positions, carefully weighs them, &c. and so regulates its assent, as not to exclude farther inquiry: the habit of calm investigation prevents mutability in a man's judgments or counsels : he knows that doubts must arise on many points, but they affect not his steady mind, &c. These are the differences generally observed in the conduct of men and children, but such observations are not universal: this shown. Concluding exhortations.

DISCOURSE XVI.

THE DIVERSITY OF CHARACTER BELONGING TO DIFFERENT PERIODS OF LIFE.

1 CORINTHIANS, CHAP. XIII.-VERSE 11.

When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things.

You may perhaps remember a remarkable passage in that work of Xenophon, in which he delineates the life and character of a philosophic prince. Cyrus was going out of Persia into Media, and was now approaching the confines of the two kingdoms; when he stopped with his attendants, and, turning round, took a solemn leave of the deities, whom he supposed to preside over his native country; and then, immediately entering the other kingdom, he committed himself to the protection and guidance of its tutelary gods. The ceremony was decent, as corresponding to the notions then entertained of a number of gods, each the guardian and governor of a distinct region and it may afford a useful lesson to those who are just passing from childhood to manhood; teaching them to attend to the different laws which nature has appointed for these different to ages; consider themselves as dismissed by the laws of the former age, and to submit with reverence and cheerfulness to those of the latter but what might perhaps have been suggested by the philosopher, is more plainly and distinctly represented by the apostle: When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child.' This sentence may seem not very happily rendered by our translators: they do not

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usually paraphrase; and the distinction expressed by the single words 'understood' and 'thought,' is less obvious than in the original, where we may conceive St. Paul to say;—I spake as a child; I had the wishes, the tastes, the enjoyments of a child; I judged and reasoned like a child:* and we cannot get a clearer view of the diversity of character belonging to each period of life, than by searching for the several marks here alluded to, in the speech, the inclinations, and the judgment. This division will furnish a method for my discourse, which shall be wholly employed in advising you to put away childish things. I. The apostle, by placing the characteristic of childhood in the speech, may possibly be understood to intimate that a child speaks before he thinks. Whether this be here particularly intended, or not, it is certainly a fault very observable in such children as are not restrained, but very unbecoming and inconvenient in men. We readily and fully excuse a child, who speaks without care or thought: gaiety and inattention are natural to his age; and neither the subject, nor the matter of his prate, can be important; he talks of trifles only, and as they appear to his puerile conception: but, when the mind is employed on many subjects, the speech will of course be deliberate; some degree of slowness and gravity will still prevail in it; and a greater degree, when the points under consideration are more difficult or more interesting. A mature understanding has constant, gentle exercise in the government of the tongue; and either remissness on the one hand, or eagerness on the other, will certainly betray itself in the discourse. Faults of these opposite kinds are to be found in young men of different dispositions; but both are to be referred to the same childish folly, of speaking before they think. One of a lively imagination, and a cheerful temper, is apt to pour forth, without attention, a multitude of unmeaning words; but, in the multitude of words there wanteth not sin.' It can scarce happen, that, amidst much discourse, thus indiscreetly and wantonly uttered, nothing should escape detrimental or dangerous to the speaker;

'Alius sermo, alia studia, alii rerum conceptus.' Grot. in loc. See also Rom. viii. 5, &c. Phil. iii. 19. Col. iii. 2.-The words in the original are, ὡς νήπιος ἐλάλουν, ὡς νήπιος ἐφρόνουν, ὡς νήπιος ἐλογιζόμην.

nothing offensive to modest or pious hearers; no groundless accusation, or severe censure of others. Some, or all of these transgressions, may commonly be observed in him, who talks much, thinks little, and cares not at all; whilst a person of a graver disposition, whose mind is properly engaged in inquiries after knowlege, will often bring inconvenience on himself in another way; I mean, by too much eagerness to speak of matters, which he does not yet fully understand; exposing himself to the contempt and ridicule of those who understand them better but this is not the worst consequence of his hasty speeches; for, when the subjects of conversation are controverted points of importance, such as those which relate to religion or government, he, who leads the discourse, can hardly avoid taking part with one side or the other, from which, though determined by accident rather than judgment, it may be to himself difficult, and may appear to others dishonorable, to recede and thus a young man, by declaring opinions before he has well considered them, becomes afterwards unable ever to consider them without prejudice; and his thoughts, which should have governed his speech, are enslaved by it.

Another part of the character of a child is, that he speaks all he thinks. Intending no ill, and suspecting none, he communicates all his sentiments and designs without reserve or caution: he believes every one, with whom he converses, to be his friend, and he is seldom mistaken: almost every one wishes him well; but the same unlimited openness is not suitable to the transactions among men. Their views are often inconsistent, their attempts unfriendly to each other. He cannot expect any success, nor indeed any reputation among them, who has not some degree of discretion and reserve, and habitual secresy. Nor is it only in the conduct of business, and to guard his own interests, that a prudent man will be often silent. He will not too freely discuss the characters of other men, nor speak too much of himself; lest he incur the reproach, in one case, of envy or ill-nature; in the other, of self-conceit or arrogance. Nay, even in conversation on general topics, or matters of science, the same caution is useful; since it has been observed, that more persons gain the reputation of wisdom, by selecting

prudently from their various thoughts, such as are proper to be declared, than can claim it by any real superiority of their inward conceptions: and so much for the speech.

II. The next note, by which the apostle distinguishes the characters of a man and a child, is taken from the difference of their inclinations. Those of a child are always governed by trifles; the things, which strike his fancy, which offer him immediate pleasure, how minute, how momentary soever, are the objects of his pursuit. Of the chief enjoyments, which human life affords, he cannot form a notion; or, if he could, yet these enjoyments, being clearly far out of his reach, would not excite his desires. A small number of slight amusements fill up his capacity for happiness: he has no wish, no taste, for any thing more important. But manly prudence includes in it, attention to the different kinds of good; the power of comparing them, with regard both to their intenseness and duration; and the habit of resisting the allurements of trifling, shortlived pleasures, and of being directed by views of greater and more lasting happiness. He, who suffers his mind to be continually engaged by mere amusements, and drawn away by them from every serious employment worthy of a rational being, whether of furnishing himself with useful knowlege and virtuous habits at one period of life, or at another of providing for the interests of a family, a neighborhood, or the public; though years may not be few, nor his amusements the same as in his childhood, is yet in the eye of reason still a child ;—not indeed in innocence, for a constant attachment to things of little value is not a little criminal; but in folly and perverseness.

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Nor ought we to wonder that a child's inclinations for these trifles are vehement; that he catches at them impetuously, whenever they fall in his way. All his happiness is collected in them; all his wishes lead to the same point. He has no interfering interests to divide his thoughts; no opposite motives to balance each other, and keep his mind in suspense. With these ardent desires, and with no foresight of any consequences, which might deter him from gratifying them, he applies all the little powers of his mind and body to gain the object of his present inclination. But his endeavours, though earnest, are not lasting. He soon finds, that the pleasure,