About this time, 5.45 or 5.50-I see by reference to the dispatch that it is 5.45-an orderly came up to me and delivered me a dispatch which, upon opening, I found to be a dispatch from Colonel Loring, inspector-general of the Ninth Corps, written at the crater and addressed to General Burnside, which dispatch the orderly, not knowing where to find General Burnside, had brought to his old headquarters, where it found me. That dispatch, so far as I recollect the purport of it, was to the effect that General Ledlie's troops occupied the crater, but in his (Colonel Loring's) opinion he feared the men could not be induced to advance beyond. That dispatch was telegraphed to General Burnside, and sent to him by an officer, so that I have no copy of it. That was the substance of it, however. It was shown to General Grant and General Humphreys, both of whom can give their recollection of it in confirmation of mine. It is an important matter to be taken into consideration here, that as early as 5.45 a. m. a dispatch was placed in my hand, stating that General Ledlie's troops could not be induced to advance. In addition to that the following dispatch was sent to him (document W). Fearing that there might be some difficulty on the part of General Burnside's troops, I thought it possible that by another corps going in on his right encouragement might be given to his men and a prompt assault might be made. The next dispatch I received was from an aide-de-camp, whom I had sent to General Burnside's headquarters, to advise me of what was going on. It is dated 5.50, and is from Captain Sanders (document X). The next dispatch that I will read is one addressed to General Burnside at 6 a. m. (document Y). Dispatches were at this time also sent to Generals Ord and Warren. You can keep these dates in your mind. The next dispatch was received from Captain Sanders at 6.10 a. m. as follows (document Z). The following dispatches are next in order (documents 1, 2, and 3). At 7 a. m. Lieutenant-General Grant put into my hand a dispatch from Colonel Comstock, an officer whom he had sent to see the progress of operations (document 4). I read all these dispatches in order that you may see how I was situated on the occasion, and what I knew of what was going on. At 7.20, twenty minutes afterward, I got the following dispatch from General Burnside (document 5). Upon the receipt of this dispatch from General Burnside, informing me that it was hard work to take the crest (at the same time he not having reported to me that anybody had attempted to take it, or that any part of his force had made any effort to take it), with the dispatches from my officers, the dispatch from Colonel Loring, and the dispatch from Colonel Comstock, to the effect that the troops were lying there, I came to the conclusion that possibly there might be some difficulty in getting the men to nove forward, either from the enemy's fire or some imaginary obstacle the troops had to encounter; that, as it was now 7 o'clock, and that the place had been occupied at 5.30 I began to suppose that there was some reason for the delay which had not been officially reported. I considered it natural that General Burnside would be indisposed to make it known so long as he had hopes of overcoming the difficulty. To me, in my position as major-general commanding the army, it was a matter of the utmost importance, because it was my intention, during the assault and before it, that if we could not carry the crest promptly by a coup de main, to withdraw the troops as quickly and safely as possible. Impressed with this view, and in order to get at the exact condition of affairs, and to justify General Burnside if there was any reason of that kind, I addressed him the following dispatch (document 6). It is proper to say that immediately after sending that dispatch, and before receiving General Burnside's answer, I received a report, verbally, from Captain Sanders that an attempt had been made to make an attack on the right, I think by General Griffin, and that he had been repulsed. I immediately sent another dispatch to General Burnside at 8 a. m., as follows (document 7). To the first of these two dispatches, subsequent to sending the second, I received this reply (document 8). The next dispatch that I received was one from Colonel Comstock, about the same time, 8 a. m. (document 9). The next dispatch I received was one dated 8.45 a. m. from Captain Sanders (document 10). At 9 a. m. I received the following dispatch from General Burnside (document 11). That was the first information I had received that there was any collision with the enemy, or that there was any enemy present. At 9.30 a. m. the following dispatch was sent to General Burnside (document 12). The next dispatch to General Burnside, at 9.45, was the peremptory order to withdraw (document 15). Receiving information from some person, I don't know who it was, that there was some difficulty about withdrawing at that time, that the safety of the column might be jeopardized by undertaking to withdraw it, the following dispatch was sent to General Burnside, and also to General Ord, who had troops there at that time-none of my dispatches to General Ord have been presented yet, because it would have confused matters. I will read them hereafter-(document 16). About that time both Major-General Burnside and Major-General Ord came to the headquarters where General Grant and myself were temporarily located. General Burnside seemed to be very much displeased at the order of withdrawal, and expressed the opinion that if allowed to remain there by night-fall he could carry that crest. As, however, he did not give any reason to show how he could take it, and as he had been from 5.30 in the morning till nearly 10, and not only had not taken it, but had his men driven out of the works he had been occupying, and as Major-General Ord, whose troops were also there, upon being asked if the crest could be carried, answered very positively that it was entirely out of the question, it was determined by the lieutenant-general commanding and myself-or rather, as I referred the matter to him and he desired the orders changed-it was determined that no further attempt should be made to take the crest, but that the men should be withdrawn whenever that could be done with security. There is now a very important point to which I will call the attention of the.. Court, and which I want investigated very thoroughly, and that is the withdrawal from the crater. At the time the order was given to withdraw the troops, the report of Major-General Ord was that the crater of the mine was so overcrowded with men that it would be nothing but murder to send any more men forward there. I do not recollect as to whether the report of Major-General Burnside was so definite, but I believe the report of Colonel Loring was that there was at least one division of the troops in there. The impression left upon my mind was that at that time there were as many men in the crater as would enable them to defend themselves if attacked, and in case no defense was necessary, and there was no occasion on my part to order troops to be sent there, I presumed that Major-General Ord and Major-General Burnside, who was having charge of that operation, would see that the men would be properly withdrawn. This conclusion having been arrived at by the lieutenant-general and myself, and it not appearing necessary that we should remain any longer at Major-General Burnside's headquarters, the lieutenant-general commanding withdrew to City Point, and I withdrew to my former headquarters, where I was in telegraphic communication with Major-General Burnside, and where, under the common correspondence between a general officer commanding the army and his subordinates, not to say under a peculiar exigency, I expected to be informed of anything that should occur. I remained in total ignorance of any further transactions until about 6 or 7 o'clock in the evening. About that hour a report or a rumor reached me that there were a number of our wounded men lying between the crater and our line, and I think an appeal was made to me by General Ord if something could not be done to remove those men. I was not aware that there was any difficulty in the way of removing them, and wondered why they had not been removed; presuming that our men were in the crater, and as no report had been made to me that they had been withdrawn, I directed a dispatch to be sent to Major-General Burnside, calling upon him for information. That dispatch read as follows (document 17). You will remember that I left General Burnside's headquarters about 10 o'clock, with the understanding that the troops were to be withdrawn when they could be withdrawn with security. The following dispatches were subsequently read by the witness (documents 18, 18, 18, 18, 19, 19, 20). So far as any information from General Burnside is concerned, I had to go to bed that night without knowing whether his troops were in the crater or whether they were not. During the night dispatches were received referring to the relief of General Ord's troops. Next morning, July 31, at 8.40 and 9 a. m., the dispatches 18 and 18 were sent and received by General Humphreys. No dispatch was received from General Burnside with reference to the withdrawal of these troops till 6.40 p. m. July 31 (marked 184), to which was sent the one marked 19. At 9.10 p. m. July 31 the dispatch was received from General Burnside (marked 194), and the reply (marked 20) was sent. Now I beg leave to call the attention of the Court to the fact that this dispatch is dated 9.10 p. m. July 31, and although it does not give an official statement of the time of the withdrawal of the troops, I know, but only from other information, that the withdrawal was at about 2 p. m. July 30, and as I consider that my conduct is, here the subject of investigation, as much as that of any other officer or man engaged in this enterprise, I wish to repudiate distinctly any responsibility 4 R R-VOL XL, PT I resting upon me for the manner of the withdrawal, beyond the orders I gave to the effect that the troops were to be withdrawn when they could be withdrawn with security, and, if they had been able to repulse an attack of the enemy, it seems to me rather extraordinary that when another attack was threatened, after the success, that they should be withdrawn simply because they were threatened with another attack; but that is the point to which I wish to call the attention of the Court, and which I wish to have thoroughly investigated.. I believe those constitute the sum and substance of all the orders that passed between myself and Major-General Burnside; but I respectfully submit to this Court that so far as it was in my power, as the commanding general of this army, to give orders, I anticipated the difficulties that occurred, and endeavored to avoid them as much as I could do so, and that I cannot be held responsible for the failure which afterward resulted. Having finished my correspondence with and orders to General Burnside, I now propose to read the correspondence with and orders to General Ord, who was the officer commanding the force next to be employed after those of General Burnside, and whose movements it is important to know. Major-General Ord was directed to relieve his corps by General Mott's division, of the Second Corps, on the evening of the 29th. He was then to move and mass his troops in rear of the Ninth Corps, and it was intended that he should support the Ninth Corps whenever the Ninth Corps had effected a lodgment on the crest; that he was promptly to move up to them and support them on the crest. I had several interviews with General Ord on the 28th and 29th. I went with him and showed him the position, showed him exactly the ground, gave him all the information I had, and also caused him to send staff officers to select positions for the troops, so that when it became dark they might know the roads, On the morning of July 30, when it became evident to my mind that General Burnside's troops were not going to advance farther than the crater, and when I had reason to suppose it was owing to some difficulty on the part of the troops themselves (so far as any official report came to me), rather than obstacles presented by the enemy, I sent a dispatch to General Ord, changing his previous orders, and directing him instead of supporting General Burnside to make an assault independent of General Burnside. That dispatch and subsequent dispatches are as follows (documents 21, 22, 23, 231, 23, 24). There were some other dispatches to General Ord of a similar character, but I do not see them here, to endeavor to get him forward independent of the Ninth Corps, to make an isolated attack-an attack of his own independent of the Ninth Corps. Owing to the obstacles presented, the fact that there was no proper débouché for our troops to that portion of the enemy's line, and the fact that the crater was overcrowded with men, General Ord, considering those obstacles insurmountable, confined his operations to sending forward, I think, only one brigade. But General Ord and his division commanders have made reports which will be placed before you. I forgot to bring them with me to-day. At about 9.45 a. m. the same orders were sent to General Ord as to General Burnside with reference to the withdrawal of the troops. That finishes all that passed between General Ord and myself. The other supporting column was under Major-General Warren on the left. In the original order General Warren was directed to mass his available troops on the right of the line, and to make all his preparations to support General Burnside in the assault wherever he should be or dered. At 4.40 a. m. the following dispatch was sent to him (document 25). At 5.50, one hour afterward, and immediately after my receiving the information that General Burnside's corps occupied the crater, the following dispatch was sent to him (document 26). I wish to call the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as 5.50 I authorized General Warren if he saw any opportunity of doing anything with his corps (not only in support of General Burnside, but as an independent operation of his own), that he should take advantage of it and push forward his troops. His reply, dated 6 a. m., is as follows (document 27). At 6.15 a. m. another dispatch was received from him as follows (document 28). Then at 6.20 another dispatch (No. 29) came from General Warren, in which he states that what we thought was a heavy line of the enemy behind the line occupied by Burnside's troops, as the sunlight comes out and the smoke clears away, proves to be our own troops in the enemy's position. You will perceive that at 5.40 I authorized General Warren and directed him to make an attack without waiting for the support of General Burnside-that is, if circumstances would justify his making an attack; and that his replies here indicate that no such attack was practicable. Coming to that conclusion and receiving information from the signal officers that the enemy had left their extreme right, which I presumed they would do, to mass on the center to receive our attack, the following dispatch was sent to General Warren at 6.30 o'clock (document No. 30). General Burnside asked for the reading of the dispatch to General Wilson, commanding a cavalry division. General Meade replied that he did not have the dispatch with him now, but would procure it for him. The order to General Wilson was written, he said, about the same time as the above dispatch to General Warren, about 6.30 a. m. General Burnside wished to be informed whether or not the order to General Wilson was rescinded. General Meade replied that the order to the cavalry was rescinded when the infantry was ordered to withdraw. General Meade then resumed the reading of dispatches, presenting documents 31 and 32. General BURNSIDE. I would like to know what that dispatch to the cavalry was and exactly what time it was rescinded. General HANCOCK. If you will recollect the matter we will have it called for subsequently. General MEADE. Just make a memorandum of it and I will have it sent. Indeed I am not positive, but I think my dispatches to General Sheridan of the cavalry are here. If they are they will be read. The next dispatch in order is the following, dated 7.30 a. m., to General Warren (document 33). General Ayres still remained on the right, and the orders still existed to do anything with him that could be done to advantage. At 7.50 a. m. we have the next dispatch from General Warren (document 34). Nothing further was received while we awaited developments from General Crawford until 8 a. m., when the following dispatch was received from General Warren (document 35). Notwithstanding it was considered that General Warren's original order authorized him to take the batteries if it could be done, inasmuch as he was directed to move and attack with General Crawford, and as it was suggested that General Ayres might be required it was thought proper to send him the following order at 8.45 a. m. (document 36). At 9.15 a. m. the following dispatch was received from General Warren (document 37). At this time the conclusion had been arrived at by the lieutenant-general commanding and myself that the affair was over, and that nothing more was to be done; and soon afterward orders similar to those which were sent to others were sent to General Warren, that he should not make any attempt to take the two-gun battery. The following dispatches were sent to General Warren (documents 38, 38, 39, and 40). Those are all the orders and communications that passed between General Warren and myself. He was authorized to attack if he could see a good chance to attack. When he reported no chance to attack and was asked what force he had available, he reported that he had no force available except he moved Ayres. He was directed not to move Ayres until information was received from Crawford, only if he could attack the two-gun battery in his front he was ordered to attack it, and then the operations were subsequently suspended. Now I have read you the communications that passed between myself and General Grant, myself and General Burnside, myself and General Ord, and myself and General Warren. It now remains for me to read the Communications that passed between myself and General Hancock and myself and General Mott. The first was a communication sent at 4.40 a. m. to General Mott (document 41). At 4.50 a. m. the following dispatch was sent to the telegraph operator at the headquarters of the Eighteenth Corps (document 42). The following dispatch, dated July 30, 6 a. m., was sent to General Hancock after the mine was occupied (document 43). The following dispatches were sent and received (documents 44, 45, 45, 454, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52). These include the dispatches sent to the cavalry. I would explain that the separate orders to General Wilson were issued because General Sheridan, commanding the Cavalry Corps, was across the James River at Deep Bottom, with two divisions, and I had to issue separate orders to General Wilson so that he might be ready for the movement next day. Here are some dispatches which are of no particular consequence, but I will leave them here. They are dispatches from the signal officers indicating the movements of the enemy. General BURNSIDE. I would suggest that all the dispatches should be left. General HANCOCK. General Meade is now giving his direct testimony, and only such dispatches are numbered as he wishes to incorporate. The others will be left here and can be called for at any time. General MEADE. Well, I will read these dispatches and you can number them and put them down (documents 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58). It was on those reports of the signal officers that General Warren's orders were predicated. The following is the report of the chief engineer (document 59). I believe I have now read every dispatch that I have received, and the Court are fully aware of all the information that I received on the ground. General Burnside said that before the Court adjourned he would like to ask what latitude was allowed in the investigation. General Hancock explained that the Court had gone back to the orders from General Meade, the orders from General Grant, and to the first inception of the mine. General MEADE. I would state that in the general orders issued on the night previous to the assault, the cavalry was ordered to make this attack on the left. Two divisions of the Cavalry Corps were over at Deep Bottom. They could not cross the river until after the Second Corps had crossed, so that it was late in the day before they came up; indeed, the head of the column did not appear before the offensive operations were suspended. As General Wilson had been ordered to be in readiness, however, and in view of the unavoidable delay of Sheridan, orders were sent to General Wilson not to wait for General Sheridan, but to push on himself to the Weldon railroad and make an assault upon the enemy. No report was received from General Sheridan. General Sheridan was sick. General Gregg reported in the evening that he had advanced his cavalry, and that they found the enemy in force at Reams' Station, at Gurley's house, and at various other points along the railroad. There was no attack made by the cavalry except at Lee's Mill, where General Gregg, encountering cavalry, drove them away to water his horses. When it was known that our offensive operations were suspended, orders were sent to the cavalry that they should push on as far as possible and find out the enemy's position, but the original orders about going into town were modified, inasmuch as the operations in our immediate front were suspended. I desire to say to the Court that it has not been my disposition or intention to throw censure upon anybody for the unfortunate failure; that, indeed, I have not been furnished with the necessary information to enable me do so. I have not yet received Major-General Burnside's nor his subordinate commanders' official reports. I have very little knowledge of what actually transpired except from the dispatches you have heard read here. I have been groping in the dark since the commencement of the attack. I did not wish to take any unpleasant measures; but I thought it my duty to suggest to the President of the United States that this matter should be investigated, and that the censure should be made to rest upon those who are entitled to it. What I have done has been to show that I tried to do all I could to insure success. During the day General Burnside and some of his staff, Generals Potter and Ferrero, of the Ninth Corps, were present. The Court adjourned to meet at 10 a. m. on the 9th. THIRD DAY. COURT-ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, The Court met pursuant to adjournment. August 9, 1864. Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate. The reading of the record of the second day was proceeded with, until suspended at page 30, document 25, by General Burnside's verbal application to have all the documents bearing date after 2 p. m. on the 30th of July, and all evidence relating to events subsequent to that time, |