batteries of the Sixth Corps to prepare and follow up the contemplated attack by General Martindale. I took part in the advance, and immediately on the enemy's being driven from his position brought up batteries to secure our possession of the position taken. I also planted batteries on the bank of the river near the Page house, in the position which commanded the railroad bridge crossing over the Appomattox at Petersburg. This position, now forming the extreme right of our lines, has been since greatly strengthened, and constitutes a strong battery with an armament of three siege guns and four 8-inch mortars. I have thus far reported such operations of the artillery as would not be included in the reports of the chiefs of artillery serving with the corps, to which I beg leave respectfully to refer for the operations of their batteries. They have doubtless rendered reports to the generals with whom they respectively served. I have received but two such reports, those of Colonels Tidball and Wainwright, commanding the artillery of the Second and Fifth Corps respectively. In the battle of the Wilderness, and indeed in the greater portion of the battles of this campaign, the ground and the nature of the operations have been unfavorable to the use of field artillery, yet hardly a day has passed from the crossing of the Rapidan that one or more batteries have not been engaged. On some occasions, as on the Po, and at Spotsylvania Court-House, many batteries have been called into requisition, and always officers and men have performed the duties devolved upon them with gallantry and skill. The excellent condition in which the batteries have been kept, the promptitude with which their supplies, on which so much depended, were furnished under unusually unfavorable circumstances, and the efficient condition which the batteries have maintained down to the present time, give proof of the excellence of the battery officers, and of the system of organization adopted for the arm.

SIEGE TRAIN.

On the 16th of April, in obedience to the instructions of the major-general commanding, I submitted a project for the organization of a siege train, to consist as a minimum of forty siege guns, ten 10-inch, twenty 8inch and twenty Coehorn mortars, recommending that the preparation of the train be intrusted to Col. H. L. Abbot, First Connecticut Artillery. This project (a copy of which is appended, marked A) was approved and Colonel Abbot proceeded at once to the organization of the train, to which by subsequent orders were added six 100-pounder Parrotts and ten 8-inch siege howitzers. Colonel Abbot was ordered to the James River in advance of this army and served under the orders of Major-General Butler, commanding the Army of the James in its operations near Richmond, and on the arrival of this army before Petersburg reported to me. The siege train has since been employed in the siege operations of both armies. For a detailed report of its organization, labors and services, I respectfully refer to the excellent reports of Colonel Abbot, appended and marked I and K.*

June 27 I was placed by Lieutenant-General Grant in charge of all siege operations against Petersburg south of the Appomattox (see Special Orders, No. 42, headquarters Armies of the United States, appended and marked B). This order brought the artillery operations in front of the Eighteenth Corps, extending from the Appomattox to near the Hare house, as well as those of this army, under my direction. Colonel Burton, Fifth U. S. Artillery, was assigned temporarily to the Eighteenth Corps,

*Embodied in No. 244, p. 671.

and in addition to the charge of the siege batteries on that front took that of the batteries of the corps, the artillery of which he reorganized. My aide-de-camp, Lieut. C. T. Bissell, Fifth Michigan Infantry, was assigned to the personal staff of Colonel Burton.

June 29, having received orders from Major-General Meade to furnish to Major-General Burnside the powder, &c., required for a mine General Burnside was running under one of the enemy's works, I procured the necessary material and selected the positions for the guns to cover the operations. As rapidly as the works could be prepared the guns were placed in position. Those not needed at the time were held ready to be so placed as soon as the necessity should arise.

July 6 to 9, the Sixth Corps, ordered to Washington, left its trains and six batteries at City Point, whence they were soon after ordered to the Artillery Reserve and placed in position on the lines. The batteries thus left were: Parsons' (A), First New Jersey, four 3-inch; Rhodes' (E), First Rhode Island, four Napoleons; Dorsey's (H), First Ohio, four 3-inch; Brinckle's (E), Fifth United States, four Napoleons; White's, Fourth Maine, four 3-inch; McLain's, Third New York, four Napoleons. July 3, received orders from Major-General Meade to examine, with Major Duane, chief engineer, the enemy's works in front of Petersburg to ascertain whether offensive operations at any point were practicable (see Appendix C).

July 6, after a careful examination of the enemy's position, a joint report from the chief engineer and myself was made, pronouncing an assault impracticable and recommending regular approaches (see Appendix D).

On the 9th of July orders were given from general headquarters to commence operations by regular approaches against Petersburg (see Appendix E).

In pursuance of these instructions I designated the positions of the batteries to be constructed for the operations then ordered. The posi tions were selected in accordance with a plan submitted by Major Duane and myself on the 10th, and approved and ordered to be exe cuted on the 11th of July (Appendix F, G). The direct object of these proposed operations was the possession of the crest of the ridge behind the enemy's line which dominates Petersburg and the possession of which it was believed would involve the fate of the town.

The operations in view were: First, to destroy the obstructions to an assault on the enemy's line, such as abatis, palisades, &c. Second, to silence his guns and especially those bearing on the point of assault. Third, to sweep the ground over which his troops must pass to attack our assaulting columns and to hold his troops in check and cover the retreat should the assault fail. To accomplish the first object the batteries were so placed as to bring all the abatis, palisades, &c., under an artillery fire, which could reach them either by a direct slant or enfilade fire; for this field guns were sufficient. The second purpose required that the batteries should be so placed as to give so far as possible a direct fire upon the enemy's embrasures, and especially upon those which flanked the point of attack. These embrasures were placed principally on the face and flank of the enemy's redoubt and works which formed the salient in front of the Fifth Corps, and in sunken batteries near-this redoubt. For this purpose siege guns were best

and field, was so arranged that all the visible ground between the suited. For the third requisite, the field of fire, for all the guns, siege enemy's line and the crest behind it should be swept by as many of the guns as a compliance with the first two conditions would permit,

From the position of the batteries of the enemy which flanked the mine work, it was evident that there would be great difficulty in bring ing a direct fire of sufficient power to silence them so promptly as to protect our assaulting columns. The redoubt is well placed, in a commanding position, and well provided with traverses. It was, therefore, considered as indispensable that we should bring, in addition to the horizontal, a powerful vertical fire to bear upon the redoubt and sunken batteries near it. All the siege mortars remaining in the train (viz, ten 10-inch and six 8-inch) were, therefore, set apart for this serv ice. The Coehorns were distributed along the line, so that all points of the enemy's position should be more or less under a vertical fire. The location of the different batteries will be seen by a reference to the drawing submitted herewith.* They were constructed by details from the different corps under the general direction of Major Duane, chief engineer.

On June 30 Brooker's battery (B), First Connecticut, six 44-inch siege guns, was placed in Battery No. 19, which commands the enemy's crest behind the mine.

July 6, four 8-inch mortars were placed in Battery No. 29. They were served by a platoon of Battery A, First Connecticut, Captain Gillett. July 8, two 8-inch mortars and July 9 four Coehorns were placed in battery near the Hare house, under command of Lieutenant Sargeant, Battery G.

July 14, the Fourth New York Artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Allcock commanding, reported for duty with the siege train.

July 25, Pratt's battery (M), First Connecticut, six 4-inch siege guns, was placed in position in Battery No. 24. A few field batteries were also in position on the line.

July 28, orders were given to prepare for an assault, and on that night ten 10-inch mortars and six 8-inch were placed in position, the 10-inch in Battery No. 8, the 8-inch in Battery No. 9; the first served by Captain Pierce's battery (C), First Connecticut, the latter by part of Battery A, Lieutenant Patterson.

On the night of the 29th Captain Brown's battery (H), First Connecticut, six 44-inch siege guns, Battery No. 4, and the field batteries of the Fifth and Eighteenth Corps, not heretofore on the lines, were placed in position.

On the 28th I visited the different batteries and gave detailed instructions for the employment of each gun under the different probable circumstances that might arise. These orders were impressed on the battery officers by their commanders, and on the morning of the 29th circular instructions were furnished to all artillery commanders (see Appendix H) for their government. The following pieces were placed in battery in front of the Fifth and Ninth Corps: ten 10-inch mortars, ten 8-inch mortars, 17 Coehorn mortars, 18 siege guns, 86 field guns; total, 141; and near the Hare house, to bear upon the enemy's batteries and lines on the right of Burnside's corps, six 8-inch mortars, 11 Coehorns, 6 field guns; total, 23. The total number of guns and mortars was, therefore, 110 guns and 54 mortars.

On the morning of the 30th, as soon as the mine exploded, our fire opened along the whole line. The firing was from each piece slow, deliberate, and careful, partaking of the nature of target practice, and was very effective, the amount of fire required being provided for by the large number of pieces brought into action. The enemy's guns in

*To appear in the Atlas.

+ Brown's battery belonged to the Fourth New York Artillery,

front of the Fifth Corps were soon silenced and his fire in front of the Ninth confined to a battery on the hill behind the mine A (see sketch) and to one gun from his work B, next south of the mine, which could not be effectually reached by the guns in front of it, and which was sheltered from the fire of Batteries Nos. 20 to 24 by the trees in front of the latter, which had not been felled by the troops as required. This work having been delayed by the Ninth Corps until the night of the 29th, it was then objected by General Burnside that the noise of chopping would alarm the enemy, and that it could be done after the mine was sprung. The battery in which this one gun was placed was expected to be in our possession within a few minutes after the explosion, but was not taken possession of by our infantry. The Battery A. on the crest behind the mine and near a place known as the Chimneys, opened from time to time, but was always silenced by a few rounds from Brooker's battery and the field guns which could be turned upon it. As a whole the practice was excellent, keeping down the enemy's fire, destroying the embrasures, especially of the enemy's redoubt and works at the angle, exploding one of his magazines and several caissons, and preventing troops passing by the direct line from his right to the point of attack. At 10 a. m. orders were given for the withdrawal of the troops, which was covered as far as possible by the artillery. Our works were so well constructed and the fire of the enemy's batteries so effectually kept down that the casualties were few. Major Fitzhugh, First New York Artillery, is included in the list of wounded. I have to acknowledge my indebtedness in these operations to Col. H. L. Abbot, First Connecticut Artillery and captain Engineers, U. S. Army, commanding siege train; Col. C. S. Wainwright, First New York Artillery, chief of artillery, Fifth Corps; Lieut. Col. J. A. Monroe, First Rhode Island Artillery, chief of artillery, Ninth Corps; Col. A. Piper, Tenth New York Foot Artillery and captain Third U. S. Artillery, chief of artillery, Eighteenth Corps; and Lieut. Col. E. R. Warner, First New York Artillery and first lieutenant Third U. S. Artillery, inspector of artillery on my staff.

Colonel Abbot was indefatigable in his labors. When the order was received by him to send the siege guns and material to the lines, it was on board ship at Broadway Landing, seven miles distant, but the same night he had the sixteen heavy mortars, with all the ammunition and material in their batteries, ready for service at the required moment, and Colonel Abbot took immediate command of the 10-inch mortar battery during the bombardment.

Colonels Wainwright and Piper and Lieutenant-Colonel Monroe were also prompt and effective in getting their batteries in position and superintending their respective lines during the action. At 11 p. m. July 30 orders were received by me to withdraw so much of the siege train as was in front of the Fifth and Ninth Corps and part of that in front of the Eighteenth and move it to City Point. The order was telegraphed to Colonel Abbot immediately, and in thirty-six hours fiftytwo heavy siege guns and mortars, with their ammunition, platforms," equipments, and other material, were secretly and safely withdrawn, moved by land seven miles to Broadway Landing, and loaded on barges. A few siege guns and mortars were left on the Eighteenth Corps front to control the enemy's batteries on the opposite side of the river.

Since July 31 various changes have taken place as necessity required in the position of the batteries on the lines and in the armament of the works; but no operations of importance have been undertaken, the batteries being employed principally to keep down the enemy's fire.

At times, however, by order of corps commanders, they have opened fire on the town of Petersburg. A number of the works having been inclosed and garrisons with artillery ordered to be left in them in case the army should move, the magazines in the forts designated were supplied with ammunition so that each gun should have 150 rounds, including that in the limbers, which in most cases were left in the forts. The ammunition for this purpose was taken from the wagons of the brigade ammunition train, and from those of the artillery park, the wagons being left empty so as to withdraw the ammunition at the shortest notice. The caissons of the batteries in the works were thus rendered disposable to take the place of these empty wagous in the brigade, and so complete the supply of ammunition for the batteries that should move. When the army was moved on 26th of October these works had their armaments left in them, so that the amount of artillery which accompanied the army was but small.

For the services of the field artillery in the affairs on the Weldon railroad, 19th-22d August, at Reams' Station on August 25, on Hatcher's Run October 26-28, and in the various operations of the cavalry, I respectfully refer you to the reports of the commanders of the troops to which the batteries were attached.

For want of complete returns I am unable to state the losses of the artillery in killed and wounded. The captures and losses of guns reported are as follows: Captured, 32 guns; lost, 25 guns; showing an excess of 7 guns captured over the number lost from May 4 to October 1864.

31,

a August 15, one 8-inch howitzer captured by Second Corps at Deep Bottom, reported since this report was made out,

I have respectfully to call attention to the services in this campaign of the commanding officer of the Artillery Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton, Fifth U. S. Artillery; of Col. J. C. Tidball, Fourth New York Foot Artillery and captain Second U. S. Artillery; Col. C. S. Wainwright, First New York Light Artillery; Col. C. H. Tompkins, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, chiefs of artillery of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps,