The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays

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Cambridge University Press, Sep 13, 1996 - Philosophy - 278 pages
Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like to have them. Amongst the other topics covered are the unity of consciousness, and the idea that the 'first-person perspective' gives a privileged route to philosophical understanding of the nature of mind. This major collection is sure to prove invaluable to all advanced students of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
 

Contents

Introspection and the self
3
On knowing ones own mind
25
Firstperson access
50
Moores paradox and selfknowledge
74
QUALIA
95
Qualities and qualia Whats in the mind?
97
Qualia and consciousness
121
Intrasubjectiveintersubjective
141
The firstperson perspective
157
Unity of consciousness and consciousness of unity
176
THE ROYCE LECTURES SELFKNOWLEDGE AND INNER SENSE
199
Selfknowledge and inner sense Lecture I The object perception model
201
Selfknowledge and inner sense Lecture II The broad perceptual model
224
Selfknowledge and inner sense Lecture III The phenomenal character of experience
246
References
269
Index
275

MENTAL UNITY AND THE NATURE OF MIND
155

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