... pain' meant - so that he constantly called different things by that name - but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain" - in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel... Feeling Pain and Being in Pain, second edition - Page 77by Nikola Grahek - 2011 - 198 pagesLimited preview - About this book
| Morris Weitz - Philosophy - 1966 - 404 pages
...symptoms and presuppositions of pain"— in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism. 272. The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own... | |
| Jonathan Bennett, Jonathan Francis Bennett - Philosophy - 1966 - 272 pages
...symptoms and presuppositions of pain' — in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.1 This argument, which seems to me entirely successful, concerns the conditions under which... | |
| Carlee Lippman - Literary Criticism - 1978 - 216 pages
...the sufferer is constantly interrupted by Confucian-like remarks such as, "Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism." His method is almost Socratic, and seems to imply that only an indirect grasp of what he says is possible... | |
| Richard Rorty - Philosophy - 1982 - 292 pages
..."neutral" in respect to different conceptual schemes, it can be so only, I would argue, by becoming "a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it." (Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations [New York: Macmillan, 1958] , I, 271.) 2. See... | |
| Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, Thomas A. McCarthy, Thomas McCarthy - Philosophy - 1987 - 504 pages
...intuition- that "every difference must make a difference" (expressed by Wittgenstein in the remark "A wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism"), 40 or instead abandon Nagel's intuition about consciousness. We certainly have both intuitions. For... | |
| Oswald Hanfling - Philosophy - 1989 - 218 pages
...symptoms and presuppositions of pain' - in short, he uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it is not part of the machine. (PI 271; cf. 289 and p. 207) Is my use of the word 'pain' subject to 'criteria of correctness'?... | |
| Richard Rorty - Philosophy - 1992 - 420 pages
...symptoms and presuppositions of pain" — in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.12 You learned the concept 'pain* when you learned language.18 In order to get clear about... | |
| Alan Donagan - History - 1994 - 316 pages
...symptoms and presuppositions of pain" — in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.58 Of course if this imaginary person's defective memory had not by its error compensated... | |
| John W. Cook - Philosophy - 1994 - 382 pages
...Locke, assign to memory that is (given the force of Russell's skeptical argument regarding the past) "a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it" and is therefore "not part of the mechanism," ie, plays no role in the use of "pain." And when this... | |
| Newton Garver - Biography & Autobiography - 1994 - 344 pages
...we do not heed the conditions for the employment of words or concepts, our reasoning may lead us to "a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it" (PI 271); or to the "pure employment of reason," when, "in defiance of all the warning of criticism,... | |
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