place to place, and a fpring of life within themselves, as beafts, birds, fishes, and infects; these are called animals. Other animated fubftances are called vegetables, which have within themselves the principles of another fort of life and growth, and of various productions of leaves, flowers, and fruit, fuch as we see in plants, herbs, and trees.

And there are other substances, which are called inanimate, because they have no fort of life in them, as earth, stone, air, water, &c.

There is alfo one fort of fubftance or being, which is compounded of body and mind, or a rational spirit united to an animal; fuch is mankind. Angels, or any other beings of the fpiritual and invifible world, who have affumed visible shapes for a feafon, can hardly be reckoned among this order of compounded beings; because they drop their bodies, and diveft themselves of those visible fhapes, when their particular meffage is performed, and thereby fhew that these bodies do not belong to their na

tures..

SECT. III.

OF MODES, AND THEIR VARIOUS KINDS, AND FIRST OF ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL MODES.

THE next fort of objects which are represented

in our ideas, are called modes or manners of being.*

A mode is that which cannot fubfist in and of itself, but is always efteemed as belonging to, and fubfifting by the help of fome fubftance, which for that reafon is called its fubject. A mode must depend on that fubftance for its very existence and being; and that not as a being depends on its caufe, (for fo fubftances themfelves depend on GoD

......

Note... The term mode is by fome authors applied chiefly to the re lations, or relative manners of being. But, in logical treatises, it is often used in a larger fenfe, and extends to all attributes whatsoever, and includes the most effential and inward properties, as well as outward refpects and relations, and reaches to actions themselves, as well as manners of action..

their Creator ;), but the very being of a mode depends on fome fubftance for its fubject, in which it is, or to which it belongs; fo motion, shape, quantity, weight, are modes of the body; knowledge, wit, folly, love, doubting, judging, are modes of the mind; for the one cannot fubfift without body, and the other cannot fubfift without mind.

Modes have their several divifions, as well as substances. I. Modes are either effential or accidental.

An effential mode or attribute, is that which belongs to the very nature or effence of the fubject wherein it is; and the fubject can never have the fame nature without it; fuch is roundness in a bowl, hardness in a stone, softness in water, vital motion in an animal, folidity in matter, thinking. in a fpirit; for, though that piece of wood which is now a bowl may be made square, yet, if roundness be taken away, it is no longer a bowl: So that very flesh and bones, which is now an animal, may be without life or inward motion; but, if all motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an animal, but a carcafs: So, if a body or matter be divested of folidity, it is a mere void space, or nothing; and, if spirit be entirely without thinking, I have no idea of any thing that is left in it; therefore, fo far as I am able to judge, confcioufnefs must be its effential attribute. Thus all the perfections of GOD are called his attributes, for he cannot be without them.

An effential mode is either primary or fecondary,

A primary effential mode is the first or chief thing that conftitutes any being in its particular effence or nature, and makes it to be that which it is, and diftinguishes it from all other beings: This is called the difference in the definition of things; of which hereafter: So roundness is the primary effential mode or difference of a bowl; the meeting of two lines is the primary effential mode, or the difference of an angle; the perpendicularity of these lines to each other

*Note... When I call folid extenfion an effential mode or attribue of matter, and a power of thinking an effential mode or attribute of a pirit, I do it in compliance with common forms of speech: But perhaps in reality thefe are the very effences or fubftances themselves, and the most fubftantial ideas that we can form of body and fpirit, and have no need of any (we know not what) fubftratum, or uninteligib! substance to support them in their existence or being.

is the difference of a right angle: Solid extenfion is the pri mary attribute or difference of matter: Confcioufnefs, or at leaft a power of thinking, is the difference or primary attribute of a fpirit; and to fear and love God is the primary attribute of a pious man,

A fecondary effential mode is any other attribute of a thing which is not of primary confideration: This is called a property. Sometimes indeed it goes towards making up the effence, efpecially of a complex being, fo far as we are acquainted with it; fometimes it depends upon, and fol lows from the effence of it; fo, volubility, or aptnefs to roll, is the property of a bowl, and is derived from its roundnefs. Mobility, and figure, or shape are properties of matter; and it is the property of a pious man to love his neighbour.

An accidental mode, or an accident, is such a mode as is not necessary to the being of a thing, for the fubject may be without it, and yet remain of the fame nature that it was before, or it is that mode which may be feparated or abolished from its fubject: So, fmoothness or roughness, black nefs or whiteness, motion or reft, are the accidents of a bowl; for these may be all changed, and yet the body remain a bowl ftill: Learning, juftice, folly, fickness, health, are the accidents of a man: Motion, fquareness, or any particular fhape or fize, are the accidents of body: Yet, fhape and fize, in general, are effential modes of it; for a body must have fome fize and shape; nor can it be without them: So, hope, fear, wifhing, affenting, and doubting, are accidents of the mind, though thinking in general feems to be effential to it.

Here observe, that the name of accident has been oftentimes given by the old Peripatetic philofophers to all modes, whether effential or accidental; but the moderns confine this word accident to the sense in which I have deEcribed it.

Here it should be noted alfo, that, though the word property be limited fometimes, in logical treatifes, to the fecondary effential mode, yet it is ufed in common language to finify thefe four forts of modes; of which fome are effentia, and fome accidental.

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See preceding Note,

1. Such as belong to every subject of that kind, but not only to thofe fubjects. So, yellow colaur, and ductility, are properties of gold; they belong to all gold, but not only to gold; for faffron is alfo yellow, and lead is ductile.

2. Such as belong only to one kind of subject, but not to every fubject of that kind. So, learning, reading, and writing, are properties of human nature; they belong only to man, but not to all men.

3. Such as belong to every fubject of one kind, and only to them, but not always. So, fpeech or language is a property of man, for it belongs to all men, and to men only; but men are not always fpeaking.

4. Such as belong to every fubject of one kind, and to them only and always. So, shape and divifibility are properties of body; fo omniscience and omnipotence are properties of divine Nature; for in this sense properties and attributes are the fame; and, except in logical treatises, there is fcarce any distinction made between them. These are called propria quarto modo in the schools, or properties of the jourth fort.

Note.... Where there is any one property or effential attribute fo fuperior to the reft, that it appears plainly that all the rest are derived from it, and fuch as is fufficient to give a full diftinction of that fubject from all other fubjects, this attribute or property is called the effential difference, as is before declared; and we commonly fay, the effence of the thing confifts in it; fo the effence of matter in general feems to confift in folidity, or falid extenfion. But, for the most part, we are fo much at a lofs in finding out the intimate effence of particular natural bodies, that we are forced to distinguish the essential difference of moft things by a combination of properties. So a Sparrow is a bird which has fuch coloured feathers, and fuch a particular fize, fhape and motion. So wormwood is an herb which has fuch a leaf of fuch a colour, and fhape, and taste, and such a root and ftalk. So beafts and fishes, minerals, metals, and works of art fometimes, as well as of nature, are distin guifhed by fuch a collection of properties.

SECT. IV.

THE FARTHER DIVISIONS OF MODE.

THE fecond divifion of Modes is into abfolute

;

and relative. An abfolute mode is that which belongs to its fubject, without refpect to any other beings whatsoever : But a relative mode is derived from the regard that one being has to others. So roundness and smoothness are the abfolute modes of a bowl; for, if there were nothing else exting in the whole creation, a bowl might be round and Smooth: But greatnefs and fmallness are relative modes for the very ideas of them are derived merely from the comparison of one being with others: A bowl of four inches diameter is very great compared with one of an inch and a half; but it is very fmall in comparison of another bowl whofe diameter is eighteen or twenty inches. Motion is the abfolute mode of a body, but fwiftness or flowness are relative ideas; for the motion of a bowl on a bowlinggreen is fwift when compared with a fnail; and it is flow when compared with a cannon-bullet.

Thefe relative modes are largely treated of by fome logical and mataphyfical writers, under the name of relations: And these relations themselves are farther fubdivided into fuch as arife from the nature of things, and fuch as arife merely from the operation of our minds; one fort are called real relations, the other mental; fo the likeness of one egg to another is a real relation, because it arifes from the real nature of things; for, whether there was any man or mind to conceive it or not, one egg would be like another: But, when we confider an egg as a noun fubftantive in grammar, or as fignified by the letters egg, these are mere mental relations, and derive their very nature from the mind of man. Thefe fort of relations are called by the schools entia rationis, or fecond notions, which have no real being, but depend entirely on the operation of the mind,

III. The third divifion of modes fhew us they are either intrinfical, or extrinsical. Intrinsical modes are con