fides in every member, which is but the fame thing in other words. Or, if a Papist should pretend to prove that bis religion is the only catholic religion; and is derived from Chrift and his apoftles, because it agrees with the doctrine of all the fathers of the church, all the holy martyrs, and all the Chrif tian world throughout all ages: Whereas this is the great point in contest, whether their religion does agree with. that of all the ancient and the primitive Christians, or

not.

III. That fort of fallacy which is called a circle, is very near akin to the petitio principii; as when one of the premises in a fyllogifm is queftioned and oppofed, and we intend to prove it by the conclufion: Or, when in a train of fyllogifms we prove the laft by recurring to what was the conclufion of the first: The Papifts are famous at this fort of fallacy, when they prove the scriptures to be the word of God by the authority or infallible testimony of their church; and when they are called to fhew the infallible authority of their church, they pretend to prove it by the fcriptures.

IV. The next kind of fophifm is called non caufa procaufa, or the affignation of a falfe caufe. This the Peripatetic philofophers were guilty of continually; when they told us that certain beings, which they called fubftantial forms, were the fprings of colour, motion, vegetation, and the various operations of natural beings in the ani mate and inanimate world; when they informed us that Nature was terribly afraid of a vacuum, and that this was the caufe why the water would not fall out of a long tube if it was turned upfide down: The moderns as well as the ancients fall often into this fallacy, when they pofitively affign the reafons of natural appearances, without fufficient experiments to prove them.

Aftrologers are overrun with this fort of fallacies, and they cheat the people grofly, by pretending to tell fortunes, and to deduce the caufe of the various occurrences in the lives of men from the various pofitions of the ftars and planets, which they call afpects.

When comets and eclipfes of the fun and moon are conftrued to fignify the fate of princes, the revolution of

states, famine, wars and calamities of all kinds, it is a fallacy that belongs to this rank of fophifms.

There is fcarce any thing more common in human life than this fort of human argument. If any two accidental events happen to concur, one is presently made the cause of the other. If Titius wronged his neighbour of a guinea, and in fix months after he fell down and broke his leg, weak men will impute it to the divine vengeance on Titius for his former injustice. This fophifm was found alfo in the early days of the world: For, when holy Job was furrounded with uncommon miseries, his own friends inferred,that he was a moft heinous criminal, and charged him with aggravated guilt as the cause of his calamities; though God himself by a voice from heaven folved this uncharitable fophifm, and cleared his fervant Job of that charge.

How frequent is it among men to impute crimes to wrong perfons? We too often charge that upon the wicked contrivance and premeditated malice of a neighbour, which arofe merely form ignorance, or from unguarded temper. And, on the other hand, when we have a mind to excufe ourselves, we practise the fame fophifm, and charge that upon our inadvertence or our ignorance, which perhaps was defigned wickedness. What is really done by a neceffity of circumftances, we fometimes impute to choice. And again, we charge that upon neceffity which was really defired and chofen.

Sometimes a perfon acts out of judgment, in oppofition to his inclination; another perfon perhaps acts the fame thing out of inclination, and against his judgment. It is hard for us to determine with affurance, what are the inward fprings and fecret caufes of every man's conduct; and therefore we fhould be cautious and flow in paffing a judgment where the cafe is not exceeding evident; and if we fhould mistake, let it rather be on the charitable, than on the cenforious fide.

It is the fame fophifm that charges mathematical learning with leading the minds of men to fcepticism and infidelity, and as unjustly accufes the new philofophy of paving the way to herefy and fchifm. Thus the reformation from Popery has been charged with the murder and

blood of millions, which in truth is to be imputed to the tyranny of the princes and the priests, who would not fuffer the people to reform their fentiments and their prac tices according to the word of God. Thus Chriftianity in the primitive ages was charged by the Heathens with all the calamities which befel the Roman empire, because the Christians renounced the heathen gods and idols.

The way to relieve ourselves from thofe fophifms, and to fecure ourselves from the danger of falling into them, is an honest and diligent inquiry into the real nature and caufes of things, with a conftant watchfulness against all thofe prejudices that might warp the judgment afide from truth in that inquiry.

V. The next is called fallacia accidentis, or a fophifm wherein we pronounce concerning the nature and effential properties of any subject according to fomething which is merely accidental to it. This is akin to the former, and is alfo very frequent in human life. So if opium or the Peruvian bark has been used imprudently or unfuccessfully, whereby the patient has received injury, fome weaker people abfolutely pronounce against the use of the bark or opium upon all occafions whatfoever, and are ready to call them poison. So wine has been the accidental occafion of drunkennefs and quarrels ; learning and printing may have been the accidental cause of sedition in a state; the reading of the bible, by accident has been used to promote herefies or deftructive errors; and for thefe reafons they have been all pronounced evil things. Mahomet forbade his followers the ufe of wine; the Turks difcourage learning in their dominions; and the Papifts forbid the fcriptures to be read by the laity. But how very unreaf onable are thefe inferences, and thefe prohibitions which are built upon them!

VI. The next fophifm borders upon the former; and that is, when we argue from that which is true in particular circumstances, to prove the fame thing true abfolutely, fimply, and abstracted from all circumftances; this is called in the schools a fophifm a dicto fecundum quid ad dictum fimpliciter; as, That which is bought in the fhambles is eaten for dinner; Raw meat is bought in the fhambles; therefore raw meat is eaten for dinner. Or thus, Livy writes fables and

improbabilities when he defcribes prodigies and owens; therefore Livy's Roman history is never to be believed in any thing. Or thus, There may be fome mistakes of transcribers in fome part of the fcriptures; therefore fcripture alone is not a safe guide for our faith.

This fort of fophifm has its reverfe alfo ; as when we argue from that which is true fimply and abfolutely, to prove the fame thing true in all particular circumstances whatsoever;* as if a traitor fhould argue from the fixth commandment, Thou shalt not kill a man, to prove that he himself ought not to be hanged: Or if a madman should tell me, I ought not to withhold his fword from him, because no man ought to withhold the property of another.

Thefe two laft fpecies of fophifms are eafily folved, by fhewing the difference betwixt things in their abfolute nature, and the fame things furrounded with peculiar circumstances, and confidered in regard to fpecial times, places, perfons and occafions; or by fhewing the difference between a moral and a metaphyfical univerfality,and that the propofition will hold good in one cafe, but not in the other.

VII. The fophifms of compofition and divifion come next to be mentioned.

The fophifm of compofition, is when we infer any thing concerning ideas in a compound fenfe, which is only true in a divided fenfe. And when it is faid in the gospel that Chrift made the blind to fee, and the deaf to hear, and the lame to walk, we ought not to infer hence that Christ performed contradictions; but those who were blind before, were made to fee, and those who were deaf before, were made to hear, &c. So when the fcripture affures us, The worst of finners may be faved; it fignifies only, that they who have been the worst of finners may repent and be faved, not that they fhall be faved in their fins. Or if any one should argue thus, Two and three are even and odd; Five are two and three; therefore five are even and odd.

This is arguing from a moral univerfality, which admits of fome exceptions, in the fame manner as may be argued from metaphysical or a natural universality, which admits of no exception.

Here that is very falfely inferred concerning two and three in union, which is only true of them divided.

The fophifm of divifion, is when we infer the fame thing concerning ideas in a divided fenfe, which is only true in a compounded fenfe ; as, if we should pretend to prove that every foldier in the Grecian army put an hundred thouf and Perfians to flight, because the Grecian foldiers did fo. Or if a man should argue thus, Five is one number; Two and three are five; therefore two and three are one number.

This fort of fophifm is committed when the word All' is taken in a collective and a diftributive fense, without a due diftinction; as, if any one should reason thus; All the mufical inftruments of the Ferwifh temple made a noble concert ; The harp was a musical inftrument of the Jewish temple; therefore the harp made a noble concert. Here the word All in the major is collective, whereas fuch a conclufion requires that the word All fhould be distributive.

It is the fame fallacy when the univerfal word All-or No refers to fpecies in one propofition, and to individuals' in another; as, All animals were in Noahs Ark ; therefore No animals perifhed in the flood: whereas in the premise all' animals fignifies every kind of animals, which does not ex. clude or deny the drowning of a thousand individuals.

VIII. The laft fort of fophifm arifes from our abufe of the ambiguity of words, which is the largest and most extenfive kind of fallacy; and indeed feveral of the former fallacies might be reduced to this head.

When the words or phrafes are plainly equivocal, they are called fophifms of equivocation; as, if we fhould argue thus: He that fends forth a book into the light, defires it to be read; He that throws a book into the fire, fends it into the light; therefore He that throws a book into the fire defires it to be

read.

This fophifm, as well as the foregoing, and all of the like nature, are folved by fhewing the different fenfes of the words, terms or phrafes. Here light in the major propofition fignifies the public view of the world; in the minor it fignifies the brightness of flame and fire; and therefore the fyllogifm has four terms, or rather, it has no middle term, and proves nothing.

But where fuch grofs equivocations and ambiguities appear in arguments, there is little danger of impofing up.