14. If any doctrine hath very strong and fufficient light and evidence to command our affent, we should not reject it because there is an objection or two against it which we are not able to anfwer; for, upon this foot a common Chriftian would be baffled out of every article of his faith, and must renounce even the dictates of his reafon and his fenfes; and the most learned man perhaps would hold but very few of them faft: For fome objections which attend the facred doctrine of the eternity and the omniprefence of God, and the philofophical doctrines of light, atoms, space, motion, &c. are hardly folvable to this day.

15. Where two extremes are propofed, either in matters of fpeculation or practice, and neither of them has certain and convincing evidence, it is generally fafeft to take the middle way. Moderation is more likely to come near the truth than doubtful extremes. This is an excellent rule to judge of the characters and value of the greateft part of perfons and things; for nature feldom deals in fuperlatives. It is a good rule alfo by which to form our judgment in many fpeculative controverfies; a reconciling medium in fuch cafes does often best secure truth as well as peace.

16, When two different propofitions have each a very ftrong and cogent evidence, and do not plainly appear inconfiftent, we may believe both of them, though we cannot at prefent fee the way to reconcile them. Reason, as well as our own confciousness, affure us, that the will of man is free, and that multitudes of human actions are in that refpect contingent; and yet reafon and fcripture affure us, that God foreknows them all; and this implies a certain fatality. Now, though learned men have not to this day hit on any fo clear and happy method as is defired to reconcile thefe propofitions, yet fince we do not fee a plain inconfiftency in them, we juftly believe them both, because their evidence is great.

17. Let us not therefore too fuddenly determine in difficult matters, that two things are utterly inconsistent :: For there are many propofitions which may appear inconfiftent at first, and yet afterwards we find their confiftency, and the way of reconciling them may be made plain and eafy: As alfo, there are other propofitions

which r

may appear confiftent at firft, but after due examination we find their inconfiftency.

18. For the fame reason, we should not call those diffi culties utterly infolvable, or thofe objections unanswer able, which we are not prefently able to anfwer: Time and diligence may give farther light.

19. In fhort, if we will fecure ourselves from error, we should not be too frequent or hafty in afferting the certain confiftency or inconfiftency, the abfolute univerfality, neceffity, or impoffibility of things, where there is not the brightest evidence. He is but a young and raw philofopher, who, when he fees two particular ideas evidently agree, immediately, afferts them to agree univerfal ly, to agree neceffarily, and that it is impoffible it should be otherwife. Or when he fees evidently that two parti cular ideas happen to disagree, he presently afferts their conftant and natural inconfiftency, their utter impoffibility of agreement, and calls every thing contrary to his opinion abfurdity and nonfenfe. A true philofopher will affirm or deny with much caution and modefty, unless he has thoroughly examined and found the evidence of every part of his affertion exceeding plain..

20. Let us have a care of building our affurance of any important point of doctrine upon one fingle argument if there are more to be obtained. We fhould not flight and reject all other arguments which fupport the fame doctrine, left if our favorite argument should be refuted, and fail us, we should be tempted to abandon that impor. tant principle of truth. I think this was a very culpable practice in Defcartes, and fome of his followers, who, when he had found out the argument for the existence of God, derived from the idea of a moft perfect and self-ex iftent being, he seemed to defpife and abandon all other arguments against Atheism.

21. If we happen to have our chief arguments for any opinion refuted, we fhould not immediately give up the opinion itself; for perhaps it may be a truth ftill, and we may find it to be justly fupported by other arguments, which we might once think weaker, or perhaps by new arguments which we knew not before.

22. We ought to esteem that to be fufficient evidence

of a propofition, where both the kind and the force of the arguments or proofs are as great as the nature of the thing admits, and as the neceffity or exigence of the cafe requires. So, if we have a credible and certain teftimony that Chrift rose from the dead, it is enough; we are not to expect mathematical or ocular demonstration for it; at least in our day.

23. Though we should feek what proofs may be at tained of any propofition, and we should receive any number of arguments which are just and evident for the confirmation of the fame truth, yet we must not judge of the truth of any propofition by the number of arguments which are brought to fupport it, but by the ftrength and weight of them: A building will stand firmer and longer on four large pillars of marble, than on ten of fand, or earth, or timber.

24. Yet where certain evidence is not to be found or expected, a confiderable number of probable arguments carry great weight with them even in matters of fpeculation. That is a probable hypothefis in philofophy or in theology, which goes fartheft toward the folution of maBy difficult questions arifing on any fubject.

SECT. III.

PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF JUDGMENT IN MATTERS OF MORALITY AND RELIGION,

HERE

ERE it may be proper, in the first place, to

mention a few definitions of words or terms.

By matters of morality and religion, I mean those things which relate to our duty to God, ourselves, or our fellow

creatures.

Moral good, or virtue, or holiness, is an action or temper conformable to the rule of our duty. Moral evil, or vice, or fin, is an action or temper unconformable to the rule of our duty, or a neglect to fulfil it.

Note.... The words vice or virtue, chiefly imply the relasion of our actions to men and this world. Sin and ho

linefs, rather imply their relation to God and the other world.

Natural good is that which gives us pleasure or fatisfaction. Natural evil is that which gives us pain or grief. Happiness confifts in the attainment of the highest and moft lafting natural good. Mifery confifts in fuffering the highest and most lasting natural evil; that is in short, heaven or hell.

Though this be a juft account of perfect happiness and perfect misery, yet wherefoever pain overbalances pleasure, there is a degree of mifery; and wherefoever pleasure overbalances pain, there is a degree of happiness.

I proceed now to lay down fome principles and rules of judgment in matters of morality and religion.

1. The will of our Maker, whether discovered by reason or revelation, carries the highest authority with it, and is therefore the highest rule of duty to intelligent creatures; a conformity or nonconformity to it determines their ac tions to be morally good or evil.

2. Whatsoever is really an immediate duty toward ourselves, or toward our fellow-creatures, is more remotely a duty to God; and therefore in the practice of it we should have an eye to the will of God as our rule, and to his glory as our end.

3. Our wife and gracious Creator has closely united our duty and our happiness together; and has connected fin, or vice, and punishment; that is, he has ordained that the highest natural good and evil, should have a close connection with moral good and evil, and that both in the nature of things, and by his own pofitive appointment.

4. Confcience fhould feek all due information, in order to determine what is duty, and what is fin, because happiness and mifery depend upon it.

5. On this account our inclination to prefent temporal good, and our averfion to present temporal evil, must be wifely overbalanced by the confideration of future and eternal good or evil, that is, happiness or misery. And for this reafon we should not omit a duty, or commit a fin, to gain any temporal good, or to avoid any temporal evil.

6. Though our natural reafon in a state of innocence

might be fufficient to find out those duties which were neceffary for an innocent creature, in order to abide in the favour of his Maker, yet in a fallen state, our natural reafon is by no means fufficient to find out all that is neceffary to restore a finful creature to the divine favour.

7. Therefore God hath condefcended in various ages of mankind, to reveal to finful men what he requires of them in order to their restoration, and has appointed in his word fome peculiar matters of faith and practice, in order to their falvation. This is called revealed religion, as the things knowable concerning God and our duty by the light of nature are called natural religion.

8. There are also many parts of morality and natural religion, or many natural duties relating to God, to ourfelves, and to our neighbours, which would be exceeding difficult and tedious for the bulk of mankind to find out and determine by natural reason; therefore it has pleased .God, in this facred book of divine revelation, to exprefs the most necessary duties of this kind in a very plain and eafy manner, and make them intelligible to fouls of the lowest capacity; or they may be very easily derived thence by the use of reason.

9. As there are fome duties much more neceffary, and more important than others are, fo every duty requires our application to understand and practice it in proportion to its neceffity and importance.

10. Where two duties feem to stand in oppofition to each other, and we cannot practice both, the lefs must give way to the e greater, and the cmiffion of the less is not finful. So ceremonial laws give way to moral: God will have mercy and not facrifice.

11. In duties of natural religion, we may judge of the different degrees of their neceffity and importance by reafon, according to their greater or more apparent tendency to the honour of God, and the good of men: But in matters of revealed religion, it is only divine revelation can certainly inform us what is moft neceffary and most important; yet we may be affifted also in that fearch by the exercises of reafon.

12. In actions wherein there may be fome fcruple about the duty or lawfulness of them, we should choose always

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