Question. Had you an opportunity of forming an opinion as to the cause or causes of the failure on that day?

Answer. I had not, from anything that I saw myself.

By the COURT:

Question. Were you so situated that you could see this assault?

Answer. I could not until I went to General Warren's headquarters, which was about 7 o'clock. I could not see the details.

Question. Had you made such an examination prior to the assault that would enable you to give a professional opinion as to the chances of success in attempting to take Cemetery Hill by assault, considering the explosion of the mine as the basis of the assault?

Answer. I had.

Question. I wish you would state to the Court what the chances of success were, using this mine as a means of inaugurating the assault.

Answer. I thought it entirely impracticable when the mine was made if the enemy's line should be held in full force. This opinion was formed a week or ten days prior to the assault. Afterward, with the knowledge I had of the movement of the enemy's troops from the south to the north side of the river, I thought an assault was entirely practicable.

Question. What do you suppose would have been the best plan for the assaulting troops to have followed after having reached Cemetery Hillmade a lodgment on and fortified that place, or proceeded immediately into the town of Petersburg?

Answer. I suppose the first step should have been to have made a lodgment on Cemetery Hill, and then to have pushed up troops to hold it at all hazards. The dispositions of the troops would depend upon the nature of the ground.

Question. From your knowledge of the nature of the intrenchmentsour own and the enemy's-do you think that immediately after the explosion of the mine, if proper working parties had been arranged, there would have been any difficulty in removing sufficient obstructions to have enabled our troops to have moved against those intrenchments in line of battle?

Answer. I do not think there would have been any difficulty.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL E. O. C. ORD.

Maj. Gen. E. O. C. Ord, U. S. Volunteers, being duly sworn and examined by the JUDGE-ADVOCATE, says:

Question. Please state what was your command at the assault on the 30th of July.

Answer. My command was composed of two divisions to aid in the assault, one of which belonged to the Tenth Corps and was under General Turner, and the other to the Eighteenth Corps, under General Ames. The divisions numbered: General Ames' about 3,500 and General Turner's 4,000 available muskets, or probably a little less. Question. What were your troops ordered to do?

Answer. My troops were ordered to a position in the rear of General Burnside's corps, with a view to supporting it. The positions were selected by General Burnside.

Question. Did your troops experience any interference from the Ninth Corps moving into position on that occasion?

Answer. After General Burnside's troops had made the assault and pushed forward, probably about an hour or a little more after the explosion of the mine, he said to "Now you can move your troops forward." I sent orders immediately to the

me,

leading division to move forward rapidly according to the programme, following the division that was in front of it, which was the rear division of General Burnside's corps. In the course of twenty minutes after the order was sent out by a staff officer, General Turner reported to me that he found the way blocked; that the approach to the place of débouché was occupied by the divisions in front, and that he had found himself in front of General Potter's troops. This was the report made by him to me. General Potter's troops, according to the programme, were to precede

his.

Question. Were any arrangements made for the passage of troops through the abatis and over the parapets to go to the front on that day?

Answer. When I went to the front I found the troops debouching by a single opening. The parapet had been thrown down and the abatis had been removed, and the troops were moved out by that opening.

Question. Please state the dimensions of that opening. Would it admit of the passage of troops in column, or line, or how?

Answer. I cannot give the exact dimensions, because my attention was occupied principally in watching what was going on in front of this place, but my impression is that the opening was large enough for a column of a company front to go out, over pretty rough ground. I do not know whether there was more than one opening; I only saw that one.

Question. That was the one your troops passed through?

Answer. No; my troops did not all pass through that way. I directed a portion of my troops to go over the parapet.

Question. Did you direct them to go over the parapet because in your judgment the opening was inadequate?

Answer. I gave those directions because the ground in front of this place of exit was occupied by the other troops and there was no room after they got out for them to be of service without moving for a considerable distance by the flank to the right and left.

Question. How were the troops that débouchéd to the assault formed to advance?

Answer. When I went to the front I saw white troops moving out by the flank into the crater and the trenches near. I say by the flank, but I will explain that they passed along by twos and threes and sometimes fours along this space, which was pretty well swept by the fire of the enemy-the space between our trenches and the crater formed by the explosion of the mine. These white troops were followed afterward by some colored troops, who also moved out, as it were, by flank, though the appearance of moving by flank may have been caused by the columns being somewhat disordered and hesitating in the move, so that a few moving forward first and others following them would diminish the width of a column and give the troops the appearance of moving by flank.

Question. In your opinion was this movement by flank judicious or was it unavoidable?

Answer. I would not suppose it was a judicious move under the circumstances if it could have been avoided. I rather think if intended to be a movement with a front of one or more companies then the kind of formation I saw was caused by the hesitation of the troops in the rear and the natural disposition of those men who are more or less timid, in following those in front, to string themselves out in almost single file.

Question. What, in your opinion, were some of the causes of failure on that occasion?

Answer. I think the first cause was that the troops were not well disciplined. They probably had not had time to become soldiers. The next cause may have been that they passed out of the trenches by one place of exit and through the covered way to a considerable extent, which necessarily impeded the progress of troops going out, especially as troops began coming in by the same covered way.

Question. Were the obstacles met by our troops, in your opinion, formidable?

Answer. I did not go to the front until difficulties were reported in the way of carrying out the order received from General Meade to move my division out to the right, independent of the troops in my front, and endeavor to reach the crest of the hill. It was reported by the division commanders that the nature of the ground was such that they could not get out that way. I went down to inspect the ground myself, and I derived the impression that there were difficulties in the way of getting out from the position occupied by my men at that time except in one place. They were in the long covered way, the way leading to the angle from which the troops débouchéd. The ground was swampy, covered with more or less undergrowth and trees, and appeared to run obliquely in front of the enemy's trenches. If the troops should get into that swamp and undergrowth it would. have been difficult to have kept them in order, and the enemy would have had them at a greater disadvantage, raking them if they occupied the trenches. The covered way was a pretty deep one, and I supposed from the fact of its being there leading to the place of exit it was swept by a very heavy fire from the enemy's batteries. It was reported that the stream running through the marsh was bridged in one place by a narrow bridge, where we crossed it, and that it was a difficult place for troops to pass over. When

I got there I saw that it was very muddy, that delays would be occasioned, and that it was a difficult place to attempt to take the enemy's intrenchments, and we would have got on the ground just under the enemy's works and probably be exposed to a very severe fire.

Question. Did any troops, to your knowledge, misbehave or disobey orders?

Answer. None that I know of, except after when an assault was made by some colored troops, followed by a brigade of the Tenth Corps, which assault was made about 8 o'clock while I was in the front line of our trenches and within less than 100. yards of the crater, and what I would call the movement of assault. The men were repulsed by a very heavy concentrated fire, which enveloped that point of exit, the enemy having massed forces on the right and front and some fire coming from the left.

Question. In your opinion had the first troops that went forward not hesitated or halted in the crater could they not have got to the desirable point-that is, Cemetery Hill?

Answer. I knew nothing about their halting or the facilities that they had for getting forward, except through what I heard from others, I not having been present at that time.

Question. How was our artillery firing, as far as you observed-effective or otherwise?

Answer. The artillery fired very rapidly and for a long time, and judging from the reports in the enemy's newspapers which I have seen since we must have done considerable damage by our artillery upon their columns moving across to the place of attack.

Question. Were the obstructions north and south of the crater removed sufficiently to admit the passage of troops in line of battle, say brigade front?

Answer. I did not see that any obstructions made by the enemy's trenches had been removed when I was there, except what had been removed by the explosion of the mine at the crater. Their ditch still remained, and I counted the regimental flags of our troops in my front occupying the trench. I do not know whether there was a strong abatis before the attack; so that I refer only to the ditch and the parapet.

By the COURT:

Question. Do you think the assault would have been successful there had the best dispositions been made that you are conversant with?

Answer. From what I learned afterward of the behavior of the troops after the explosion, when the enemy was most alarmed, I think that the assault, if it had been made with no more vigor, would have failed no matter what the disposition. If the troops had behaved properly elsewhere I think the probability of success would have been increased by having more openings, a simultaneous assault, and increased material; but if the troops would have behaved as improperly as they are reported to have done in front-not going forward when ordered-I think the assault would have failed no matter what the disposition.

Question. In your opinion was there any necessity for an officer of rank being present who should have had a more general command than the commander of the troops making the assault and the commanders of the supports and reserves; should there have been an officer present to have combined the whole command, nearer than the commander of the army, who was only in telegraphic communication with the different commanders of troops on the field; should there have been one single person there invested with authority to direct the whole operation, and would the result have been different if such had been the case?

Answer. The only commands referred to as present there, the assaulting corps and the reserves, were under General Burnside and myself; and upon reporting to General Burnside I accompanied him to the trenches and told him I would obey any instructions he gave me; so that the whole of the operations were under his orders, until the orders came from higher authority to make the change referred to, and to discontinue the assault. General Burnside being the senior officer I considered that he had a right to give me orders. He directed me to place my troops in the rear until after his troops should have made the assault, and until he had learned when they would be necessary and where, which I did. General Burnside was to give me word when to move my troops and where to move them. I told him I considered myself bound to obey any instructions that he might give me, and that any instructions that he would give would be obeyed with alacrity. So that, so far as concerns the movements directed by him, I do not think the presence of any other officer in those two corps would have made any change in moving forward.

Question. Could your troops when they were called into action have advanced to the front over the enemy's parapet and have gotten through in line of battle in any front greater than that of two regiments, at the time you were sent in, on each side of the crater?

Answer. I think it probable that my troops might have gotten in on the left of the crater at that time if they had advanced through the opening by fronts of regiments, or even companies-gotten into the enemy's trenches; but my answer must be understood to convey only a knowledge of what I saw. I do not know what force the enemy had on the left. I only knew that the resistance on the right was very great, and they appeared to have a severe fire upon the troops on the right of where we advanced to the crater. My troops were directed to support General Burnside on the right.

Question. Were you present when the mine exploded; do you consider that the troops might have advanced to the top of Cemetery Hill on that ridge had they been properly led forward or the troops behaved properly?

Answer. I do not consider I was present when the mine exploded.

By General MEADE:

Question. Where was your general position on the field during the operations of the morning?

Answer. When the mine exploded, and probably for an hour and a half or two hours afterward, I was with General Burnside in the trenches in rear of one of the batteries about one-third or half a mile from the point of assault; after that for half an hour I was up to the front as far as I could get without going into the crater or outside our line of intrenchments as far as the head of my advanced division was. I then returned, and General Burnside and myself occupied the same place in the rear of this battery for probably an hour, except that I rode to the rear where General Meade was and passed around a little trying to rally some troops who were going from the front. This took me till between 9 and 10 o'clock, when General Burnside and myself both rode to the rear to learn something about an order that was issued in regard to our future movements.

Question. Could anything be seen from this point with sufficient distinctness to have enabled the commanding general to give orders other than he did from the point occupied by him?

Answer. Immediately after the explosion the fire from both our batteries and the enemy's came very heavily, and the cloud of smoke prevented us from seeing anything

that was going on there. We were ignorant of the condition of things except from the information staff officers brought us or from the nature of the firing we heard, up to the time that I informed myself by going to the front.

Question. Did you hear any staff officer report to General Burnside that the troops could not be got to advance from the crater? If So, how many officers so reported, and do you know their names?

Answer. The first two or three reports that were brought to General Burnside were brought by officers whose names I do not know, and not until some considerable time had expired after the explosion; and although I did not hear the reports distinctly enough to repeat them they were not satisfactory, and indicated that the troops could not be moved readily forward.

Question. Did you not report to the commanding general that the troops were overcrowded in the crater and the enemy's adjacent works, and that in your judgment there was no probability of the crest of Cemetery Hill being carried-this, somewhere between 9 and 10 a. m., at the headquarters of the commanding general in the field?

Answer. I did. I would say, in addition to my answer, that General Burnside and myself were present at the time, and the question was whether we could carry it at that time; and my answer intended to convey whether we (General Burnside and myself) with our forces could have done so had they let us; and after the troops were disorganized and driven back those who made the attack later and those who made the attack earlier were packed in the trenches adjacent, that under the circumstances we could not carry it with all our troops at that point of attack.

Question. Did General Burnside, about 10 a. m., when at his commanding general's headquarters on the field, say that he could maintain his lodgment in the crater, and that he could take Cemetery Hill before night, if so permitted?"

Answer. General Burnside disagreed with me when I said I did not think we could take it. I supposed he meant that he could take it with the force he had, consisting of his own corps and my reserves, though he said something about it was time then for the Fifth Corps to move up. The remark was made by General Burnside with a view of persisting in the attack which he had commenced, and it had been my opinion, ever since I was near enough to see what was going on in the crater, that the sooner we withdrew our troops, when we got into such a bad position, the better, and any persistence in the attack at that point I looked upon as very improper.

Question. Was it not understood at this time that offensive operations should cease, but that the crater should be held till the troops could be securely withdrawn, and that this would probably be till night?

Answer. I think such was General Burnside's understanding, and I know he received such orders. My troops were all inside the intrenchments except those who had run into the enemy's trenches to avoid the tremendous fire which they met when they went out.

By General WARREN:

Question. Do you remember seeing General Warren at the battery at General Burnside's station?

Answer. I do.

Question. Was not the whole field at that time sufficiently clear from smoke to be visible, and had been so for some time previous at that point?

Answer. I do not know whether it was after my return from the vicinity of the crater or before that I saw General Warren. My impression is that each time I looked from the parapet before I left the trenches-which was two or three timesthat I rose to look to the front, the smoke obscured the view so that I, at least, could form no definite idea of what was going on at the front. After the firing from the batteries on our side had ceased, which was probably an hour from the time of the assault, the atmosphere was clearer, but even then I could make out really little of what was going on in front, from the distance, the peculiar position of the point of attack, and from the fact, too, that I do not see very well because I am nearsighted.