when I halted the cavalry to await the approach of Colonel McMil len's brigade, who informed me by courier that he had succeeded in crossing the Wolf River with one regiment of infantry and three companies of cavalry. The regiment of infantry he immediately sent forward to bridge the north fork of the same stream. I subsequently received word from him that in attempting to cross his train the bridge, which he reported as being a very imperfect and bad one, was rendered completely useless by a wagon breaking through and sinking one of the boats. This made it necessary to construct a new bridge, and the remainder of his command could not be moved over until 3 o'clock Tuesday morning (May 3).

Having received information that Forrest was concentrating his force at Jackson with the intention of moving south, and also intelligence from the major-general commanding the district that it had been unofficially reported to him that a division of our infantry had moved up the Tennessee River with the intention of occupying Purdy, and thus to cut off Forrest's line of retreat in that direction, I did not deem it safe to move forward the entire cavalry force until the infantry had arrived to within supporting distance, or had at least effected the crossing of the Wolf River and its fork, as it would have enabled the enemy to pass over the Hatchie River at the Estenaula crossing, on the direct road from Somerville to Jackson, by means of the pontoon he had with him, and to move between the cavalry and Colonel McMillen's infantry brigade, thus giving him an opportunity to destroy both in detail. Under these circumstances I ordered Colonel Waring, at 1 p. m., May 2, to send Colonel Kargé forward to Bolivar with the Second New Jersey and Tenth Missouri Cavalry, with two pieces of artillery (in all, 700 strong), for the purpose of gaining more definite information of the enemy's movements, and, if possible, to secure the bridge he had thrown across the Hatchie River at that point. The remainder of Colonel Waring's division I halted 5 miles from Somerville, on the Bolivar road, to support Colonel Kargé should he meet with any considerable force, or to oppose an advance from the Estenaula crossing should that be attempted, until I could gain satisfactory tidings from Colonel McMillen, to whom I had sent word to move up with all dispatch.

During the night I received information from Colonel Kargé that his advance had encountered the enemy's vedettes, 7 miles from Bolivar, to which place he pursued them, and then met the enemy with a force equal if not larger than his own, commanded by Forrest in person. After a sharp engagement of nearly an hour's duration he had succeeded in dislodging the enemy from the earth-works and rifle-pits, which had been thrown up there before, and finally drove him through the swampy bottoms in the direction of Pocahontas and Middleton, not, however, until the bridge over the Hatchie River had been destroyed. Our loss in this engagement was 2 killed and 10 wounded. The enemy's loss was much heavier, owing to the determination of our troops and the superiority of our arms and artillery, which the enemy was not at all provided with. Among his wounded were several officers, including Forrest's adjutant-general, whose arm was shattered by a carbine ball.

I immediately ordered the entire cavalry force to move to Bolivar at daylight in the morning (May 3), and ordered Colonel McMillen to join there as rapidly as possible with his own brigade, as well as the additional infantry force commanded by Colonel Harris, and which had overtaken him while bridging the Wolf River.

The cavalry arrived at Bolivar on the afternoon of the 3d instant, so as to push forward toward Purdy and to co-operate with the force from the Tennessee River, which I judged, from the information received, had arrived from Cairo and was moving in that direction also. In the mean time I had sent 200 of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, commanded by Captains Woods and, of the same regiment, to the Brownsville and Estenaula crossings, with instructions to press laborers and tools, and to lay out timber for bridges, thus to occupy the attention of the enemy and prevent his crossing there until a new bridge could be built at Bolivar, so as to move on to Purdy. The infantry and the supply train arrived at Bolivar on the 4th instant, at noon, where the remainder of the day was consumed in issuing rations and affording the infantry a short and necessary rest.

The bridge was nearly completed when I felt convinced from information brought in by scouts that the rear of Forrest's command had reached Purdy on Monday night, the 2d instant, and that his entire force was pushing on to Tupelo, Miss.; also that there was no co-operating force moving up from the Tennessee River.

The enemy, having all cavalry, was enabled to move much more rapidly, and could keep our pursuing force, the greater portion being infantry, at any distance he might desire. Though he had already a two days' march the advantage, and a rapid and unfordable stream as a safe barrier against any flank movement, I ordered Colonel Waring to pursue with his cavalry division at daylight on the morning of the 5th and to move as far in the direction of Ripley as possible, thinking that the enemy would make a stand there to enable him to move off the immense train of supplies he was reported as sending down by way of Corinth.

On the 6th instant I directed Colonel Waring to send reconnoitering parties to Ripley, to Hatchietown, and to Salem, and with his command at Mud Creek (8 miles north of Ripley) I directed him to await the arrival of the infantry, which came up in the afternoon of the same day.

Information brought in by the reconnoitering forces as well as that derived from prisoners captured at Ripley, from citizens of that place, and a deserter, proved beyond a doubt that Forrest's forces had again united at Tupelo, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and were moving toward Okolona. The immense trains he was reported as having brought with him was an entire exaggeration, and consisted only of pressed wagons for the transportation of sufficient forage to give two brigades a two days' supply at Corinth and five days' rations to his men, and were released and returned to their owners. Knowing that a further pursuit in a country entirely destitute of forage would compel me to abandon much of my artillery in another day, from the fact that many horses had already given out and been abandoned along the road, and it being represented to me that the condition of the horses of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry in particular was such that it would necessitate the abandoning of one-half of them unless they could have ample rest and forage, I therefore held a consultation with commanding officers of divisions and brigades, who unanimously agreed with me to move back to the railroad terminus, and were of the opinion that to continue the pursuit to Tupelo or Okolona would be certain disaster to ourselves unless amply provided with rations and forage necessary for such a campaign.

On the morning of the 7th the infantry, followed by the cavalry, therefore marched to 4 miles beyond Salem, and the whole command

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encamped on the Lamar road. The troops being exhausted from long and fatiguing marches, and the horses much jaded and broken down, I did not move on Sunday, the 8th instant, but allowed both men and animals to rest.

Receiving the dispatch of the major-general commanding the same afternoon to return to Moscow, and informing me that trains would be there to receive the infantry, I moved the command to Grissom's Station the next day (9th instant), where the greater portion of the infantry was embarked on the cars and arrived at Memphis in the night. The remainder of the infantry arrived at Memphis on Monday, the 10th instant, while instructions were given Colonel Waring, commanding the cavalry, to return to Memphis with his division and to escort the wagon train and artillery.

Though it is desirable to have chronicled a defeat and rout of the enemy, the results of the expedition are the same; his forces were divided and compelled to abandon a section of country he had so long occupied. His thorough knowledge of the country, and the advantage in having good [horses], together with the sympathies of the people in giving him information of our movements, enabled him to beat a rapid retreat to Mississippi, into which State he was pursued for 30 miles, and the chase only then given up when the poverty and barrenness of the country to subsist an army unprovided for a regular campaign made it necessary. The plan of campaign suggested by Major-General Washburn was based in a measure upon the idea of a co-operating force at Purdy, and had that force been in position it would have closed the only door by which Forrest's command could possibly have escaped, and I believe would have resulted in its capture or destruction.

I avail myself of this opportunity to thank the general commanding the district for the promptness with which everything in his power was furnished me to render the expedition successful.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. D. STURGIS, Brigadier-General, Commanding Expedition.

Maj. WILLIAM H. MORGAN, A. A. G.

No. 3.

Itinerary of the First Brigade, Cavalry Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, commanded by Col. George E. Waring, jr., Fourth Missouri Cavalry.*

April 30, the mounted part of this brigade, under Colonel Kargé, Second New Jersey Cavalry, marched out the Randolph road to Raleigh; 17 miles.

May 1, on the march. The brigade, under command of Colonel Kargé, Second New Jersey Cavalry, Colonel Waring in command of the Cavalry Division, left Raleigh, Tenn., and marched to Oakland; 22 miles.

May 2, marched from Oakland to Bolivar; 32 miles. Engaged Forrest, commanding superior forces in person; beat him. The brigade lost 2 killed and 5 wounded; enemy lost 7 dead and 20 wounded, including 4 officers.

May 5, marched from Bolivar to near Ripley, Miss.; 35 miles.

From returns for April and May, 1884,

Colonel

May 6, marched on the Ruckersville road; 8 miles. May 7, marched to beyond Salem, Miss.; 16 miles. May 9, marched to Grissom's Bridge; 18 miles. May 10, marched to Germantown, Tenn.; 15 miles. May 11, marched to White's Station, Tenn.; 5 miles. Waring assumed command. The camp was moved from Fort Pickering to White's Station. Remained in camp during the rest of the month, sending large and small parties out to the east and southeast. May 22, one scouting party of the Fourth Missouri Cavalry was attacked by a large party of rebels while passing over very broken ground, near Mount Pleasant, Miss.; lost 8 killed and 4 wounded and prisoners.

No. 4.

Report of Maj. P. Jones Yorke, Second New Jersey Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND NEW JERSEY CAVALRY,

White's Station, Tenn., May 11, 1864. GENERAL: I have the honor to report that on the 30th of April a force under the command of Brigadier-General Sturgis left Memphis in pursuit of General Forrest.

On the 2d of May we reached Somerville, Tenn., and halted. It being ascertained that a force of the enemy held the town of Bolivar, on the Hatchie River, a distance of 23 miles from Somerville, Colonel Kargé, commanding the First Cavalry Brigade, was sent forward with a force consisting of 200 of the Tenth Missouri Cavalry, 400 of the Second New Jersey Cavalry, and a section of guns belonging to the Tenth Missouri Cavalry. Starting at 1.30 p. m., we made a forced and very rapid march, and found the enemy, 800 strong, under command of Major-General Forrest, in position behind strong intrenchments and fortifications, about 1 mile from Bolivar. After a severe engagement of two hours' duration we routed the enemy and drove them from their intrenchments and through the town, and but for the lateness of the hour (it being after 8 p. m.) and our utter ignorance of the country through which the enemy retreated, would have captured or destroyed the entire force.

The loss of our regiment in this action was 2 killed, 5 wounded, and 20 horses killed and wounded.

The names of the killed are: Orderly Sergt. E. E. Cooper, Company F, and Private George Schweitzer, Company H. The 5 wounded are Frank Malone, Company A; Oscar Rudolph, . Company A; Michael McSorley, Company ; Martin Pirman, Company F; John Egan, Company H.

The regiment behaved nobly, and especially I would mention Company E, under command of Lieut. Lewis Rainear, who opened and took the brunt of the action.

I am happy to say that the Second New Jersey Cavalry enjoys the best reputation, and the esteem not only of the commanding general, but all the troops in this department.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. JONES YORKE,
Major, Commanding.

General ROBERT F. STOCKTON,
Adjutant-General, State of New Jersey..

No. 5.

Itinerary of the First Brigade, First Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, commanded by Col. William L. McMillen, Ninety-fifth Ohio Infantry.*

This brigade marched as part of an expedition under BrigadierGeneral Sturgis on April 30. It proceeded by rail to within 4 miles of Moscow, Tenn., where the bridge across Wolf River was destroyed. It was detained there building a bridge.

May 2, marched in the direction of Somerville, Tenn., going some 5 miles before encamping.

May 3, marched to within 8 miles of Bolivar.

May 4, reached Bolivar, where the brigade found the cavalry forces under General Sturgis; remained until next day.

May 5, whole force marched out on the Pocahontas road; marched in a southerly direction until the evening of the 7th, when it reached Salem, Miss., and encamped.

May 9, marched in the direction of Memphis, reaching that city the same evening, since which time it has been doing picket duty at this place.

*From return for May, 1864.