Now, the Art of Logic is compofed of thofe obfervations and rules which men have made about these four operations of the mind, perception, judgment, reafoning, and dif pofition, in order to affift and improve them.

I. Perception, conception, or apprehenfion, is the mere fimple contemplation of things offered to our minds, without affirming or denying any thing concerning them. So we conceive or think of a horfe, a tree, high, fwift, flow, animal, time, motion, matter, mind, life, death, &c. The form under which these things appear to the mind, or the refult of our conception or apprehenfion, is called an idea.

II. Judgment is that operation of the mind whereby we join two or more ideas together by one affirmation or negation; that is, we either affirm or deny this to be that. So This tree is high; That horfe is not fwift; The mind of man is a thinking being; Mere matter has no thought belonging to it; God is juft; Good men are often miferable in this world; A righteous governor will make a difference betwixt the evil and the good; which fentences are the effect of judgment, and are called propofitions.

III. Argumentation or reafoning is that operation of the mind, whereby we infer one thing, that is, one propofition from two or more propofitions premifed. Or, it is the drawing a conclufion, which before was either unknown, or dark, or doubtful, from fome propofitions which are more known and evident. So, when we have judged that matter cannot think, and that the mind of man doth think, we then infer and conclude, that therefore the mind of man is not

matter.

So we judge, that a juft governor will make a difference between the evil and the good; we judge alfo, that God is a juft governor; and from thence we conclude, that God will make a difference between the evil and the good.

This argumentation may be carried on farther: Thus, God will one time or another make a difference between the good and the evil: But there is little or no difference made in this world: Therefore there must be another world wherein this difference fhall be made.

These inferences or conclufions are the effects of reasoning; and the three propofitions, taken all together, are all called a fyllogifm or argument.

IV. Difpofition is that operation of the mind, whereby we put the ideas, propofitions, and arguments, which we have formed concerning one fubject, into fuch an order as is fitteft to gain the cleareft knowledge of it, to retain it longeft, and to explain it to others in the best manner : Or, in short, it is the ranging of our thoughts in such order as is beft for our own and others conception and memory. The effect of this operation is called method. This very defcription of the four operations of the mind and their ef fects, in this order, is an instance or example of method.

Now, as the art of logic affifts our conceptions, fo it gives us a large and comprehenfive view of the fubjects we inquire into, as well as a clear and diftinct knowledge of them. As it regulates our judgment and our reasoning, fo it fecurès us from mistakes, and gives us a true and certain knowledge of things; and, as it furnishes us with method, fo it makes our knowledge of things both eafy and regular, and guards our thoughts from confufion.

Logic is divided into four parts, according to these four operations of the mind, which it directs, and therefore we fhall treat of it in this order.

THE

First part of Logic.

OF PERCEPTIONS AND IDEAS.

THE first part of Logic contains obfervations and precepts about the first operation of the mind, perception or conception: And, fince all our knowledge, how wide and large foever it grow, is founded upon our concep. tion and ideas, here we fhall confider,

1. The general Nature of them.

2. The Objects of our Conception, or the Archetypes or Patterns of these Ideas.

3. The feveral Divifions of them:

4.

5.

The Words and Terms whereby our Ideas are expreffed
General Directions about our Ideas.

6. Special Rules to Direct our Conceptions.

CHAP. I.

OF THE NATURE OF IDEAS.

FIRST, the nature of conception or percep

tion fhall just be mentioned,* though this may feem to belong to another science rather than Logic.

Perception is that act of the mind, (or, as fome philofophers call it,) rather a passion or impreffion, whereby the mind becomes confcious of any thing; as, when I feel hunger, thirst, or cold, or heat; when I see a horse, a tree,

......

*Note....The words conception and perception are often used promifcuoufly, as I have done here, because I would not embarrass a learner with too many distinctions; but, if I were to distinguish them, I would say, perception is the consciousness of an object when present; conception is the forming an idea of the object, whether present or absent.

or a man ; when I hear a human voice, or thunder, I am confcious of these things, and this is called perception. If I study, meditate, wish, or fear, I am confcious of thefe inward acts alfo, and my mind perceives its own thoughts, wishes, fears, &c.

An idea is generally defined a reprefentation of a thing in the mind; it is a representation of fomething that we have feen, felt, heard, &c. or been confcious of. That notion, or form of a horse, a tree, or a man, which is in the mind, is called the idea of a horfe, a tree, or a man.

That notion of hunger, cold, found, colour, thought, or wifh, or fear, which is in the mind, is called the idea of hunger, cold, found, wifh, &c.

It is not the outward object, or thing which is perceived, namely, the horse, the man, &c. nor is it the very percep tion or fenfe, and feeling, namely, of hunger, or cold, &c. which is called the idea; but it is the thing as it exifts in the mind by way of conception or reprefentation, that is properly called the idea, whether the object be present or abfent.

As a horse, a man, a tree, are the outward objects of our perception, and the outward archetypes or patterns of our ideas; fo for our own sensations of hunger,cold,&c.are alfo inward archetypes or patterns of our ideas: But the notions or pictures of these things, as they are confidered, or conceived in the mind, are precisely the ideas, that we have to do with in Logic. To fee a horfe, or to feel cold, is one thing; to think of, and converse about a man, a horse, hunger, or cold, is another.

Among all these ideas, fuch as represent bodies are generally called images, especially if the idea of the fhape be included. Thofe inward reprefentations which we have of fpirit, thought, love, hatred, caufe, effect, &c. are more pure and mental ideas, belonging more especially to the mind, and carry nothing of fhape or fenfe in them. But I fhall ⚫ have occafion to speak more particularly of the original and the distinction of ideas in the third chapter. I proceed therefore now to confider the objects of our ideas.

CHAP. II.

OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION.

SECT. I.

OF BEING IN GENERAL.

THE object of perception is that which is repre

fented in the idea, that which is the archetype or pattern, according to which the idea is formed; and thus judg ments, propofitions, reafons, and long difcourfes, may all become the objects of perception; but in this place we speak chiefly of the first and most fimple objects of it, before they are joined and formed into propofitions or discourses.

Every object of our idea is called a theme, whether it be a being or not-being; for not-being may be proposed to our thoughts, as well as that which has a real being. But, let us first treat of beings, and that in the largest extent of the word.

A being is confidered as poffible, or as actual.

When it is confidered as poffible, it is faid to have an effence or nature; fuch were all things before their creation : When it is confidered as actual, then it is faid to have exiftence alfo; fuch are all things which are created, and God himself the Creator.

Effence, therefore, is but the very nature of any being, whether it be actually exifting or not. A rofe in winter

has an effence, in fummer it has existence alfo.

Note....There is but one Being which includes existence in the very effence of it, and that is Gon, who therefore actually exifts by natural and eternal neceffity; but the actual existence of every creature is very diftinct from its effence, for it may be, or may not be, as GoD pleases.

Again....Every being is confidered either as fubfifting in and by itself, and then it is called a fubftance; or it fubfifts in and by another, and then it is called a mode or manner of being; though few writers allow mode to be called a being in the fame perfect fenfe as a fubftance is; and fome modes have evidently more of real entity or being than others, as will appear when we come to treat of them. Thefe things will furnish us with matter for large difcourfe in the following fections.

B