6th Obferv. Where we cannot find out the effence or effential difference of any species or kind of beings that we would define, we must content ourselves with a collection of fuch chief parts or properties of it as may best explain it, fo far as it is known, and best diftinguish it from other things: So a marigold is a flower which hath many long yellow leaves, round a little knot of feeds in the midft, with fuch a peculiar ftalk, &c. So if we would define filver, we fay it is a white and hard metal, next in weight to gold: If we would define an elder tree, we might say it is one among the leffer trees, whofe younger branches are foft and full of pith, whose leaves are jagged or indented, and of fuch a particular shape, and it bears large clufters of fmall black berries: So we must define water, earth, ftone, a lion, an eagle, a ferpent, and the greatest part of natural beings, by a collection of those properties, which according to our obfervation diftinguish them from all other things. This is what Mr. Locke calls nominal essences, and nominal definitions. And indeed, fince the effential differences of the various natural beings or bodies round about us arise from a peculiar fhape, fize, motion, and fituation of the fmall particles of which they are compofed, and fince we have no fufficient method to inform us what these are, we must be contented with fuch a fort of definition of the bodies they compofe.

Here note, That this sort of definition, which is made up of a mere collection of the most remarkable parts or properties, is called an imperfect definition, or a defcription ; whereas the definition is called perfect when it is compofed of the effential difference, added to the general nature or

genus.

7th Obferv. The perfect definition of any being always includes the definition of the name whereby it is called, for it informs us of the sense or meaning of that word, and fhews us what idea that word is affixed to: But the definition of the name does by no means include a perfect definition of the thing; for, as we have faid before, a mere fynony mous word, a negation of the contrary, or the mention of any one or two distinguishing properties of the thing, may be a fufficient definition of the name. Yet in thofe cafes where the effential difference or effence of a thing is un

proper

known, there a definition of the name, by the chief ties, and a defcription of the thing, are much the fame.

And here I think it neceffary to take notice of one general fentiment, that feems to run through that excellent performance, Mr.Locke's Effay on human Understanding, and that is, "That the effences of things are utterly unknown to us, and therefore all our pretences to distinguish the effences of things can reach no farther than mere nominal essences; or a collection of fuch properties as we know; to fome of which we affix particular names, and others we bundle up, feveral together, under one name: And that all our attempts to rank beings into different kinds of fpecies can reach no farther than to make mere nominal species; and therefore our definitions of things are but mere nominal defcriptions or definitions of the name."

Now, that we may do juftice to that great author, we ought to confider that he confines this fort of discourse only to the effence of fimple ideas, and to the effence of fubftances, as appears evident in the fourth and fixth chapters of his third book; for he allows the names of mixed modes always to fignify the real effences of their fpecies,Chap. V. and he acknowledges artificial things to have real diftinct fpecies; and that, in the distinction of their effences, there is generally lefs confufion and uncertainty than in natural, Chap. VL fect. 40, 41. though it must be confeffed that he scarcely makes any distinction between the definition of the name and the definition of the thing, as Chap. IV. and fometimes the current of his difcourfe decries the knowledge of effences in fuch general terms as may justly give occafion to mistake.

It must be granted, that the essence of most of our fimple ideas, and the greatest part of particular natural fubftances are much unknown to us; and therefore the effential dif ference of different qualities, and of the various kinds of bodies, (as I have faid before) lie beyond the reach of our understandings: We know not what makes the primary real inward diftinctions between red, green, fweet, four, &c. between wood, iron, oil, fione, fire, water, flesh, clay, in their general natures; nor do we know what are the inward and prime diftinctions between all the particular kinds or fpecies in the vegetable, animal, mineral, metallic, or liquid world of things. See Philofophical Effays, Effay xi. sect. 1.

1

But ftill there is a very large field for the knowledge of the effences of things, and for the use of perfect definitions amongst our complex ideas, the modal appearances and changes of nature, the works of art,the matters of fcience, and all the affairs of the civil, the moral, and the religious life: And indeed it is of much more importance to all mankind, to have a better acquaintance with the works of art for their own livelihood and daily ufe, with the affairs of morality for their behaviour in this world, and with the matters of religion, that they may be prepared for the world to come, than to be able to give a perfect definition of the works of

nature.

If the particular effences of natural bodies are unknown to us, we may be yet good philofophers, good artists, good neighbours, good fubjects, and good Chriftians, without that knowledge; and we have just reason to be

content.

Now that the effences of fome of the modal appearances and changes in nature, as well as things of art, fcience, and morality, are fufficiently known to us to make perfect definitions of them, will appear by the fpecimen of a few def nitions of these things.

Motion is a change of a place. Swiftness is the paffing over a long space in a fhort time. A natural day is the time of one alternate revolution of light and darkness, or it is the duration of twenty-four hours. An eelipfe of the fun is a defect in the fun's tranfmiffion of light to us by the moon interpofing. *Snow is congealed vapour. *Hail is congealed rain. An *ifland is a piece of land rifing above the furrounding water. An hill is an elevated part of the earth, and a *grove is a piece of ground thick fet with trees. An houfe is a building made to dwell in. H cottage is a mean house in the country. A fupper is that meal which we make in the evening. A triangle is a figure compofed of three fides. A gallon is a measure con

ཞ.......

*Note....Ifland, bill, grove, are not defigned here in their more rem mote and fubftantial natures, (if I may fo express it) or as the matter of them is earth for in this fenfe we know not their effence, but only as confidered in their modal appearances whereby one part of earth is dif tinguished from another. The fame may be faid of now, bail, &c.

taining eight pints. A porter is a man who carries burdens for hire. A king is the chief ruler in a kingdom. Veracity is the conformity of our words to our thoughts.. Covetousness is an exceffive love of money, or other poffeffions. Killing is the taking away the life of an animal. Murder is the unlawful killing of a man. Rhetoric is the art of speaking in a manner fit to perfuade. Natural philofophy is the knowledge of the properties of bodies, and the various effects of them, or it is the knowledge of the various appearances in nature, and their caufes; and Logic is the art of using our reafon well, &c.

Thus you fee the effential differences of various beings may be known, and are borrowed from their qualities and properties, their caufes, effects, objects, adjunct ends, &c. and indeed, as infinitely various as the effences of things are, their definitions must needs have various forms.

After all, it must be confeffed, that many logicians and philofophers in the former ages have made too great a buftle about the exactness of their definitions of things, and entered into long fruitless controverfies, and very ridiculous debates in the feveral fciences, about adjusting the logical formalities of every definition; whereas that fort of wrangling is now grown very juftly contemptible, fince it is agreed that true learning and the knowledge of things depend much more upon a large acquaintance with their various properties, caufes, effects, fubject, object, ends and defigns, than it does upon the formal and fcholaftic niceties of genus and difference.

SECT. VII.

OF A COMPLETE CONCEPTION OF THINGS.

HAVING

AVING dwelt fo long upon the first rule to direct our conceptions, and given an account of the definition both of names and things, in order to gain clear and diftinct ideas, we make hafte now to the fecond rule, to guide our conceptions, and that is, Conceive of things completely in all their parts.

All parts have a reference to fome whole: Now there is an old distinction which logical writers make of a whole and its parts into four several kinds, and it may be proper juft to mention them here.

1. There is a metaphyfical whole, when the effence of a thing is faid to confift of two parts, the genus and the difference, that is, the general and the special nature, which being joined together make up a definition. This has been the fubject of the foregoing fections.

2. There is a mathematical whole, which is better called integral, when the feveral parts which go to make up the whole are really distinct from one another, and each of them may fubfift apart. So the head, the limbs, and the trunk, are the integral parts of any large number; so these difcourfes which I have written concerning perception, judgment, reafoning, and difpofition, are the four integral parts of logic. This fort of parts goes to make up the.completeness of any fubject; and this is the chief and most direct matter of our discourse in this fection.

3. There is a phyfical or effential whole, which is usually made to fignify and include only the two effential parts of man, body and foul: But I think the sense of it may better be altered, or at least enlarged, and fo include all the effential modes, attributes, or properties, which are con-tained in the comprehenfion of any idea. This fhall be the fubject of difcourfe under the third rule to direct our conceptions.

4. There is a logical whole, which is also called an univerfal; and the parts of it are all the particular ideas to which this universal nature extends. So a genus is a whole in respect to the several species which are its parts. So the fpecies is a whole, and all the individuals are the parts of it. This fhall be treated of in the fourth rule to guide our conceptions.

At prefent we confider an idea as an integral whole, and our fecond rule directs us to contemplate it in all its parts: But this can only refer to complex ideas, for fimple ideas have no parts.