land face (except one 8-inch columbiad) dismounted. Our mortars, with this gun, however, kept up a steady fire upon the enemy's line of infantry, whilst our sea-face batteries replied with steadiness and coolness to the fire of the fleet, but as I was engaged entirely on the land face, for want of data not now to be had, I am unable to report with what effect. The exhausted condition of our men, now greatly decimated by fifty-six hours of hard fighting, the major-general commanding being unable to relieve them without, in effect, evacuating his works at the mouth of the river, from which he had drawn as heavily (in re-enforcing Colonel Lamb) as he could, rendered it necessary to fire at the fleet seldom and at long intervals. This may in some measure account for their being able to keep up their heavy fire, as none of their ships were withdrawn from action. Under cover of the smoke of this terrific fire the enemy threw forward a column(supposed to be a brigade) from the left of their line along the sea beach (the tide being low), who succeeded in gaining the right of our palisade line before they were discovered. This advance was quickly and gallantly repulsed by our troops with heavy loss. The attack on the flank of the work would now seem to have been only a feint, to be converted into a real attack as circumstances might determine, since a heavier column had approached under cover of the hill and woods on the river side (our left) and succeeded in gaining a foothold on our works. It was whilst this attack was going on on our sea front that Colonel Lamb (as I was confidently informed) reported to Major-General Whiting the fact of the repulse of the enemy at all points. The enemy, in his hurried retreat, were destroyed in large numbers. Such guns on the sea face as would bear, together with our only remaining gun (an 8-inch columbiad), opened on them with canister at short range. It was while engaged in bringing this last gun to bear on them that I discovered that their assaulting column had gained a position on the left of our works, when I immediately ordered the officer in charge (Lieutenant Swain) to traverse his gun and open on them, the gun having a flanking fire, and at once led in person the troops collected at this point (as the only field officer present) to attack them down the parapet of the work. The fire of the heavy force of sharpshooters on the enemy's right, together with the torn up condition of the work, rendered it necessary to take them down within the work, where I joined Major-General Whiting, who was leading his men in person with the entire disposable force, hurrying on to drive the enemy from his position. I had been previously wounded in the attack on the right; I fell at the foot of the fifth traverse from the left of the work, the enemy having possession of and firing from the third, when I was taken up and carried into a magazine. As soon as I recovered sufficiently I rejoined Major-General Whiting, whom, I was informed, was wounded in the bombproof. At this juncture Colonel Lamb entered, wounded, and told the general that his men, whom he had endeavored to lead from the works on the sea front to drive the enemy from his lodgment on our left, would not follow him. General Whiting, although wounded, was still directing as far as possible the movements of his small force, when Major Reilly rushed in and reported the astounding fact that an officer, having put his handkerchief on a ramrod whilst he was temporarily in another portion of his command, had surrendered 300 of his men and admitted a regiment of the enemy into the galleries of the sally-port on the land face. The general, who had repeatedly ordered Colonel Graham, with the remainder of Hagood's brigade, whom he supposed at the Mound Battery, directed me to bring him up without delay. I need not add that the troops were not there, and the want of them lost us the fort. On attempting to rejoin the general I found that the enemy, in overwhelming force, covered the land and sea face, and were firing from the parapet of the work, in the bombproof of which I had left the general. I returned to Battery Buchanan and advised the immediate withdrawal of the force at this point, as the enemy had the fort and were then marching on the battery, the troops for whose defense were reduced to the gun detachments in re-enforcing the fort, the guns having been spiked. The bombproof being full of wounded, the commanding officer was unable to blow up the magazine. This command was safely brought off, but, owing to the want of a steamer, numbers of our poor fellows who were retreating before the enemy were left on the beach. I came off with the naval officer commanding Battery Buchanan at 10.40 p.m. I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Col. ARCHER ANDERSON, WM. J. SAUNDERS, Major and Chief of Artillery. No. 25. Reports of Maj. Gen. William H. C. Whiting, C. S. Army, of operations January 15. FORT FISHER, January 18, 1865. GENERAL: I am sorry to have to inform you, as a prisoner of war, of the taking of Fort Fisher on the night of the 15th instant, after an assault of unprecedented fury, both by sea and land, lasting from Friday morning until Sunday night. On Thursday night the enemy's fleet was reported off the fort. Friday morning the fleet opened very heavily. On Friday and Saturday, during the furious bombardment on the fort, the enemy were allowed to land without molestation and to throw up a light line of fieldworks from Battery Ramseur to the river, thus securing his position from molestation and making the fate of Fort Fisher, under the circumstances, but a question of time. On Sunday the fire of the fleet reached a pitch of fury to which no language can do justice. It was concentrated on the land front and fort. In a short time nearly every gun was dismounted or disabled, and the garrison suffered severely from the fire. At 3 o'clock the enemy's land force, which had been gradually and slowly advancing, formed into two columns for assault. The garrison during the fierce bombardment was not able to stand to the parapets, and many of the re-enforcements were obliged to be kept at a great distance from the fort. As the enemy here slackened his fire to allow the assault to take place, the men hastily manned the ramparts and gallantly repulsed the right column of assault. Portion of the troops on the left had also repelled the first rush to the left of the work. The greater portion of the garrison being, however, engaged on the right, and not being [able] to man the entire work, the enemy succeeded in making a lodgment on the left flank, planting two of his regimental flags in the traverses. From this point we could not dis lodge him, though we forced him to take down his flag, from the fire from our most distant guns, our own traverses protecting him from such fire. From this [time] it was a succession of fighting from traverse to traverse, and from line to line, until 9 o'clock at night, when we were overpowered and all resistance ceased. The fall both of the general and the colonel commanding the fort, one about 4 and the other about 4.30 p. m., had a perceptible effect upon the men, and no doubt hastened greatly the result; but we were overpowered, and no skill or gallantry could have saved the place, after he effected a lodgment, except attack in the rear. The enemy's loss was very heavy, and so, also, our own. as a prisoner, I have not been able to ascertain. Of the latter, At 9 p. m. the gallant Major Reilly, who had fought the fort after the fall of his superiors, reported the enemy in possession of the sally-port. The brave Captain Van Benthuysen, of the marines, though himself badly wounded, with a squad of his men picked up the general and colonel and endeavored to make way to Battery Buchanan, followed by Reilly with the remnant of the force. On reaching there it was found to be evacuated; by whose order, or what authority, I know not. No boats were there. The garrison of Fort Fisher had been coolly abandoned to its fate. Nothing was left but to await the approach of the enemy, who took us about 10 p. m. Thus fell Fort Fisher after three days' battle, unparalleled in the history of the war. The fleet surpassed its tremendous effort upon the previous attack. The fort has fallen in precisely the manner indicated so often by myself, and to which your attention has been so frequently called, and in the presence of the ample force provided by you to meet the contingency. The fleet never attempted to enter until after the land force had done its work, and, of course, unless the supporting force played its part, Fort Fisher must have fallen. Making every allowance for the extraordinary vigor and force of the enemy's assault, and the terrific effect of the fire of the fleet upon the garrison, and the continual and incessant enfilading of the whole point from Battery Buchanan to the fort, thereby preventing to a great extent the movement of my troops, I think that the result might have been avoided, and Fort Fisher still held, if the commanding general had have done his duty. I charge him with this loss; with neglect of duty in this, that he either refused or neglected to carry out every suggestion made to him in official communications by me for the disposition of the troops, and especially that he, failing to appreciate the lesson to be derived from previous attempt of Butler, instead of keeping his troops in the position to attack the enemy on his appearance, he moves them twenty miles from the point of landing in spite of repeated warnings. He might have learned from his failure to interrupt either the landing or the embarking of Butler for two days with his troops, though disgraceful enough, would indicate to the enemy that he would have the same security for any future expedition. The previous failure was due to Fort Fisher alone, and not to any of the supporting troops. I charge him further with making no effort whatever to create a diversion in favor of the beleaguered garrison during the three days' battle, by attacking the enemy, though that was to be expected, since his delay and false disposition allowed the enemy to secure his rear by works, but works of no strength. I desire that a full investigation be had of this matter and these charges which I make; they will be fully borne out by the official records. I have only to add that the commanding general, on learning the approach of the enemy, would give me no orders whatever, and persistently refused from the beginning to allow me to have I conse anything to do with the troops from General Lee's army. quently repaired to Fort Fisher as the place where my own sense of duty called me. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, General R. E. LEE, W. H. C. WHITING, Major-General (prisoner of war). Commanding Armies Confederate States. HOSPITAL, FORT COLUMBUS, GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, New York Harbor, February 19, 1865. The above is an exact copy of the dispatch dictated to Major Hill in the hospital at Fort Fisher (and preserved in his note book) on the 18th of January, 1865, and which I intended to have endeavored to forward at that time by flag of truce, and accordingly made a request of General Terry. On his reply that it would be necessary to refer it to Lieutenant-General Grant, I concluded to postpone the report. I wish to add a few remarks upon the difference between the two attacks, and also give some information which I have acquired. Had the enemy assaulted the work on the first attack, he would have been beaten off with great slaughter. The fire of the fleet on that occasion, though very severe and formidable, was very diffuse and scattered, seemingly more designed to render a naval entrance secure than a land attack, consequently our defense was but slightly damaged. We had nineteen guns bearing on the assault, and above all, the palisade was almost as good as new. Moreover, the fleet, during the first bombardment, hauled off at night, leaving the garrison time for rest, cooking, and refreshment. It is remarkable that during the first bombardment no gun's crew was ever driven from its guns; but on the 13th and 14th of January the fleet stationed itself with the definite object of destroying the land defense by direct and enfilade fire, the latter a feu d'enfilement to knock down the traverses, destroying all guns, and pound the northeast salient into a practicable slope for the assaulting column. By 12 m. Sunday not a gun remained on the land front. The palisade was entirely swept away, the mines in advance, so deeply did the enemy's shot plough, were isolated from the wires and could not be used. Not a man could show his head in that infernal storm, and I could only keep a lookout in the safest position to inform me of the movements of the enemy. Contrary to previous practice, the fleet kept up the fire all night. Cooking was impracticable. The men, in great part, in Fisher at the second attack were not those of the first, and were much more demoralized. The casualties were greater, with but one ration for three days. Such was the condition when the parapets were manned on the enemy's ceasing firing for assault. As soon as a lodgment was made at Shepherd's battery, on the left, the engineers at once threw up a strong covering work in rear of Fisher, and no effort of ours against overwhelming numbers could dislodge them. Then was the time for the supporting force, which was idly looking on only three miles off, which could see the columns on the beach, to have made an attack upon the rear of the assaulting columns; at any rate, to have tried to save Fort Fisher, while the garrison had hurled one assaulting column, crippled, back, and were engaged for six hours with 5,000 men vigorously assaulting it. General Bragg was held in check by two brigades of U. S. Colored Troops, along a line of no impediment whatever. Once at this line by the river bank with his three batteries of artillery, and his whole force steadily advancing, the enemy's fleet could not have fired again without hurting their own men. The enemy had not a single piece of artillery; altogether about 7,000 or 8,000 men. Pushing our batteries to Camp Wyatt and Colonel Lamb's headquarters, and opening heavily on Shepherd's battery, with an advance of our troops, and such of the enemy as could not have escaped in boats must have fallen into our hands; but it was not to be. I went into the fort with the conviction that it was to be sacrificed, for the last I heard General Bragg say was to point out a line to fall back on if Fort Fisher fell. In all his career of failure and defeat from Pensacola out, there has been no such chance missed, and no such stupendous disaster. Wounded, in the hospital, with mortification at the shameful haste, I heard the blowing up of Fort Caswell before the enemy had dared to enter the harbor. I demand, in justice to the country, to the army, and to myself, that the course of this officer be investigated. Take his notorious congratulatory Order No. 14 [17*], with its numerous errors, and compare his language with the result. I do not know what he was sent to Wilmington for. I had hoped that I was considered competent. I acquiesced with feelings of great mortification. My proper place was in command of the troops you sent to support the defense; then I should not now be a prisoner, and an effort at least would have been made to save a harbor on which I had expended for two years all the labor and skill I had. I should not have had the mortification of seeing works which our very foes admire, yielding after four days' attack, given up and abandoned without even an attempt to save them. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, General R. E. LEE, W. H. C. WHITING, Major-General (prisoner of war). Commanding Armies Confederate States. No. 26. Report of Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Colquitt, C. S. Army, commanding bri gade. HEADQUARTERS COLQUITT'S BRIGADE, COLONEL: In reply to your communication, I have the honor to submit the following statement: In accordance with instructions from the general commanding, I left the landing at Sugar Loaf in a row-boat about 9p. m. of the 15th instant, with a view to proceed to Fort Fisher and assume command. I was accompanied by Lieutenant Washington, of General Hoke's staff, and Lieutenants Estill and Colquitt, of my own staff. The accounts which had been given from Battery Lamb and other points excited the apprehension that the fort was in possession of the enemy. A dispatch from General Whiting, dated at the fort at 6.30 p. m., dispelled these apprehensions and gave the assurance that the fort was still holding * See Vol. XLII, Part I, p. 999 |