made a free port. This difference surely would not authorize a conunuation of the war. As to no mention having been made of the prince of Orange, it was most evident that we had not the power to reinstate him by force of arms; but certainly no opportunity would be lost in negotiating for his interests. Naples, which now was possessed by the armies of France, was to be restored to its lawful sovereign. Malta was to be availing to neither of the contracting parties. As for Portugal, she had retained every thing that could be useful to retain, and had made no sacrifice that could be injurious. There was nothing in the West Indies which could have justified a continuance of the struggle, and in the East the overthrow of Tippoo had completely secured our empire from annoyance. Ceylon and Trinidad were important acquisitions; but it was much more important that we had overcome the erroneous opinions prevalent in England and in Ireland. He concluded with trusting the peace would be found advantageous and safe for the country.

Lord Westmeath also spoke in favour of the address.

Lord Grenville said it would be indeed to him a matter of the most lively satisfaction and heartfelt joy, if his judgment could permit him to congratulate the house as the noble mover of the address had done, or if he could agree to an address which stated that we had brought an arduous and important contest to a successful termination. Independent of every public consideration which must have animated him, every private feeling he possessed must have rejoiced at the

attainment of that object, which for so many years of his life it was his duty continually to urge to their lordships. He feared, however, that all the pains he had bestowed upon that object, would turn out mere fruitless labour, for he was sorry to say, that, according to his view of the subject, no one of the objects for which we had so long warred had been obtained. If security was the object of the war, we now remain in a state of greater insecurity than at the commencement of the war, or at any time during its continuance. He should agree that our naval and military efforts had been crowned by success greater than at any former period: he also agreed that peace ought to have been made when it could be made on secure and honourable terms, for a secure and honourable peace is the only legitimate object, of war. The question was not whether the peace should or should not be agreed to, for the honour of the nation was now pledged to the observance of its conditions; and as so many sacrifices had already been made, he should be the last man who would propose to sacrifice the national honour. The question now is, what are the merits of this treaty? or can the house assure his majesty that the terms of it me their approbation? To this he could not agree, because he conceived the terms disadvantageous to the country, and fraught with national degradation. This was stated to be only a question about terms, and therefore it must be tried by an examination of the terms, by weighing our cessions and our conquests, and considering our relative sitration. He considered that it was perfectly known to every statesman,

that

that there were but two principles on which negotiations for peace usually proceeded: the first was the state of things before the war, or the status quo ante bellum; or the actual state of things at the time of negotiating, or the uti possidetis. If the situation of things was such as that it was not possible to restore them to what they was before the war, then the negotiation should have been on the latter principle, and every deviation from that principle should be strictly watched. If we had been much inferior to the enemy in strength at the time of the negotiation, that surely must enter into the account; but every noble lord who had yet spoken, disclaimed, and indeed it had been completely disproved by the event of the last year's war, in which it was by no means found that we were inferior to the enemy, either in success, in means, or resources. If the situation of the country then was elevated and prosperous, we ought to have had honourable terms of peace; we were in a condition to demand such terms as were adequate to our rank and power. He then requested their lordships to consider the situation of France, and by comparing it with that of this country, ascertain the relative situation of both. He by no means meant to undervalue the conquests of France, on the contrary, he thought them of the highest importance. By taking the Rhine for her boundary, and annexing Savoy, &c. she had not only extended her empire beyond what the most ambitious of her monarchs had ever conceived, but she had her frontiers additionally secured by dependent republics and tributary kings, additional war, continued success,

and fresh conquest. On our side, our successes were no less brilliant. We had rescued Egypt; possessed ourselves of Malta and Minorca ; and shut up the Mediterranean against the ships of France and Spain. We had the Cape of Good Hope, a most important key to the East. In the West Indies we had every thing that was desirable, Martinico, Trinidad, &c. On the continent of South America we had, at Demerara and Surinam, an empire almost equal in extent and importance to the power to whom we restored it. Although the war had not been undertaken for colonial acquisitions, yet it was wisely directed to that object, as being the best means of crippling her marine, by contracting her commerce; but although we were disappointed in the objects of the war, these possessions should have been held as pledges for indemnity, and still more so for security. If the continent of Europe could not be restored to its former state, they ought to have been retained as a counterpoise to the power of France. The noble lord had seemed principally to rely upon an argument ad hominem, by comparing this treaty with the projet of Lisle, but he had forgot to state that, besides the cessions con- ́ tained in that projet, the present treaty gave up Surinam, Minorca, and Malta. After four years of additional war and expense, we had given more to receive less; besides we should have remembered in what a period of despondency those negotiations began. The stoppage at the bank, which threatened more alarming consequences than resulted from it, to which was to be added, the unexpected defection of our allies, and, above all,

that

that the war had been carried on till it was hopeless to proceed any 'further. So far of its object as went to the security of our constitution had been attained. He should not boast of this peace as a very honourable one; but his principal wish was satisfied, if it was a secure and lasting peace, and the former ministers had declared that was their only object. We had certainly conquered many possessions of the enemy; but had France gained no dominion over Naples and Portugal? As to the projet of Lisle, that was but a projet, a proposition, and by no means an ultimatum, and it is by no means certain what would have been the terms agreed to, if these negotiations had gone on; however, he wished to procure a suitable indemnity for the prince of Orange; he could not, in his conscience, risk the peace by insisting upon this point; he thought it better to leave it for future arrangement. As to the Cape of Good Hope, however important it might be as a station and as a harbour, he thought it by no means worth continuing the war at an expense of thirty millions a year to obtain the possession of it; and as to the Mediteranean, he conceived we were better off now than in 1797, when the island of Malta had no power to guaranty it from France; and we were much better off than we would be if we, for the sake of retaining it, suffered France to keep possession of Naples and Portugal. In the West Indies, he confessed that he should prefer Martinique, if it could be obtained, to Trinidad. He thought there was a greater chance of this peace being permanent, than any peace which might have been made in

Lord Moira, in reply to lord Grenville, said, the peace was only so far inadequate as it was inadequate to the expectations which that noble lord and his colleagues had daily held out to parliament and the country, of indemnity for the past, and security for the future. Although parliament had given the most unbounded confidence, and ample supplies that were ever entrusted to ministers, yet those promises constantly failed, and the country was brought so on the verge of ruin, as that a peace at any price became necessary. He should, however, wish that what was past, should be, as much as possible, buried in oblivion, and that we should look forward to the more pleasing prospects which now open upon us. He did not at all agree in the justice of the metaphor used by lord, Pelham, that this country and France had gone on in parallel lines; he thought there was no parallel between them. France was an extensive continental power, and her greatness depended on her army. The security of England rested on her navy; but however glorious and brilliant our victories bad been both by sea and by land, Great Britain stood in a state of comparative inferiority both in strength and aggrandizement. The acquisitions we had made certainly bore no comparison to those which

France

France had made. All the islands we had taken in the West Indies were not equal in value to Savoy, which was a very small portion of the acquisitions of France. The strict basis of the uti possidetis could not be adhered to when a weaker power was negotiating with a stronger. He rejoiced sincerely that peace was effected, and gave ministers credit for having made the best peace which, under the existing circumstances, could be procured. His lordship concluded by a declaration to ministers, that he was disposed to give them his cordial and unreserved support, in the expectation that they would continue to deserve it.

Lord Mulgrave, in a very animated speech, defended the peace, and gave the highest encomiums to the valour of the British soldiers and sailors.

The duke of Bedford supported the address and the preliminaries of peace, although he differed widely from some of the noble lords who had supported it; he supported it as a peace the best which could be obtained under the circumstances of the country. In comparing it with the projet of 1797, he observed that, notwithstanding the vigour and resources which this country displayed in the last year of the war, France had, since 1797, gained such important victories on the continent, as to place her higher, if possible, than she stood in 1797. He could not therefore withhold his approbation of the peace, unequal as it was, disgraceful as it might be. He hoped, however, that his majesty's present ministers would follow up the peace by a full restoration of the constitution to the people, and an immediate repeal VOL. XLIV.

of those statutes, which originated in childish alarm, and apprehension of danger which never existed but in the minds of his majesty's late ministers. He concluded by promising to support ministers if they continued in the same course they had hitherto pursued.

The bishop of Rochester said, that although he was a friend to peace, as became the sacred profession to which he belonged, he was an enemy to a mere semblance and counterfeit of peace, which contained within it the germ of future war, and perhaps of the destruction of the country; he should have been heartily glad to have given his support to a peace that was honourable and advantageous to the country, and likely to be safe and permanent. The bishop condemned the mode of defending the preliminaries by considering the importance of the island of Malta, or any particular cession separately. We should weigh the great mass of cessions generally, and see for what they had been made: we had yielded the Mediterranean in absolute sovereignty to the enemy; we had opened for them a door to India; given them back the Cape, and their islands in the West Indies, rendered infinitely more valuable by British industry and capital--and in exchange for such immense cessions, we had got nothing but a precarious and hollow truce. The reverend prelate followed nearly the same course lord Grenville had taken in his disapprobation of the preliminaries, and concluding by hoping that ministers would not rescind those salutary statutes, which had been found so efficacious in promoting the peace and tranquillity of the country.

Lord Fitzwilliam considered the C peace