rebellion subsequent to the time in which he considered them as under his protection. A third charge is, that the Rajah had taken some runaway Polygars under his protection, and given them a residence. As the nature of the crime of these runaways is not specified, and no other proof of the fact is given but the word of the Nabob, it. Cannot merit notice. The fourth charge is, that the Rajah had, under the plea of borrowing money, mortgaged some districts of the Tanjore country to the Dutch, French, and Danes. The whole amount of this charge is, that the Nabob forces the Rajah, by invasions and violent extortions, to mortgage some of his territories, and then makes that mortgage a reason for robbing him of all the remainder. The last chargé is, that the Rajah had refused to pay the money agreed for by treaty, ten lacks still remaining due. Though this charge was admitted by the Presidency without inquiry, the fact is, that this money was, at the time of the accusation, actually paid. The Rajah, notwithstanding the exhausted state of his finances, had borrowed money of Comora, an Hindoo, for this purpose, and pledged a territorial revenue for the payment. This Comora drew bills on his master, Paul Benfield, the Nabob's banker, for the amount, which bills (by Mr. Benfield's own confeffion) were in the Nabob's or his banker's hands. On these light grwands, which the Presidency took up on the bare word of the Nabob, the war was renewed, under the protection of the English aims in 1773, which issued in the plunder of four millions sterling of the wealth of Tanjore, and the core quest of the country.
Such is the evidence (which must be allowed to carry with it much appearance of truth) on which this Writer justiścs the conduct of the Directors of the East-India Company in restoring