not my regimental color, but meeting the commanding officer of the Thirteenth Indiana Regiment, of the Tenth Corps, I stopped to converse with him. There were in front of me at this time, lying outside the earth-works, negro troops in two lines-that is to say, four deep. They were lying on their faces in line of battle immediately on the outside of the ditch. Directly in front of them was another line of negro troops, in the ditch, mingled with the white troops of the First Division. I did not go into the crater because I was desirous, if possible, of learning where my regiment was before getting in. In justice to myself, I might say that it was a much more exposed position outside the ditch than it was inside, but, as I said before, I desired to find my regiment first. But being unable to do so, I had determined to go in and look for it in the ditch. Just as I was about to step forward, about half a dozen officers of the negro troops rose up and attempted to get their commands out of the work, for the purpose of advancing I should judge, although I knew nothing of what the movements were to be, and therefore only judged so from their actions. About 200 men (white and black) rose right in my front, their officers attempting, as I understood, to advance them, but they immediately fell back, and thereupon the two lines of negro troops that had been lying in front of me near the ditch rose to their feet and went back to the rear, marching over the Thirteenth Indiana Regiment, which remained in its position. This was about 100 yards on the right of the crater.

Question. The white troops in the crater belonged to what division? Answer. They belonged to the First Division (General Ledlie's).

Question. State to the Court, if you know, or give your opinion as to why they hesitated or stopped in the crater and did not go forward. Answer. Of my own knowledge I do not know.

Question. Did any of the troops of the First Division get beyond the crater toward the enemy?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. In your opinion how did this hesitation or rest in the crater affect the result of the action?

Answer. In my opinion it affected it in this manner: The hesitation and the length of time consumed in reorganizing or rearranging the men for moving forward enabled the enemy immediately in front to be prepared not only for our advance, which they were, but to advance against us, which they did.

Question. Do you know whether the division and brigade commanders were present when the troops halted in the crater?

Answer. No, sir; I do not know of my own knowledge.

By the COURT:

Question. How many troops were there in those two lines which lay just along the enemy's rifle-pit?

Answer. The number from the crater to a short distance to my right was, I should judge, 600 or 700, possibly more. I could not say how many more there might be because of the nature of the ground, there being a descent in the ground beyond which I could not see.

Question. Did they at any time charge up the slope toward Cemetery Hill?

Answer. They did not to my knowledge.

Question. When they rose up and went to the rear, in what order did they go?

Answer. In disorder.

Question. Were those troops again brought forward that day?

Answer. Not to my knowledge. Some of them were rallied in rear of the next line in the rear.

8 R R VOL XL, PT I

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ROBINSON.

Lieut. Col. GILBERT P. ROBINSON, Third Maryland Battalion, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Were you in the crater at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command on that occasion?

Answer. I was in the crater at the assault, and I formed part of the third line making the assault. The brigade was in three lines. I belonged to the Second Brigade of the First Division.

Question. In what formation did your command go forward?

Answer. In column by battalions.

Question. Did any of your troops get beyond the crater?

Answer. Yes, sir; some of them did. My brigade went to the right of the crater to the breast-work in front of the battery, which was in accordance with the orders from Colonel Marshall the night before.

Question. Did the mass of the troops of the First Division halt in the crater and about it, or did they go forward toward the crest?

Answer. I did not see any of them go forward toward the crest. A majority of them went through the crater perpendicular to our front. I kept to the right. Question. You know the fact that those troops halted there? Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know why they halted?

Answer. I could not positively say why, without it was in consequence of the ground being so small, and so many of them getting together in the crater. There was great confusion in the crater.

Question. Was there not plenty of ground in front-why did they not go?

Answer. Yes, sir; I cannot answer about what transpired on the left. I went to the right and kept up a fire, and advanced as far as I could until I got to an angle in the works which was held by the rebels. I used the Spencer rifle upon them. The battalion numbered only fifty-six men.

Question. Was there confusion at that point of attack, or were the troops in any order?

Answer. I could not see any order at all. There was nothing but confusion in the crater. What was in the covered way beyond the crater toward Petersburg I could not say.

Question. Did you have an opportunity of observing whether efforts were made by division and brigade officers to relieve the troops from this disorder?

Answer. Yes, sir; every effort that could be made was made by Colonel Marshall and myself, for he had given orders that I should be obeyed, as I was next in command. I saw no division commander in the crater at the time.

Question. What was the cause of this confusion that you say existed in the crater?

Answer. I cannot assign any reason for the confusion if it was not as I said the ground being so much torn up and the place being so small, and when they got in there the fire was pretty strong.

Question. What was the nature of the enemy's fire at that time, heavy or otherwise?

Answer. When we got there the fire was not so strong as it was half an hour afterward.

Question. What kind of fire was it, artillery or musketry?

Answer. Both. I would call it a moderate fire. I do not think the heavy fire commenced until after 8 o'clock. I think we had fire there from their mortar batteries.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR RANDALL.

Maj. GEORGE M. RANDALL, Fourteenth New York Heavy Artillery, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Were you in or about the. crater on the 30th of July, and what was your command?

Answer. I was in the crater, and was acting aide to General Ledlie.

Question. In what formation did your division go forward?

Answer. It went forward as I should judge by the flank. They did not go forward in solid column as we expected they would do.

Question. Do you know any reason why they did not?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Were you rear the head of the column, or were you among the first that got into the crater?

Answer. I was about the second line. I was ordered by General Ledlie to go forward with the advancing column.

Question. Had you an opportunity of observing why the troops halted in the crater?

Answer. Yes, sir. I saw the Fourteenth New York and the Second Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery pass through the crater and occupy traverses in rear of the fort. And there they remained.

Question. Were efforts made to urge them forward according to the plan?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And at a time, too, when they were not in disorder?

Answer. They were very much in disorder when they arrived at the crater. That was just the difficulty. If the regiments had been in their proper places when they arrived at the crater we would have taken the crest of the hill, but they were scattered, and it was impossible to get any of the regiments together. Colonel Robinson and myself attempted to get them forward, but could not do so.

Question. While this was going on was there a fire of any account from the enemy?

Answer. No, sir; there was not much when we first advanced in there.
Question. Please to state in your opinion what it arose from.

Answer. I cannot tell exactly. I suppose it was because when the mine exploded they were so much excited, for when the mine exploded they hardly knew what they were doing. It appeared to be the opinion of all who were there that immediately after the explosion one good regiment in solid column could have gone forward without any difficulty. But we were in there only a short time when the enemy opened on our right and left.

Question. Was the division commander present during this confusion?

Answer. Not in the crater.

Question. It is your opinion that this hesitation affected the result of the action?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Do you know whether there were any pioneers with tools or engineer troops with fascines or gabions ready to come forward to crown the crest in the event of your getting up on Cemetery Hill?

Answer. I think I saw the Twenty-fifth [Thirty-fifth] Massachusetts (First Division), with shovels and spades; I cannot positively say but I think I saw them there somewhere.

By the COURT:

Question. To all appearances were the rebels awake and vigilant before and up to the time of the springing of the mine, or were they apparently asleep and unprepared?

Answer. They appeared to be awake. When I was on the first line the line that General Willcox's division occupied-shots were continually fired by the enemy from the fort before the mine exploded; they came from the right or left, at least from the immediate vicinity of the fort.

Question. Are you certain they came from the enemy?

Answer. Yes, sir; I am positive of it.

Question. Where was the division commander during the assault? Answer. He was in rear of the first line-the line occupied by General Willcox's troops. I carried orders to him and found him always in rear of the first line, sitting down behind the parapet.

Question. Do you know any reason why General Ledlie was not with his division in front?

Answer. No, sir.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL MONROE.

Col. J. A. MONROE, First Rhode Island Artillery, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and in what capacity did you serve?

Answer. I was there as chief of artillery of the Ninth Army Corps.

Question. What preparations were made, such as making openings, for passing field artillery through our line of works when it should become necessary in the front?

Answer. No such preparations were made to my knowledge.

Question. What preparations were made for unmasking our artillery, such as cutting down the trees and obstructions there were in front?

Answer. No preparations had been made immediately before the explosion. Some had been made weeks before. The trees in front of what is known as the "heavy work" were left standing until the morning of the 30th, directly after the explosion of the mine, when a few of the trees were cut down.

Question. Do you understand that some of the batteries were masked by those trees?

Answer. They were not exactly masked, but the trees obstructed the fire of the batteries.

Question. Were you aware that the Fifth Corps artillery was to find its way to the front through openings that were to be made in the Ninth Corps front?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. What have you to say about the fire of the enemy's artillery, as to its commencement and its formidableness on that day?

Answer. It was not severe at all at first. Half or three-quarters of an hour afterit might have possibly been an hour-they had a battery firing which enfiladed our line on the right. That fire came apparently from one or two guns on Cemetery

Question. What troops occupied that line?

Answer. I think it was the First Division of the Ninth Corps, which had endeavored to move up toward the crest of Cemetery Hill, by the way of the Chimneys, where there is another battery. The fire of the enemy's battery on Cemetery Hill was not formidable, because the heavy battery of ours kept it almost completely silenced.

Question. Had those trees been removed, could our batteries have played on the enemy's guns on our right of the crater, which were firing across the plain over which our troops were to charge?

Answer. Yes, sir. They could also have fired upon a battery in the edge of the woods, almost in front of the crater, that was enfilading our line.

Question. What is the reason the trees were not cut down?

Answer. I called General Burnside's attention to it three weeks before. I went to the general the night before the explosion of the mine, and tried to get a large party to cut those trees down, and he said no trees should be cut down until the mine should have exploded. I asked him for a detail, and he gave me eighty men, which were to be set at work immediately after the explosion of the mine. I put them to work, two men to a large tree and one man to a small one, and they commenced cutting, but only a few trees were cut down, the party was so small.

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN GREGG.

Capt. THEODORE GREGG, Forty-fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Ninth Corps, being duly sworn, says to questions by JUDGE-ADVOCATE: Question. Were you at the assault on the 30th of July, and what was your command?

Answer. I was at the assault on the 30th of July. My command was the Fortyfifth Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteers, First Brigade, Second Division, Ninth Army Corps.

Question. State briefly what you observed about the operations on that day.

Answer. My regiment was in the intrenchments opposite the rebel fort that was blown up. About 3.30 o'clock on the morning of the assault I received orders from Captain Raymond, aide to Colonel Bliss, commanding the brigade, to leave part of the regiment deployed as skirmishers and go back with the remainder to the edge of the woodlands and form on the right of the Fourth Rhode Island, and remain there until further orders. When the explosion took place I was ordered by Captain Peckham, who was also an aide to Colonel Bliss, to follow the Fourth Rhode Island. We marched by the flank, left in front, through the covered way. On arriving at our front line of works opposite the crater the order was given to double-quick across the open plain. On arriving in front of the rebel works we found several regiments lying down on the ground, and a great many men killed and wounded. I then received orders to charge across the crater; I gave the command "face by the right flank," in order to march in line of battle; and on arriving at the edge of the crater I faced again by the left flank, and marched in single file around and in rear of the crater. The crater was filled with the troops of the First and Second Divisions of the Ninth Army Corps. General Bartlett, commanding the First Brigade, First Division, General Griffin, commanding the Second Brigade, Second Division, and General Hartranft, were in the crater. They appeared to be endeavoring to rally the troops for the purpose of charging forward to some buildings about 400 yards in rear of the crater toward Petersburg, and I believe on Cemetery Hill. I was ordered by General Bartlett to charge across the plain and secure those buildings so that we could use them to operate as sharpshooters against the enemy's artillery. At the same time Captain Peckham ordered me to form in line of battle and then charge down in rear of the enemy's line of rifle-pits on the right-that is to face by the rear rank and charge the enemy in the rifle-pits on the right. As soon