wieldly; that a relatively small body elected for long terms on some plan of proportional representation to which would be selected those who are familiar with local conditions as well as with some of the essential principles and practices of government administration seems a requirement, if government is to keep pace with the growth of its functions and the increasing complexity of the conditions with which it must deal. It is also realized that governments are acquiring new and more complex functions and that a large part of the time of those connected with the government must now be given to the collection of information, in the form of investigation and research, in order that legislative and adminis trative officers may deal intelligently with the very difficult prob lems that arise.

To meet this situation, the Haldane Report included among the suggested executive departments one on research and information. Perhaps an even better arrangement would be to have research divisions and bureaus connected with all the departments and in proportion to the need of technical assistance and information. In the light of these principles the American theory of the separation of powers appears largely as a device for a policy of inaction-an excellent plan to encourage politicians to escape responsibility and to permit private individuals and corporate organizations to defy public powers with impunity. In the words of a caustic foreign critic, if the desire is to secure an effective check on radical and progressive movements, if the intention is to place corporate organizations in an impregnable position so far as government regulation is concerned, the American theory of the separation of powers is undoubtedly a well-conceived device for this purpose.18 From the standpoint of responsible and efficient government, the separation of powers stands as an obstacle which must be removed if the government of the United States is to make progress along governmental lines and is to be prepared to meet conditions both domestic and foreign.

A large part of this difficulty could be overcome if the President and his cabinet were made directly responsible for the formulation of legislation as respects the administration, and the cabinet

18 See Lambert, op. cit., 224.

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members were free at any time to appear and debate in the houses. It seems necessary, therefore, that an extreme and indefensible separation of powers in the United States, which was largely the result of interpretation, be abandoned in order to make our government more responsible and more efficient. This could be done by a mere general agreement, just as the existing theory is largely based upon the peculiar conception of officers, who were responsible originally for the interpretation and application of our constitutions. Modifications could be made through the simple process of interpretation by which they were engrafted upon early American institutions. The almost universal tendency of European nations to unite to a considerable degree the legislative and executive functions should lead us ultimately to the conclusion that our present system, a disjointed and indirect system of legislative and executive relations, should be revised.

While defects in our present system of separation of powers and lack of ministerial responsibility are apparent, it is significant that we have in our government certain advantages, such as the ready and easy concentration of power in time of war, which the leaders of thought in foreign governments would like to adopt. And the American government need not abandon the essential principles of its separation of powers. Rather should it modify its practices and procedure so as to secure ready and open access of the President and his cabinet members to the houses of Congress, and a more definite correlation of legislation and administration. This can be done without breaking down the essential features of our existing governmental order, which despite its many defects has worked fairly well. It is evident from a comparison of the cabinet and presidential governments, that cabinet government can be improved by the application of principles now made a definite part of the presidential system, and that presidential government can be improved by taking advantage of the well-known practices which have proved so successful in the countries with a cabinet government. Each has advantages which deserve continuance and development. The combination of the features of both plans is apparent in a number of recent constitutions.

Certain tendencies are particularly notable in recent constitutions. Three are marked enough to merit listing: (1) To create a semi-independent executive, but to require ministers to assume responsibility for all important political acts of the President either individually or collectively before the legislative chambers. (2) To give the ministers free access to the legislature to take part in debates, to present measures and, if members of the legislature, to vote. (3) To place upon ministers the duty of preparing the budget, and the responsibility of formulating laws and presenting them to the legislative bodies.

With a few exceptions the tendencies are distinctly in the direction of the adoption of the essential features of cabinet government with such modifications as will leave place for a President and premier each with certain distinct and independent functions. Which of the two, President or premier, will exercise the greater powers will depend to a considerable degree upon the political ⚫ conditions of the country, the personality of those holding the offices and the particular influences at work favorable either to to incabinet or presidential machinery.

But mere palliatives such as the making of the budget by the President and his cabinet, and the combination of executive and legislative powers largely in the same hands, though they may improve the working of existing governmental machinery will only tend to call attention anew to certain obvious facts, namely, that modern representative assemblies are failing in the performance of some of their most important functions, that the present bodies must be radically changed or give way to other forms of political organization, and that the contest to secure and retain representative and responsible governments will require as in past generations constant vigilance and increased interest on the part of political thinkers.

It seems necessary for the consideration of the problems of representative government and ministerial responsibility to bring under criticism certain well-known political ideas and traditions. With regard to the organization of government just as in the field of law, mere tinkering with political forms and organizations will not meet the requirements necessary to adapt political

institutions to modern conditions and tendencies. The leaders in political science will of necessity be required to devote more effort to the preparation of programs of reform and reconstruction involving entirely new procedure and practices and to the campaign for acceptance of these reforms as parts of the governing processes. Such reforms, as is the case with the plans for reorganization of courts fostered by various bar associations, will be adopted slowly. But the need in the field of political science with respect to radical reconstruction, both from the standpoint of legislation and administration, is equally as necessary as constructive reforms in the field of law. Half-way or temporary measures, such as the commission form of government in cities or the plan of administrative consolidation of bureaus, commissions and other administrative agencies in state governments, though they may be serviceable in the direction of more effective administration, do not remove the fundamental defects in modern government. Nothing short of a new type of legislative body and a very much changed form of executive and administrative organization, with a well worked out plan of correlation between the two departments, will render modern governments competent to meet the exigencies of present political, social, and economic life.

NEW EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONS

IN POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS,

CROATES AND SLOVENES

RALSTON HAYDEN

University of Michigan

In this period during which all political institutions are being tested as never before by the searching criticism of an awakened world and by application to the well-nigh insoluble problems left by the World War, the constitutions which have been developed by the post-war states of Europe possess a peculiar interest to the student of public affairs. They are the results of the conscious effort of the statesmen of these new commonwealths to combine with the historic institutions of their own lands those features of the public law and the political practises of the older democracies which experience has proven to be workable, to be conducive of good government, and to make possible a more or less popular control over affairs of state. The product of a season when democracy is the fashion, all of these instruments are filled with rules and phrases which have a familiar ring in American ears, despite a more than occasional Gallic or native accent. As one reads that:

"We, the Czechoslovak Nation, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice and order in the republic, insure the tranquil development of the Czechoslovak homeland, promote the general welfare of all of the citizens of this State and secure the blessings of liberty to future generations, have adopted . . . a Constitution," it is easy to forget that the majority of the people who are to live under the institutions to be established differ as greatly from ourselves in their political background and experience as they do in language and in their picturesque national costumes. Yet the fact is that the seed of Western European