DISCOURSE XIV.

ON THE RULE OF LIFE.

[Preached January 27, 1793.]

ROMANS, CHAP. III.-VERSE 8.

And not rather, as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say, Let us do evil, that good may come.

You see with what earnest zeal the apostle vindicates himself, and his associates in converting the world, from the imputation of having lent their authority to this pernicious maxim ; a maxim, which renders the rule of life uncertain, and represents faith as making void the law; which would set religion at variance with the plainest dictates of reason and conscience; and justify those acts of perfidy, at which honor blushes; and those scenes of cruelty, which humanity deplores.

If we attend to the train of reasoning, in which this maxim is alluded to, we shall readily discover the propriety of its introduction, and more than one instance of its application.

On mentioning the rejection of the disobedient and unbelieving Jews, the apostle, in the verses immediately preceding the text, supposes one of that nation to expostulate with him in these words: If our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of God, what shall we say? Is God unrighteous, who taketh vengeance?' The apostle answers, God forbid; for then how shall God judge the world?' that is, the same argument, which you oppose to the rejection of your nation, to the particular dispensation of which you complain, will apply with equal force to the general dispensation of God, which you

allow, in the final condemnation of sinners; for if God be an unrighteous Being, he is not qualified to judge the world; and if the plea you allege be admitted in your case, it must be admitted equally in all; and there will then remain no sinners to be judged. The Jew continues, or explains, his argument farther: For if the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie (or my unbelief) unto his glory, why yet am I also judged as a sinner?' The apostle again reminds him, in the words of the text, that the same reasoning, which he brings to excuse his unbelief, might be urged for the impunity of all sin whatsoever; and that on these principles might be defended even that detestable maxim, with which the Christians had been maliciously reproached, 'Let us do evil, that good may come.'

It was therefore no sufficient apology for the conduct of the Jews, either that their unrighteousness had illustrated the righteousness of God, in still performing the promises made to their fathers; or that their unbelief and refusal of the gospel had eventually contributed to its success, in the call and conversion of the Gentile world.

Nor will the plea, which is denied to the Jew, avail the disciple of Christ. This is expressly asserted in a subsequent ehapter, where the apostle, having magnified the grace of God in the pardon of sin and the redemption of mankind, intro duces a convert to Christianity as drawing, from the doctrine he had delivered, this weak and wrong conclusion: What shall we say then? shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?' The apostle replies with warmth, God forbid : how shall we, who are dead to sin, live any longer therein?' Is it credible, or possible, that the same religion, which requires us to be as incapable of sin as the dead are of the actions which belong to the living, should itself afford any the least pretext to the continued indulgence of our sinful habits?

The event of our actions is in the hand of God: and the only point, which we are required to consider, is, not the effects which they may possibly produce, but the motives and principles, on which they are deliberately performed. We are indeed commanded, whatsoever we do, to do all to the glory of God; but the precept must plainly be understood with the

* 1 Cor. x. 31.

same restriction, which, as the apostle informs us, was observed even in the contests for earthly fame, in which if a man strive, and with whatever success, 6 yet is he not crowned, unless he strive lawfully."* Now to us the only lawful and appointed means of contributing to this great end, the glory of God, are habitual virtue and unaffected piety; and if we will use unlawful means, it concerns us seriously to remember, that we must ourselves abide the consequences of our own choice. 'God hath no need of the sinful man:'+ vain therefore and impious are all fanatical pretences of promoting his glory by the crimes which he has forbidden. Even the purest efforts of virtue must be carefully guarded from this presumption. Can a man be profitable unto God? Or is it gain to him, that thou makest thy way perfect?' The glory of God depends not on the agency of mortals: it is represented indeed as increased by the conduct of virtuous men ; but it is equally displayed in his treatment of all his creatures. The best are instances of his mercy, the worst shall be examples of his justice. He shows the riches of his goodness in accepting the humble faith of the returning penitent; and he can also get himself honor on the proudest and most obdurate sinners, if not in the wonder of their conversion, yet in the awfulness of their punishment.

Having considered the instances, to which the apostle has himself applied the principle he so severely condemns, let us proceed to examine some of the cases, in which the same principle more particularly influences the manners of later ages.

Many writers on morals have considered utility as the criterion of virtue. Will it not therefore follow, in contradiction to the apostle, that nothing can be evil, from which good will come? To enter on the merits of the opinion itself in a Christian audience, whose rule of life is, not the uncertain deduction of unassisted reason, but the perfect law of divine revelation, must be unnecessary; yet to guard against the dangerous inferences which may be derived from it, when wrongly understood or incautiously applied, can never be improper; and especially, since utility is often pointed out by the Christian teacher, not indeed as the only characteristic of virtue, but as one of its * 2 Tim. ii. 5. + Ecclus. xv. 12. ↑ Job, xxx. 2, 3.

many powerful motives, it thence becomes of considerable importance, that we determine the true nature of the utility which is thus ascribed to virtue. This utility then is not the separate effect of a single act, how highly or diffusively beneficial soever it may prove; but the general consequence of all actions of the same kind, supposing them permitted without limitation, and practised universally and without restraint. Now many of the most odious and contemptible crimes may be accompanied with accidental, temporary, or partial expedience; but there is nothing, except virtue alone, which can at all pretend to be thus uniformly conducive to the happiness of the individual, and the permanent welfare of society.

Vice is indeed attended with many allurements, with many present pleasures and advantages; and these it is the general business of moral instruction and discipline to enable us to resist and forego: but the particular good, which we are forbidden by the apostle to pursue, is such a good, as does not merely tempt us to commit evil, but is speciously or commonly urged to excuse or even vindicate our compliance.

Of this there are many examples.

I. Persecution for religious opinions is confessedly doing evil that good may come; for what is its avowed object, but either the particular good done to the persons converted, or the general good produced by the promotion of true religion? Whether it have any real tendency to accomplish either of these ends is more than doubtful; but were the benefits arising from it ever so certain and ever so important, still it would come within the limits of the apostle's prohibition; for persecution is an evil unauthorised by nature or the gospel, and therefore a moral evil; an evil, which we are forbidden to commit, whatever good may be expected, or actually derived from it. I would only add farther, that not magistrates alone may be thus guilty, but individuals also may very effectually, and therefore very sinfully persecute each other. With this crime we are manifestly chargeable, if we wilfully misrepresent the character, the conduct, or the tenets of those who differ from us, merely because they differ from us; if we think of them with rancor, or treat them with injustice; if we deny them protection in danger, or assistance in distress; or even if, without any acts of posi

tive unkindness, we refuse them the common civilities of common life. These things, my brethren, ought not so to be :' they are most of them contrary to the natural law of universal equity; they are all of them wide deviations from the revealed law of universal charity.

Perhaps it may be asked, if persecution for opinions be doing evil that good may come, and therefore in all cases forbidden; will not the punishment of crimes also come under the same description, and consequently be, for the same reason, and to the same extent, indefensible? I answer, no; because the punishment of crimes is authorised by the laws both of God and man; the evil therefore so inflicted, when it exceeds not its due proportion, is not a moral evil; not the kind of evil, which is forbidden to be done from the prospect of ensuring a greater good.

II. The obligations to truth, though in general acknowleged to be of the very highest importance, are yet, on many occasions of seeming convenience or utility, very liberally dispensed with. Not to insist on the slighter instances, in which falsehood is professedly indulged, as prescribed by the forms, or conducive to the convenience of fashionable intercourse; unnecessary misrepresentations are also very freely allowed, when directed to produce any trivial good, or avert any unimportant evil; to create amusement, to flatter vanity, to soften disappointment; or when they only do, or are intended to do, no harm, Even sordid interest can plead for its disgraceful exceptions; and, in many transactions of life, truth is so often violated, that it ceases almost to be expected. The voice of reproach is scarcely heard, especially when the injury (for an injury there must be) is of such a nature, as affects not the rival interest of any private sufferer. In this case, not only the laws of truth, but even the solemnity of an oath is boldly disregarded. The sanctions of religion may perhaps be interposed on too many, and on too slight occasions; but that is surely no excuse for the extreme irreverence and impiety of their conduct, who wantonly convert the most awful test of human veracity into an empty and unmeaning form.

To affirm that all these offences are of equal malignity, were absurd; to allow of no deviations, however minute, under any