observe the constitutional Charta, with the modifications contained in the declaration of the Chamber of Deputies, to govern only by the laws, and according to the laws; to render good and even justice to every one according to his right, and to act, in all things, with the sole view to the interest, happiness, and glory of the French people."

"The laws"-" the laws"-" the Charta"" the Charta," were the words always in the mouth, the constant rule of conduct of Louis Philippe. He never promised more. And if we look at his speech as King-his first speech-what did it state or promise more?

"I should have, indeed, been most happy never to have occupied the throne to which the national will has called me; but France, attacked in her liberties, saw public order in peril: the violation of the Charta had deranged every thing. It was necessary to re-establish the action of the laws, and it was the duty of the Chambers to take the necessary steps for this pur. pose. You have done this, gentlemen. The sage modifications you have made in the Charta, guarantee the security of the future; and I hope that France will be happy within, respected abroad, and that the peace of Europe will be rendered more and more permanent."

"Order-peace-the laws-the Charta:" Louis Philippe never promised more than this. He has kept his word, and therefore the Coalition now join against him. He never promised to violate existing treaties, but to maintain them; he never promised more extensive frontiers to France, but on the contrary to be satisfied with those which she possessed; he never promised war, but proclaimed peace; he never encouraged propagandism, but said, "We will show to Europe, that, exclusively occupied with our internal concerns, we cherish peace as well as liberty, and that we only desire the happiness and repose of our neighbours."

But all this is to be changed. The Coalition is tired of order, weary of peace, fatigued with commercial and agricultural prosperity, sighs once more for the glory of the battle field, the roar of cannon, and the din of arms. The system which has been tried and succeeded, is now to be discarded. The laws which have restored order and peace to the country,

are now to be repealed. The alliances which France has contracted with so much difficulty are now to be deranged. And what is the pretext for all this-the flimsy, shabby pretext-for it is nothing more? Why, that Louis Philippe is too much master, too much King; that he rules the council, and directs all the affairs of the state: that his system prevails, and not that of his ministers; that he is irresponsible for acts which belong to him, and that the ministers are responsible for acts which are not their own. But this is only special pleading. Has Louis Philippe ministers? Are they members of one or the other House of Parliament? Have they declined on any one occasion the responsibility which belongs to them? Do they countersign all the royal ordinances? Did they defend the foreign and domestic policy of their cabinet in the last session, foot by foot, inch by inch, and day by day, though they had arrayed against them the eloquence of Berryer, the philosophy of Guizot, the captivating causerie of little Thiers, the grave and solemn protestations of Barrot, and the wit or malice of Garnier Pages, Martin of Strasbourg, or Midul of Bourges? To be sure they did; and piece by piece the ministers destroyed the projected address of the Coalition, substituting in its place their own; and all this after twelve days of anxious and continuous discussion. Have the ministers governed the country? Yes; and governed it well.

"But," says M. de Cormenin (and he is the most formidable of all the enemies of the throne of Louis Philippe), " as he who countersigns, and not he who signs, is he who really governs, it is the minister who is the government and not the King." Granted.

But then he adds, "the truth of their responsibility renders it necessary that, in order to express the wishi of the parliamentary majority, they should belong to it." Granted ;— but what parliamentary majority? M. de Cormenin and the Coalition see no other majority than that of the Chamber of Deputies. The King and Count Molé are, on the contrary, of opinion, that a Chamber of Peers, composed of peers for life, must also be taken into the calculation of the majority; and if, as we learn, half the Chamber of Deputies, and nine-tenths of the Cham

ber of Peers, are in favour of the continuance of the system of peace and order pursued from 1831 to 1839, the real majority, both parliamentary and of the three powers, is in favour of that system.

M. de Cormenin insists:

1st, That Louis Philippe makes his ministers responsible for a system which is not their own.

This is absurd. If they disapproved the system, they would resign; what matters it who was its author, if all are agreed to adopt it?

2d, That Louis Philippe treats directly with the chancellors of foreign cabinets; and has telegraphs, couriers, and autographic notes, and secret despatches at his disposal.

All kings receive ambassadors. No one did so more frequently than Charles X.-and he acted wisely. But when treaties are to be signed acts are to be decided-and arrangements are to be made-is not Louis Philippe always assisted by the presence and counsels of the president of the Council, or the Minister of Foreign affairs? Always.

3d, That the ministers are only secretaries to copy orders, and not councillors of the Crown; and that, instead of having a system of their own, they are only the very humble and very obedient servants of the King. This is reasoning in the vicious circle. The King, when he found out M. Thiers making use of the telegraph to organize a "co-operation" in Spain with Christina, notwithstanding the avowed policy of the Cabinet was that of "non-intervention," got rid of his ungrateful minister, and appointed Count Molé as his successor. When the Molé Cabinet, however, was formed, upon what conditions was it constituted? Peace abroad-order at home-non-intervention abroadand an amnesty at home. These conditions were approved by the members of the Molé administration-and they have honourably carried the whole of them into operation. The Coalition, during the change of this system, say that the King is its author, and that the ministers are only his secretaries! But if this be the case, at least the leaders of the Coalition, when themselves ministers from 1831 to 1837, were only secretaries too- for the same system which was pursued by Louis Philippe in that period, is pur

sued now. The truth is, that it is neither the system of Louis Philippe nor of Cassimir Perier, nor even of Prince Talleyrand; but it is the system indicated to all the Conservatives of the new order of things in France, by the good sense of each one, as the only system which could possibly maintain intact the Throne and the Charta of 1830. M. Thiers has taken a great deal of pains to prove, but he has failed in his attempt, that the system which was good from 1832 to 1837 is good no longer. No—it is good no longer, if the rights and prerogatives of the Throne are to be discarded-if the Chamber of Deputies is to govern France instead of a constitutional monarchy-and if the threat of Lafayette is to be carried into execution, that "the throne of the Citizen King is to be surrounded by republican institutions." But if factions are to be kept down, if a monarchy is to be supported, if peace is to preserved, if propagandism is to be discouraged, if alliances and treaties are to be maintained and enforced-then the system once so energetically defended by Persil, Guizot, Thiers, and Duchatel, must be persevered in, and that which was good from 1831 to 1838 must be continued by those who shall direct the helm of the state vessel. M. Thiers has taken a vast deal of pains to show that " every dog has its day;" that every system has its period of decline and fall, as well as of rise and power; and that states and governments lose themselves when they persevere with a system which is no longer adapted to the state of the public mind, and to the exigencies of the state. But then there is a preliminary question which M. Thiers has not solved, has not replied to, to our satisfaction,-"Is the period arrived when the system adapted to from 1831 to 1839 can, or ought to be changed?" With all submission to the ex-editor of the National-the ex-president of the council-and the present editor-inchief of the Constitutional, no such case is made out; and we agree with Roger Collard that the change required by the Coalition, is the demand of the revolutionary spirit, "which may be known by the hypocrisy of its words, the folly of its pride, and by its profound immorality."

Now we maintain, with a profound conviction of the correctness of our

statement, that were the laws of September to be repealed, all the excesses of 1831 to 1835 would be repeated; and should, in addition to the repeal of those laws, the electoral franchise be extended to what are quaintly called "the capacities," all the horrors of 1793 might be reperpetrated. The French are not changed in heart. Why should they be? Is the standard of morals higher? Has the literature of the country exercised a softening and ameliorating influence over the habits and feelings of the population? And, above all, has religion gained her lawful and lovely sway over the hearts and consciences of the people? M. Thiers knows that the answers to these enquiries must be in the negative. And then, to descend a step lower-is it not true that the Legitimists, Republicans, and Napoleonists, retain all their hate, more or less well-founded, to the Revolution of July, and to the new dynasty? Has the amnesty of Louis Philippe, that wise and generous measure, recommended by Count Molé, converted the enemies of the Throne into its friends? Have the haters of Louis Philippe forgotten their hates? Have the regicides for ever renounced their projects? Why, if M. Thiers knows what is daily said in the lower and middling classes of society in Paris, and in the great cities, where the revolutionary press has produced the most permanent effects on the population, he must know that the language made use of, with reference to the King and the monarchy, is just the reverse of being satisfactory and pacific. Have the Napoleonists abandoned their hopes of seeing one of the nephews of the ex-usurper on the throne? If the laws of September were repealed, would they not, twentyfour hours afterwards, establish their long-projected journals, "L'Aigle," "L'Empereur," and "Napoleon?" Have the republicans been convinced by their oft-repeated failures that France will not submit to the form of government they espouse? By no means; and if the necessary restrictions at present placed on the press of France were to-morrow repealed, we should, within a week afterwards, again hear of the daily "Bon Sens"-the "Tribune"-the "Journal du Peuple," and all the other revolutionary offspring of the barricades of 1830. Now, France is either to have a fixed and established government or none.

She must either retain that which she possesses, notwithstanding its deplorable origin and its unjust foundation, or she must be perpetually exposed to the anarchy and ruin of never-ending changes. To secure that which exists, the laws and institutions now in force are indispensable. These cannot be touched without overthrowing the whole fabric.

The Coalition which has been formed in the Chamber of Deputies, is anti-monarchical and monstrous. It is ANTI-MONARCHICAL, not merely because it is specially formed against Louis Philippe, but because, should it succeed, it renders the Crown responsible for the exercise of its rights and prerogatives to a majority in one of the two Chambers, thus destroying the power of the Throne, and disturbing the equilibrium of the three powers in the state. And it is MONSTROUS, because those who now unite against Louis Philippe do so on actually different principles, and to obtain actually different results. And we hope M. Guizot will forgive us our frankness if we now address a few questions to him. We ask M. Guizot, does he not know that Berryer has joined the Coalition, not for the purpose of obtaining the establishment of what he, M. Guizot, calls a parliamentary government, but solely with the view of bringing into hatred and contempt the present occupant of the throne, whom he regards merely as an usurper? We ask M. Guizot, does he not know that Garnier Pages and his republican friends, in joining the Coalition, have done so for the purpose of bringing into hatred and contempt, not only the person and dynasty of Louis Philippe, but also of causing to he humbled and disgraced, the monarchical power and government in that country? And we ask M. Guizot, in the third place, does he not know that even Odillon Barrot and the "Gauche dynastique," in joining the Coalition, have very different objects in view to himself, M. Guizot? Is M. Guizot prepared to demand the repeal of the laws of September, as M. Barrot and his friends are ready to do, if the King shall be defeated? Is M. Guizot prepared to exclude Louis Philippe from presiding over his councils of ministers, as Odillon Barrot and the Gauche would desire should be the case? No-and even M. Guizot's address to the Mayor at Lisieux proves that he

is not. Then what means this monstrous Coalition of Legitimists, Republicans, and Radical Whigs, with M. Guizot, M. Persil, and a fraction of the French Conservatives? We have called it monstrous, because it is so. It is monstrous to see faction thus conspiring against the only bulwark which remains not only for the monarchy, but for the peace and order, happiness and prosperity, of a great nation. M. Guizot, in order to be constitutional in his opposition, has wisely and prudently resorted to the fiction of blaming the ministers of the Crown; but he knows, as well as we do, that this is only a fiction, and that the real warfare now carrying on is against the Throne.

The elections of 1839 are the most memorable which have occurred since those of 1830. Louis Philippe, perceiving that the war, conducted by the Coalition in the last Chamber, was one against himself and the monarchy, and feeling that it was his duty, a duty which he owed to the Charta of 1830, to himself, his dynasty, and his country, to make a last and desperate effort in favour of monarchical institutions in France, dissolved the Chamber which had been elected in 1837, and made an appeal to the electoral body. In taking this step he proved his appreciation of the state of parties, his knowledge of the real nature of the conflict in the Chamber of Deputies, and his determination to act legally and constitutionally, but, at the same time, to brave all unpopularity and odium, for the purpose of maintaining the equilibrium of the three powers of the state. That appeal has been unsuccessful! The majority of the voting electors have decided against him: and the Gauche and Centre Gauche, aided by the Legitimists and Republicans, and by a fraction of the Right of the Chamber, to which M. Guizot and M. Persil belong, have obtained 250 out of 459 votes, of which the Chamber of Deputies is composed. Count Molé has been blamed for counselling the King to adopt the measure of a dissolution, without being sure of a majority. This blame is, however, undeserved. It was impossible for the noble Count to ascertain, with any thing like accuracy, what would be the effect of a coalition of Legitimists, Republicans, Doctrinaires, and of Centre Gauche, and Gauche electors,

at the electoral colleges. He could not possibly ascertain how many of the electors would consent to this coalition-how many would vote for a candidate who professed opinions precisely opposite to their own, simply for the sake of assuring the triumph of the Coalition, and the defeat of the monarchy. He had the right to believe that tens of thousands of electors would not consent to be thus mystified, and that multitudes would say "no-we have peace, order, obedience to the laws, commercial prosperity, and a gradual amelioration of our social and political situation; M. Molé has assured to us these advantages; the King has confidence in his ministers; the Chamber of Peers has confidence, too; more than one-half of the last Chamber entertained the same feeling; and we will not lend ourselves to a cabal against the last rampart of our liberties and our stability." But Count Molé has been mistaken. The majority of the voting electors have not so felt, and have not so decided. The elections of 1839 are anti-monarchical, and the throne of Louis Philippe is in real danger.

The debates which took place in the Chamber of Deputies, on occasion of the address to the King, in reply to his speech on the opening of the last session of Parliament, are unparalleled in the history of France for their insincerity and falsehood. The chiefs of the Coalition affected to find fault with the foreign and domestic policy of the ministers, and to believe and feel that the question at issue was purely one of a ministerial character. And yet the basis of the Coalition, the declared and agreed basis among the chiefs and leaders was, that Louis Philip should be attacked, that "his" system should be grappled with, that "he" should be defeated, and that, as all were agreed to oppose "him," all might vote for each other's candidates at the elections, and for the overthrow of his system in the Chamber. We have already seen what that system is;-that of the triumphant Coalition will be developed in a few weeks ;its principles are known beforehand. During the debates in the Chamber of Deputies, in January last, most of the leaders of the Coalition professed their attachment to the King, their respect for his person, their veneration for his talents, and their conviction of the necessity for preserving his rights