cumstances attending the unsuccessful assault on the enemy's position on the 30th of July, 1864. The Court will report their opinion whether any officer or officers are answerable for the want of success of said assault, and, if so, the name or names of such officer or officers.

Detail for the Court: Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock, U. S. Volunteers; Brig. Gen. R. B. Ayres, U. S. Volunteers; Brig. Gen. N. A. Miles, U. S. Volunteers; Col. E. Schriver, inspector-general, U., S. Army, judge

The Court met pursuant to the foregoing orders: Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate.

The order instituting the Court was read and the Court and judgeadvocate were sworn according to law.

The judge-advocate then presented and read the orders issued from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac on the 29th of July, 1864, containing the "instructions for the guidance of all concerned," in the operations against the enemy's position before Petersburg on the 30th of July, as follows:

ORDERS.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 29, 1864.

The following instructions are issued for the guidance of all concerned: 1. As soon as it is dark Major-General Burnside, commanding Ninth Corps, will withdraw his two brigades under General White, occupying the intrenchments between the plank and Norfolk roads, and bring them to his front. Care will be taken

not to interfere with the troops of the Eighteenth Corps moving into their position ⚫in rear of the Ninth Corps. General Burnside will form his troops for assaulting the enemy's works at daylight of the 30th, prepare his parapets and abatis for the passage of the columns, and have the pioneers equipped for work in opening passages for artillery, destroying enemy's abatis, &c., and the intrenching tools distributed for effecting lodgment, &c.

2. Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth Corps, will reduce the number of his troops holding the intrenchments of his front to the minimum and concentrate all his available force on his right, and hold them prepared to support the assault of Major-General Burnside. The preparations in respect to pioneers, intrenching tools, &c., enjoined upon the Ninth Corps will also be made by the Fifth Corps.

3. As soon as it is dark Major-General Ord, commanding Eighteenth Corps, will relieve his troops in the trenches by General Mott's division, of the Second Corps, and form his corps in rear of the Ninth Corps and be prepared to support the assault of Major-General Burnside.

4. Every preparation will be made for moving forward the field artillery of each corps.

5. At dark Major-General Hancock, commanding Second Corps, will move from Deep Bottom to the rear of the intrenchments now held by the Eighteenth Corps, resume the command of Mott's division, and be prepared at daylight to follow up the assaulting and supporting columns, or for such other operations as may be found necessary.

6. Major-General Sheridan, commanding Cavalry Corps, will proceed at dark from the vicinity of Deep Bottom to Lee's Mill, and at daylight will move with his whole corps, including Wilson's division, against the enemy's troops defending Petersburg on their right by the roads leading to that town from the southward and westward. 7. Major Duane, acting chief engineer, will have the pontoon trains parked at convenient points in the rear prepared to move. He will see that supplies of sand-bags, gabions, fascines, &c., are in depot near the lines ready for use. He will detail engineer officers for each corps.

8. At 3.30 in the morning of the 30th Major-General Burnside will spring his mine and his assaulting columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear, and effect a lodgment there. He will be followed by Major-GeneralOrd, who will support him on the right, directing his movement to the crest indicated, and by Major-General Warren, who will support him on the left. Upon the explosion of the mine the artillery of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the enemy's works whose fire covers the ground over which our columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the progress of our troops. Special instructions respecting the direction of fire will be issued through the chief of artillery.

9. Corps commanders will report to the commanding general when their preparations are complete, and will advise him of every step in the progress of the operation and of everything important that occurs.

10. Promptitude, rapidity of execution, and cordial co-operation are essential to success, and the commanding general is confident that this indication of his expectations will insure the hearty efforts of the commanders and troops.

11. Headquarters during the operation will be at the headquarters of the Ninth Corps. By command of Major-General Meade:

S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Whereupon the Court directed the judge-advocate to notify all the officers named therein of the institution and design of the Court, so as to enable them to be present during its sessions, which was done by addressing the following circular to each:

SIR: The Court of Inquiry instituted by War Department Special Orders, No. 258, of August 3, 1864, for the investigation of the facts and circumstances which attended the unsuccessful assault on the enemy's lines before Petersburg on the 30th ultimo, will meet here on the 8th instant, and the days following, at 10 a. m., and I am directed to acquaint you thereof, so that you may be present at the Court's sessions should you desire to do so. Please acknowledge the receipt of this communication to me at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

ED. SCHRIVER, Inspector-General, Judge-Advocate.

(Addressed to Major-Generals Meade, Burnside, Warren, Sheridan, and Ord, Brigadier-Generals White, Hunt, and Mott, and Major Duane.)

The Court then adjourned to meet at 10 a. m. on the 8th instant.

SECOND DAY.

COURT-ROOM, HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS,

The Court met pursuant to adjournment.

August 8-10 a. m.

Present, Major-General Hancock, Brigadier-Generals Ayres and Miles, and Colonel Schriver, judge-advocate.

The proceedings of the first day were read and approved.

The judge-advocate stated that he had engaged Mr. Finley Anderson, a phonographer, to record the proceedings so long as he should do so to the Court's satisfaction, and Mr. Anderson was sworn according to law. It is here recorded, also, that all officers of rank who, it is supposed, participated in the affair of the 30th ultimo have been informed that they could be present at the Court's sessions and make any statements they may regard important to themselves, should they see fit.

Maj. Gen. G. G. MEADE, U. S. Volunteers, being duly sworn, says:

I propose, in the statement that I shall make to the Court (I presume the Court wants me to make a statement of facts in connection with this case), to give a slight preliminary history of certain events and operations which culminated in the assault on

July 30, and which, in my judgment, are necessary to show to this Court that I had a full appreciation of the difficulties that were to be encountered, and that I had endeavored, so far as my capacity and judgment would enable me, not only to anticipate but to take measures to overcome those difficulties.

The mine constructed in front of General Burnside was commenced by that officer Soon after the occupation of our present lines, upon the intercession of LieutenantColonel Pleasants, I think, of a Pennsylvania regiment, without any reference to or any sanction obtained from the general headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. When the subject was brought to my knowledge I authorized the continuance of the operations, sanctioned them, and trusted that the work would at some time result in forming an important part in our operations. But from the first I never considered that the location of General Burnside's mine was a proper one, because, from what I could ascertain of the position of the enemy's works and lines erected at that time, the position against which he operated was not a suitable one in which to assault the enemy's lines, as it was commanded on both flanks and taken in reverse by their position on the Jerusalem plank road and their works opposite the Hare house.

I will now read to the Court the dispatches which passed between LieutenantGeneral Grant, commanding the Armies of the United States, and myself, which will bear in themselves a sort of history of those preliminary operations-a correspondence which resulted, as I said before, in the final arrangements for the assault on July 30. On the 24th of July I received a letter from the lieutenant-general commanding, which I will now read. I had been previously informed by the lieutenant-general commanding that he desired some operations to take place (offensive) against the enemy, and he had instructed the engineer officer at his headquarters, the engineer officer at General Butler's headquarters, and the engineer officer at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac to make an examination of the enemy's position, and give an opinion as to the probable result of an attack. Their opinion is contained in the following letter (document marked A, Appendix).

I desire to call the particular attention of the Court to that communication, because it contains the views of the lieutenant-general commanding with reference to the assault which should be made on Petersburg, and I wish them to compare this communication with the orders and arrangements that I gave and made, so that they may see that to the best of my ability I ordered everything which he indicated to be done. At the time that this communication was made to me, however, I was under the impression that the obstacles to be overcome were more formidable than the subsequent operations led me to believe, and also that subsequent to that time there had been no movement of the army to produce that great weakening of the enemy's front which afterward occurred. Therefore my reply was to the effect that I was opposed to our making the assault.

The following is my reply sent on the 24th (documents B and B 2).

In reply to that I received a communication or report from General Grant, the result of which was a suspension of the proposed attack (document C).

Next day I made a closer examination, and in the mean time a signal station was erected in a pine tree in front of General Burnside, which gave us a more complete view than we had previously had of the enemy's line. My observations modified my views, because I could not detect a second line, although I detected isolated batteries on the crest. I therefore wrote the following communication to General Grant, dated 12 m. July 26 (document D), to which I received the following reply (document E). There you perceive that the lieutenant-general commanding ordered that whilst the Second Corps was across the James River I should immediately make an assault with the Ninth and Fifth, abandoning the line of the Fifth Corps. In answer to that I wrote him the following dispatch (document F).

That produced a suspension of the order to attack until the return of General Hancock.

The next dispatch I received from General Grant was the following (document G). which I answered at 1 p. m. July 28, as follows (document H).

I will here observe that Lieutenant-General Grant, in consequence of the services which the Second Corps had performed across the river, desired, and gave me directions verbally to that effect, to use the Eighteenth Corps in the assault, and to let the Second Corps take the place of the Eighteenth in the line.

The next dispatch I received was the following, dated City Point, July 29 (document I).

General Grant had come to my headquarters at 4 p. m., and at that time I showed him the order for the assault next day, which had just then been prepared, and which order met with his perfect approbation. He read the order and expressed his satisfaction with it. No other dispatches passed between the lieutenant-general and myself. Next morning between 3.30 and 4 o'clock (before 4 o'clock) he arrived on the ground at General Burnside's headquarters, and all further communications between us were verbal until August 1 at 11.40 a. m., when I received the following dispatch (document J.).

We had given our respective views concerning the assault and I particularly impressed my views with reference to the difficulties to be overcome. When it was ascertained that the movement of the Second Corps had drawn over to the north bank of the James five of the eight divisions composing General Lee's army, together with the information I had obtained that the enemy had no second line upon the ridge but only one or two isolated batteries, I came to the conclusion that the explosion of the mine and the subsequent assault on the crest, I had every reason to believe, would be successful and would be followed by results which would have consisted in the capture of the whole of the enemy's artillery and a greater part of his infantry. The plan sketched out by Lieutenant-General Grant in his dispatch to me, which I endeavored to carry out, and for the execution of which I gave the necessary orders, was that the mine should be exploded as early as possible in the morning-before daylight; that in the mean time the Ninth Corps should be massed and formed in assaulting columns; that every preparation should be made by removing the abatis so that the troops could débouché, and particularly the assaulting columns; that as soon as the mine was exploded the assaulting columns should push forward; that a sufficient proportion should be left to guard the flanks of the main column, because they had to look for an attack on the flanks; that the main body should hold the lines during the attempt to gain the crest of the hill, and if it was successful then I intended to throw up the whole of the Eighteenth Corps, to be followed by the Second Corps, and, if necessary, by the Fifth Corps also. I do not suppose it is necessary to read the order; I will read it, however (document K).

Having read to the Court the correspondence which passed between the lieutenantgeneral and myself preliminary to the operations, and having read the order for the operations, I now propose to read and to accompany with some explanatory remarks the dispatches and correspondence which passed between myself and Major-General Burnside, who had the immediate active operations to perform; afterward between myself and Major-General Ord, between myself and Major-General Warren, and between myself and Major-General Hancock. These dispatches, when compared with each other and in connection with the remarks which I shall make, will show the facts so far as they came to my knowledge; and I wish the Court to bear in mind, and I desire to call their attention particularly to the paucity of information which was furnished me by Major-General Burnside of the operations which were made, and to the difficulty that a major-general commanding an army like the one I am commanding labors under to give direct orders in the ignorance of matters transpiring in the front at the immediate scene of operations. Before those operations were concluded upon I called on Major-General Burnside to furnish me in writing what he proposed to do in case his mine was exploded, in response to which I received the following report (document L).

The request made in that communication by Major-General Burnside was complied with-that is to say, sand-bags were furnished him, but the amount of powder asked for, which was 12,000 pounds, was reduced to 8,000, upon the belief on my part, and on my engineers, that 8,000 pounds would be sufficient for the purpose. Another matter in that dispatch to which my attention was directed, and which was finally the subject of an order on my part, is the suggestion of Major-General Burnside to place the colored troops at the head of the assaulting column. That I disapproved, and I informed him of my disapproval, which was based upon the ground not that I had any reason to doubt, or any desire to doubt, the good qualities of the colored troops, but that I desired to impress upon Major-General Burnside (which I did do in conversations, of which I have plenty of witnesses to evidence, and in every way I could) that this operation was to be a coup de main; that his assaulting column was to be as a forlorn hope, such as are put into breaches, and that he should assault with his best troops; not that I had any intention to insinuate that the colored troops were inferior to his best troops, but that I understood that they had never been under fire; not that they should not be taken for such a critical operation as this, but that he should take such troops as from previous service could be depended upon as being perfectly reliable. Finding General Burnside very much disappointed-for he had made known to General Ferrero and his troops that they were to lead in the assault, and fearing that the effect might be injurious, and in order to show him that I was not governed by any motive other than such as I ought to be governed by-I told him I would submit the matter with his reasons and my objections to the lieutenant-gen-eral commanding the armies, and I would abide by the decision of the lieutenantgeneral as to whether it was expedient and right for the colored troops to lead the assault. Upon referring the question to the lieutenant-general commanding he fully concurred in my views, and I accordingly addressed to Major-General Burnside, or had addressed to him, the following communication (document M).

The following dispatches read near the end of the testimony are here inserted, as directed, in their proper place (documents M 1 and M 2).

The next dispatch to General Burnside was addressed by me at 9.45 p. m. July 29, the evening before the action. I had received a dispatch from General Ord stating that it would take him till very late to relieve the troops in the trenches. The following is my dispatch to General Burnside (document N).

My idea was that General Burnside should form his columns of assault, make all his preparations, take all his men out of the trenches, and move forward; and that then General Ord should occupy his trenches in case he should find it necessary to return. No further dispatches passed between General Burnside and myself. I think it proper to state, however, that on the day previous to the assault I was at General Burnside's headquarters and had the good fortune to meet his three division commanders, and some conversation passed between us; and I would like the Court to inquire into what transpired on that occasion, because I would like to impress upon the Court, as I did impress upon General Burnside and his officers, that this operation which we had to perform was one purely of time; that if immediate advantage was. not taken of the explosion of the mine, and the consequent confusion of the enemy, and the crest immediately gained, it would be impossible to remain there; for, that as soon as the enemy should recover from their confusion, they would bring their troops and batteries to-bear upon us and we would be driven out; that there were two things to be done, namely that we should go up promptly and take the crest, for, in my judgment, the mere occupation of the crater and the holding on to that was of no possible use to us, because the enemy's line was not such a line as would be of advantage to us to hold except to go from it to the crest; and that the troops. were to be withdrawn when the assault proved unsuccessful.

General HANCOCK, president. Do you not mean that you met four division commanders instead of three, as you said, at the headquarters of General Burnside?

General MEADE. No; I mean three. I saw Potter, Ledlie, and Willcox, and I mentioned in the presence of those gentlemen the tactical maneuvers to be made between that crater and the crest; that the only thing to be done was to rush for the crest and take it immediately after the explosion had taken place, and that they might rest assured that any attempt to take time to form their troops would result in a repulse. Those were all the dispatches that transpired betwen General Burnside and myself before the day of the assault. On the morning of the 30th, about 3.15 o'clock, when I was about preparing to go forward to General Burnside's headquarters, Í found that it was very dark, and suggestions being made by some of my officers that it was too dark to operate successfully and that a postponement of the explosion of the mine might be advantageous, I accordingly addressed a dispatch to General Burnside to the following effect (document O).

To that I received the following reply from General Burnside (document P).

I then went over to General Burnside's headquarters, he, during these operations, being farther to the front. The hour had arrived; I stood waiting. I heard no report from General Burnside and no explosion of the mine. In the mean time Lieutenant-General Grant arrived. Finding that there was no explosion, I sent two staff officers, first Captain Jay and then (I do not recollect the name of the other), but I sent two staff officers to ascertain from General Burnside what the difficulty was (if there was any difficulty), why his mine did not explode, if he knew, to which I received no answer. At 4.10 the following dispatch was sent to him (document Q), and to this I got no answer. At 4.20 another dispatch was sent to him as follows .(document R).

I should have stated before this that in order to secure the speedy transmission of intelligence, I took the precaution to have a telegraph run from my headquarters in General Burnside's camp to where General Burnside had established his headquarters for the day, in the fourteen-gun battery. The following is the next dispatch I sent to General Burnside (document S). To this I received no reply. Finding that no replies were received, and the lieutenant-general commanding desiring that an immediate assault should be made without reference to the mine, at 4.35 the following dispatch was sent to General Burnside (document T).

The same orders, you will find, were sent to General Warren, to General Mott, and to General Hunt, to open the artillery. About this time, however, about 4.40, the mine was exploded. In the mean time Captain Jay returned and informed me that the fuse had failed; that a defect was found, and the fuse had been overhauled about fifty feet or twenty-five feet (I forget the distance) from the entrance; that the defect had been ascertained, and had been remedied, and that finally the mine had been exploded. So far as my recollection goes the mine was exploded about 4.40 or 4.45. At 5.45 a. m., one hour after the explosion of the mine, the following dispatch was sent to General Burnside (document U).

The following dispatch was received from him apparently as an answer to mine, although through a difference in time it is dated before it (document V).