the principle of the open door is essential to the maintenance of peace. The weakness of the American claim was that it was based, at least partly, on a principle to which the United States was not prepared to give universal application. It is not unreasonable to ask why, if the United States has "a right to share in any discussions relating to the status of such concessions" in the Near East, Great Britain-which is an American Power in a sense in which the United States is certainly not a Near Eastern Powershould be debarred from sharing in the discussion of concessions in the Western Hemisphere. Clearly the Monroe Doctrine, originally reciprocal, has become a regional understanding of a very one-sided kind: it seems to have been extended to all the world in something of the sense given to it in the 'fifties in its application to the Americas. This, of course, is not necessarily to condemn it. "The virtue of the Monroe Doctrine," says Captain Mahan," without which it would die deservedly, is that through its correspondence with national necessities, it possesses the inherent principle of life, which adapts itself, with the flexibility of a growing plant, to the successive conditions it encounters." Had it been inflexible, it would have simply given one more proof of the absurdity of wrapping up an infant nation in doctrinal swaddling clothes. As it is, it has adapted itself to the imperial growth of the American nation. And the limits of this growth cannot be fixed by any doctrine, Monroe or other. They will be fixed only whenever and wherever other national forces arise, strong enough to resist their advance.

W. ALISON PHILLIPS

1.

2.

THE UNITED STATES IN THE PHILIPPINES

The Outlook for the Philippines. By C. E. RUSSELL. New York. 1922. The Isles of Fear. By KATHERINE MAYO. Faber & Gwyer. 1925.

3. General Wood and the Law. By J. BOCOBO. Manila. 1923.

4. Nuestra Demanda de Libertad. Por La Misión Parlamentaria Filipina. Manila. 1923.

5. The Corner-Stone of Philippine Independence. By F. B. HARRISON. New York. 1922.

IN

N the introduction which Mr. Lionel Curtis contributes to Miss Mayo's book he very rightly lays considerable stress upon the importance of a knowledge of the way in which other nations are handling the problems created by the possession of an overseas empire, and in particular of their treatment of those whom an earlier generation dismissed as "subject races." There can, unfortunately, be no doubt that, in the past ignorance in this sphere was too often characteristic of British statesmen; but now that the relations between East and West are every day becoming more important, such lack of knowledge can no longer be excused, and the experiences of the United States in questions of this nature must always rouse special interest in Great Britain.

In the first place, the creators of the American Constitution made no provision whatsoever for the government of colonies or dependencies, and consequently a system of administration is only now being devised amid doubts and difficulties which are strangely reminiscent of the early British efforts in the same field. Already the empire of the United States includes Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, as well as the Philippines; but it is the last-named which is of the most interest to the foreigner, partly because of its size, but chiefly on account of its large native population, whose presence gives rise to problems analogous to those which confront British administrators in India and the Sudan. Thus the government of the Philippines possesses a double interest-the machinery which is being created to administer them and the attitude of the inhabitants towards the American occupation.

As in the case of Ireland, history plays an exceptionally large part in the present state of the Philippines, and the heritage of

three centuries of Spanish rule has been the ignorance and corruption which are widespread in the islands to-day. The lofty, even if often misplaced, idealism of the first "conquistadores soon gave place to the avarice and extortion which characterized their successors, in many cases sent out from Spain for no other reason than to repair their shattered fortunes, and the example which they set was by no means lost upon the native Filipino politician. Just as the legacy of Constantinople to the Balkans has been one of intrigue and divided counsels, so that of Spain to the Philippines has been moral and political atrophy. It is, of course, true that the same methods of misgovernment have been practised by all colonizing nations, and the gravamen of the charge against the Spaniard is, not that he employed the methods of the seventeenth century at that period, but that he continued to use them two hundred years later. The result has been disastrous, and to the heritage of Spain may be traced many of the vices of the Filipino national character.

The overthrow of the Spanish administration was not, as is commonly supposed, due to American arms, but rather to a Filipino rising, aided by the American victory over the Spanish fleet. The insurgents expected, as a result of their success, to achieve immediate independence, and their chagrin was great when they discovered that after all their efforts they had merely exchanged the rule of Madrid for that of Washington. Aguinaldo and his compatriots then turned their arms against the United States, and it was only after hard fighting that they were beaten. After their defeat the Philippines settled down under American rule, and the islands were administered by a series of governors, of whom the best-known was Mr. (later President) Taft. During this period, no effort was spared to improve the moral and material condition of the Filipinos, and more was accomplished in these fourteen years than in the three hundred of Spanish misrule. It certainly was not government by the people, but it equally decidedly was government in their interests, and the system continued in full force until 1913, when Mr. Wilson took up his residence at White House. The period of direct American rule was then at an end, and an entirely new era was about to

commence.

The Democratic party in the United States had always been averse from any policy which savoured of imperialism, and the

new President shared to the full the feelings of his supporters in this matter. For many years he had advocated the granting of independence to the Filipinos, and now that he was in office he determined to translate his views into practice. Mr. Wilson's first step was to appoint Mr. Francis Burton Harrison as GovernorGeneral, and the act was in itself significant. Mr. Harrison was the son of a prominent Confederate official, and had himself sat for some years in the House of Representatives; he was thoroughly in accord with the President's political views, and on that account was more than a little suspect in many quarters. The new Governor-General lost no time in making plain the policy which he intended to pursue, for on the very day of his arrival at Manila he read President Wilson's message to the people of the Philippines. Two sentences in this document revealed the nature of the Democratic programme :

We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the United States, but for the benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands.

Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence. The turning-point in modern Philippine history had been reached.

President Wilson and his new Governor-General did not, however, let their zeal on behalf of Philippine independence outrun their discretion, for it was not until 1916 that the famous Jones Act was passed by Congress. This measure conferred a very wide autonomy on the islands, and at the same time established a constitution similar to that of the United States. It also considerably increased the power of the Governor-General, who now had a right of veto on the acts of the Filipino Congress, and all relations with foreign countries were to be conducted as before by the State Department at Washington. The weakness of the Jones Act lay in the fact that it was an attempt to apply American political ideas to a race which knew little or nothing of the constitutional conventions of the United States. The same separation of powers was to exist at Manila as at Washington, but with a very considerable difference in the United States a deadlock between President and Congress cannot continue indefinitely, because in the last resort both are responsible to the same electors, but in the Philippines there is no such safeguard, for the Governor-General is responsible to Washington while Congress has to answer to the Filipino electorate. Under Democratic administration this difficulty was not obvious, but when a

Republican, with different views as to the ultimate destiny of the islands, succeeded Mr. Wilson at the White House, it at once began to make itself felt.

The last five years of Mr. Harrison's tenure of office were marked by the complete Filipinization of the administration. He regarded himself as the liquidator of his country's interests in the Philippines, and he acted in such a way as he considered would make the transition to complete independence as easy as possible. The Governor-General worked in complete harmony with the leaders of the majority in the Philippine Congress, and had the Democratic party remained in power in the United States all would doubtless have been well. Unfortunately both for Mr. Harrison and for the aspirations of the islanders, the Republicans came into office, and one of their first acts was to send the WoodForbes Commission to report upon the condition of the islands. This body condemned the Harrison régime in the most wholehearted manner, declared that the Filipinization of the administration had resulted in an orgy of corruption and inefficiency, and concluded by stating its belief that only a small minority of the native population really desired independence at all. In February, 1921, Mr. Harrison was succeeded in the office of Governor-General by General Wood, one of the authors of the

report.

It soon became apparent that General Wood entertained very different ideas of his position to those held by his predecessor, and the natural result has been to draw attention to the deficiencies of the Jones Act, for a deadlock soon took place between the Governor-General and the legislature. General Wood has made extensive use of his power of veto, and it is with this aspect of his government that Señor Bocobo's pamphlet deals, for its author is strongly of the opinion that an act of the Philippine Congress can only be legally vetoed if it is unconstitutional. The real difficulty is that, as a result of the different policies pursued during the last few years, the future of the islands has become a party issue in the United States; the Republicans attack the administration of Mr. Harrison with quite as much venom as the Democrats assail that of General Wood, and the result is naturally very perplexing to those who wish to examine the question in all its bearings.

The literature which is growing up on the subject is on the