revelation. A confufed heap of dark and inconsistent ideas, make up a good part of their knowledge in matters of philofophy as well as religion, having never been taught the ufe and value of clear and just reafoning.

Yet it must be still confeffed that there are fome myfteries in religion, both natural and revealed, as well as fome abftrufe points in philofophy, wherein the wife as well as the unwife must be content with obfcure ideas. There are feveral things, especially relating to the invifible world, which are unfearchable in our present ftate, and therefore we must believe what revelation plainly dictates, though the ideas may be obfcure.

Reafon itfelf demands this of us; but we should seek for the brightest evidence both of the ideas, and of the connexion of them, wherefoever it is attainable.

RULE II. "Enlarge your general acquaintance with things daily, in order to attain a rich furniture of topics, or middle terms, whereby thofe propofitions which occur may be either proved or difproved; but efpecially medi tate and inquire with great diligence and exactness into the nature, properties, circumftances, and relations of the particular fubject about which you judge or argue." Confider its caufes, effects, confequences, adjuncts, oppofites, figns, &c. fo far as is needful to your prefent purpose. You fhould furvey a queftion round about, and on all fides, and extend your views as far as poffible to every thing that has a connexion with it. This practice has many advantages in it; as,

1. It will be a means to fuggeft to your mind proper topics for argument about any propofition that relates to the fame fubject.

2. It will enable you with greater readiness and juftnefs of thought to give an answer to any fudden question upon that fubject, whether it arises in your own mind, or is proposed by others.

3. This will inftruct you to give a plainer and speedier folution of any difficulties that may attend the theme of your difcourfe, and to refute the objections of those who have efpoufed a contrary opinion.

4. By fuch a large furvey of the whole fubject in all its properties and relations, you will be better fecured from

inconfiftencies, that is, from afferting or denying any thing in one place, which contradicts what you have afferted or denied in another: And to attain thefe ends, an extenfivenefs of understanding, and a large memory, are of unfpeakable fervice.

One would be ready to wonder fometimes how eafily great and wife and learned men are led into affertions in fome parts of the fame treatife, which are found to be fcarce confiftent with what they have afferted in other places: But the true reafon is, the narrowness of the mind of man, that it cannot take in all the innumerable properties and relations of one fubject with a single view; and therefore, whilft they are intent on one particular part of their theme, they bend all their force of thought to prove or difprove fome propofition that relates to that part, without a fufficient attention to the confequences which may flow from it, and which may unhappily effect another part of the fame fubject; and by this mean they are fometimes led to fay things which are inconsistent. In fuch a cafe, the great dealers in difpute and controverfy take pleasure to caft nonfenfe and felf-contradiction on their antagonift, with huge and hateful reproaches. For my part, I rather choose to pity human nature, whose neceffary narrowness of understanding expofes us all to fome degrees of this frailty. But the most extenfive furvey poffible of our whole fubject is the best remedy against it. It is our judging and arguing upon a partial view of things, that expofes us to mistakes, and pushes us into abfurdities, or at least to the very borders of them.

RULE III "In fearching the knowledge of things, always keep the precife point of the prefent queftion in your eye. Take heed that you add nothing to it while you are arguing, nor omit any part of it." Watch carefully left any new ideas flide in to mingle themselves either with the fubject or the predicate. See that the question be not altered by the ambiguity of any word taken in different fenfes; nor let any fecret prejudices of your own, or the fophiftical arts of others, cheat your underftanding by changing the question, or fhuffling in any thing else in its room.

And for this end it is useful to keep the precise matter of inquiry as fimple as may be, and difengaged from a com, plication of ideas, which do not neceffarily belong to it. By admitting a complication of ideas, and taking too many things at once into one question, the mind is fometimes dazzled and bewildered; and the truth is loft in fuch a variety and confufion of ideas; whereas, by limiting and narrowing the queftion, you take a fuller furvey of the whole of it.

By keeping the fingle point of inquiry in our conftant view, we shall be fecured from fudden, rafh, and impertinent refponfes and determinations, which fome have ob truded instead of folutions and folid anfwers, before they perfectly knew the questions.

RULE IV. "When you have exactly confidered the precife point of inquiry, or what is unknown in the quef tion, then confider what, and how much you know alrea dy of this question, or of the ideas and terms of which it. is compofed." It is by a comparison of the known and unknown parts of the queftion together that you find what reference the part known hath unto, or what connexion it hath with the thing that is fought: Thofe ideas, whereby the known and unknown parts of the queftion are con nected, will furnish you with middle terms or arguments whereby the thing propofed may be proved or difproved.

Some

In this part of your work, namely, comparing ideas together, take due time, and be not too hafty to come to a determination, especially in points of importance. men, when they fee a little agreement or difagreement between ideas, they prefume a great deal, and fo jump into the conclufion: This is a fhort way to fancy, opinion and conceit, but a most unsafe and uncertain way to true knowledge and wisdom.

RULE V. "In choofing your middle terms or arguments to prove any question, always take fuch topics as are fureft, and leaft fallible, and which carry the greatest evidence and strength with them." Be not fo folicitous about the number, as the weight of your arguments, efpecially in proving any propofition which admits of natural certainty, or of complete demonftration. Many times we do injury to a caufe by dwelling upon trifling

arguments. We amuse our hearers with uncertainties, by multiplying the number of feeble reasonings, before we mention those which are more fubftantial, conclufive, and convincing. And too often we yield up our affent to mere probable arguments, where certain proofs may be obtained.

Yet it must be confeffed, there are many cafes wherein the growing numbers of probable arguments increases the degree of probability, and gives a great and fufficient confirmation to the truth which is fought; as,

(1.) When we are inquiring the true fenfe of any word or phrafe, we are more confirmed in the fignification of it, by finding the fame expreffion fo ufed in feveral authors, or in feveral places of the fame author.

(2.) When we are fearching out the true meaning or opinion of any writer, or inquiring into any facred doctrine of fcripture, we come to a furer determination of the truth by feveral diftinct places wherein the fame thing is expreffed or plainly implied; because it is not so probable that an honest skilful reader should mistake the meaning of the writer in many places, as he may in one or two.. (3.) When we would prove the importance of any fcriptural doctrine or duty, the multitude of texts wherein it is repeated and inculcated upon the reader, feems naturally to inftruct us that it is a matter of greater importance than other things which are but flightly or fingly mentioned in the Bible.

(4.) In fearching out matters of fact in times paft or in diftant places, in which cafe moral evidence is fuffi. cient, and moral certainty is the utmost which can be attained, here we derive a greater affurance of the truth of it by a number of perfons, or a multitude of circumstances concurring to bear witness to it.

(5.) From many experiments in natural philosophy we more fafely infer a general theorem, than we can from

one or two.

(6.) In matters which require prefent practice, both facred and civil, we must content ourselves oftentimes with a mere preponderation of probable reasons or arguWhere there are feveral reasons on each fide, for

ments.

and against a thing that is to be done or omitted, a small argument added to the heap may juftly turn the balance on one fide, and determine the judgment, as I have noted. in the Second Part of Logic.

To conclude: A growing acquaintance with matters of learning, and a daily improvement of our underftandings in affairs human and divine, will beft teach us to judge and distinguish in what cafes the number of arguments adds to their weight and force: It is only experience can fully inform us when we must be determined by probable topics, and when we muft feek and expect demonstrations.

RULE VI. "Prove your conclution (as far as poffible) by fome propofitions that are in themfelves more plain, evident, and certain, than the conclufion; or at leaft fuch as are more known, and more intelligible to the perfon whom you would convince." "If we fhall neglect this rule, we shall endeavour to enlighten that which is ob fcure by fomething equally or more obfcure, and to con firm that which is doubtful by fomething equally or more uncertain. Common fenfe dictates to all men, that it is impoffible to establish any truth, and to convince others of it, but by fomething that is better known to them than that truth is.

RULE VII. "Labour in all your arguings to enlighten the understanding, as well as to conquer and captivate the judgment." Argue in fuch a manner as may give a natural, diftinct, and folid knowledge of things to your hearers, as well as to force their affent by a mere proof of the question. Now, to attain this end, the chief topic or medium of your demonftration fhould be fetched, as much as poffible, from the nature of the thing to be proved, or from those things which are most naturally connected with it.

Geometricians fometimes break this rule without necef fity, two ways, namely,

1. When they prove one propofition only by fhewing that abfurdities will follow if the contradictory propofition be fuppofed or admitted: This is called Reductio ad ab