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be without excuse. But we have only pushed the problem further back. Why was the effort not made? What caused the "spiritual monotony and intellectual anæmia" (the phrase is not Rostovtzeff's) of the Græco-Roman world? Why was leadership lacking? Will the same phenomenon recur? To the last question there is no answer save in the words of the Greek poet :

Θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται.

H. STUART JONES

WHEN

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

/HEN the League of Nations was first created, its warmest supporters expected that it would prove a panacea for all the ills of humanity, that it would make war impossible, and establish international co-operation on a firmer basis than ever before. Its adversaries, on the other hand, were convinced that it would achieve nothing; that as long as humanity was humanity men would go on fighting, and that no League could ever prevent it. Some went even further in their pessimism, and declared that the League merely sanctioned the injustices of the Peace Conference and provided opportunities for future wars. The League has now been in existence for over seven years and, if much of its brilliant promise has failed to materialize, yet it has undoubtedly secured many useful results, which have come as a surprise to those who totally disbelieved in it. It may therefore not be unprofitable to draw up a balance-sheet of its successes and failures, on the basis of which we may perhaps foreshadow its possibilities and limitations in the future.

The mistake which many enthusiasts and also many opponents have made is to regard the League as a super-human institution, as something outside and above mankind, a force capable of dominating international events, independently of the will of the various governments of the world. Others regard it as the "voice of the peoples," over the heads of their governments. Those who accept these views forget that governments are all more or less the creation of their respective peoples, whereas the League is the creation of a small group of individuals believing in certain ideas which appeal only to minorities of peoples in a few countries. The League can only work through the agency of very ordinary human beings; it must therefore be judged from a human point of view and only entrusted with such tasks as are humanly possible for it to accomplish. It is a piece of machinery suited to certain aspects of international relations; if we try to make it do what it is as yet obviously incapable of doing, it is liable to break down.

The first difficulty which has always prevented the creation of a complete system of international collaboration is the enormous

difference existing between the various States-difference of size, power, wealth, and civilization. In theory, relations between States should be regulated on the same basis as those between individuals and all States be treated as equals. That theory is impossible of application. In small matters, not affecting great national interests, the idea of equality may be accepted; but in the really important political problems it is rejected by the Great Powers and the smaller are forced to relinquish it. The idea that international questions could be considered from the point of view of abstract justice alone, however admirable in theory, has not stood the acid test of realities. After the war, while there was a very real desire on the part of the peoples of most States to avoid any repetition of its horrors, there was also a strongly intensified national feeling which found expression in various ways. League enthusiasts were apt to lay too much stress on the first of these tendencies, and to minimize the importance of the second. Another obstacle is that international organization proceeds far more slowly than the internal organization of individual States.

When the Covenant of the League of Nations was being drafted an attempt was made, not altogether without success, to conciliate the theoretic equality of all States with the actual and inevitable predominance of the Great Powers, and to blend to some extent the national with the international spirit. The Covenant, in fact, provides for the theoretic equality of States by means of the Assembly, whereon all States members of the League are equally represented and possess only one vote each, and for the real predominance of the Great Powers by means of the Council, whereon those Powers alone have permanent seats and were actually, as we shall see, to have constituted a majority of the members. While Assembly and Council represent the national spirit, being composed of delegates of States, the Secretariat and certain other organs represent the international spirit, the personnel being recruited from almost all countries. The Council is the body which exercises the most direct and active control over the League's policy: it meets frequently, deals with any international conflict which may arise and acts as the executive committee of the Assembly, although there is no well-defined line of demarcation between its functions and those of the Assembly. It is natural that on such a body the Great Powers, who are alone

capable of enforcing peace, should be in a predominant position. The Assembly, apart from certain functions assigned to it by the Covenant, such as the admission of new States to the League, is to a large extent engaged in expressing general views and tendencies. It was originally intended that Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States should be permanent members of the Council, that Germany and Russia should some day be added, and that four other States should be elected annually as non-permanent members, to act as intermediaries between the Great Powers and the rest of the League. The number, both of permanent and temporary members of the Council, could be increased by agreement between that body and the Assembly.

As it turned out, the United States did not join the League; Germany was not admitted until September, 1926, and Russia is still outside. For some years the permanent and temporary members were thus equal in numbers, but recently the latter have been increased, and at the last Assembly they were raised to nine, with a complicated procedure conceived for securing a sort of semi-permanence to some States and with the object of conciliating Spain and Brazil. But the result has been only to alter the formerly well-adjusted balance between great and small Powers, to the detriment of the Council's efficiency, while Spain and Brazil have withdrawn-it is hoped only temporarily-from the League. Although the League does not comprise all the States of the world, as it was expected to do, the 56 States constituting it are sufficient to confer on it a world character.*

It was at first expected that the League would be entrusted with all international affairs, from the great political problems affecting the chief Powers to technical and social questions and to all forms of co-operation between States. It was soon realised, however, that the League was not in a position to deal with the larger questions, because the Great Powers objected to having them decided by a body on which, in theory at least, the vote of Paraguay or Siam is equal to that of the British Empire, France or Italy. These questions have, in fact, continued to be dealt

*Besides the United States and Russia, Mexico and a few other smaller States are not members. Spain and Brazil are still technically members, as their withdrawal only comes into force two years after it has been notified.

with directly by the parties concerned according to the old diplomatic methods, which in many cases have a good deal to recommend them. The League's constitution being what it is, there is always the risk that irresponsible parties-small States or individual delegates--may rush in where serious statesmen fear to tread and, regardless of the consequences, take action calculated to intensify rather than allay international bitterness. This occurred in the Italo-Greek conflict and in other cases.

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The inadequate prestige enjoyed by the League is due to a variety of causes. One is the disappointment felt by its too ardent friends at the generally prudent way in which it conducts business, and the fact that many of the traditional methods of international politics still continue under the League. A great deal of nonsense is talked about open as contrasted with "secret" diplomacy, largely due to the loose thinking of President Wilson and his admirers and to their ignorance of any kind of diplomacy. The League has been inevitably forced into a sort of semi-secrecy in all its more important transactions, for although the Council, the Assembly and most of the committees hold their meetings in public, the decisions on really essential matters are generally the result of private meetings, often of ultra-private conversations between the delegates of two or three Powers in their hotels. This will be still more the case after the recent enlargement of the Council, but it has led the League zealots to accuse the delegates of being relapsi in hæreticam pravitatem. If anything, there is too much publicity at the League, and more dope" is supplied to the press than at any other type of conference, so much so that the journalists are overwhelmed by the vast amount of printed and roneoed matter unloaded upon them.

A more serious reason for this lack of confidence lies in the different degrees of influence exercised by the various Powers in the League. There is no doubt that the British Government and people take a greater interest in the League than does any other country. But the very fact of this great interest, as well as the somewhat Anglo-Saxon character of the institution and of its procedure, evolved while its offices were in London, renders it somewhat suspect in the eyes of non-British observers.

Another country which plays a very important rôle in League affairs is France-a rôle more important, in spite of the comparative lack of interest on the part of public opinion, than is generally

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